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Is the WTO Passé?†
Kyle Bagwell, Chad P. Bown, and Robert W. Staiger*
The WTO has delivered policy outcomes that are very different from those likely
to emerge out of the recent wave of preferential trade agreements (PTAs). Should
economists see this as an efficient institutional h
 and-off, where the WTO has carried
trade liberalization as far as it can manage, and is now passing the baton to PTAs
to finish the job? We survey a growing economics literature on international trade
agreements and argue on this basis that the WTO is not passé. Rather, and subject to
some c aveats, our survey of research to date suggests that the WTO warrants strong
support while a more cautious view of PTAs seems appropriate. ( JEL F13, F14, K33,
N70)

1.

Introduction

T

ogether with its predecessor the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),
the World Trade Organization (WTO) has
delivered policy outcomes for its member
* Bagwell: Stanford and NBER. Bown: Peterson
Institute for International Economics and the Center for
Economic Policy Research. Staiger: Dartmouth and NBER.
Bagwell thanks the Center for Advanced Studies in the
Behavioral Sciences at Stanford for support and hospitality. Bown thanks the World Bank’s Development Research
Group for its hospitality during the period in which much
of the work on this paper was completed and acknowledges
financial support from the World Bank’s 
Multi-Donor
Trust Fund for Trade and Development. We thank Steven
Durlauf, Douglas Irwin, Nuno Limão, Daniel Trefler, and
six anonymous referees for very useful and detailed comments on an earlier draft. Semira Ahdiyyih provided outstanding research assistance. With minor editorial changes
at the galley stage, this paper corresponds to the draft
as accepted in June 2015.
†
Go to http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jel.20151192 to visit
the article page and view author disclosure statement(s).

governments that are very different from
those likely to emerge out of the recent wave
of preferential trade agreements (PTAs).
Over nearly seventyyears, the GATT/WTO
concluded 
eightrounds of 
multilateral
trade negotiations, reducing the average ad
valorem tariff on industrial goods to below
4 percent and expanding the multilateral system’s membership from 2 3to 1 61economies.
But the GATT/WTO liberalization process
has ground to a halt with the ninth and seemingly moribund Doha Development Round.
Furthermore, the scope of GATT/WTO
liberalization, with its focus on border measures, has mainly been shallow. By contrast,
PTAs have emerged as the vehicle by which
countries reduce their tariffs from current
WTO levels down to zero, albeit on a discriminatory basis: the number of PTAs has
expanded from roughly 100in 1 990to nearly
400today. And the intended scope of PTA
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liberalization, which reaches further and further behind the border, is increasingly deep.1
Should economists see the current state
of affairs as an efficient institutional h
 andoff,
with the GATT/WTO having carried trade
liberalization as far as it could manage, and
now passing the baton to PTAs to finish the
job and help governments arrive at their
international efficiency frontier?  2 And if so,
can PTAs rely on their own systems of dispute resolution to ensure that governments
remain at the frontier? If these questions
can be answered in the affirmative, then
economists could view PTAs as a legitimate
successor to the GATT/WTO and reasonably conclude that “the WTO is passé.” But
there are alternative interpretations of these
developments.
One possibility is that PTAs are indeed
needed to complete or complement the liberalization process and move governments
1 Here and throughout our survey, we focus on international agreements to liberalize market access for traded
goods and services, which for short we refer to as “trade
agreements.” The GATT focused on liberalizing market access for goods and, as we explain further below,
took a shallow integration approach. The WTO’s General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) extended the market-access focus of GATT to trade in services, but GATS
has yet to produce meaningful liberalization (Francois
and Hoekman 2010). The WTO agreements also include
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS), the principal concern of which
is the protection of intellectual property rights, rather
than issues of market access. While distinct from our trade
agreements focus, in the conclusion we briefly discuss a
literature related to the TRIPS agreement in the context of
our discussion of linkage across issue areas in trade agreements. Finally, while we consider the GATT/WTO multilateral agreement in some detail, we do not delve into the
specific details of the individual PTA agreements.
2 By “international efficiency frontier,” we mean policy
choices that could not be adjusted to generate Pareto gains
across countries when each country’s welfare is judged by
the preferences of its government. This focus on government preferences generally follows the literature, though
a distinction is made in some of the literature between
ex ante and ex post government preferences. We discuss
these points further in our survey. Our survey does not
focus on research that assesses the value of trade agreements from the perspective of a specific sector, country or
subset of countries.

to their international efficiency frontier,
but that a central role for dispute resolution
would continue to reside at the WTO. Under
this view, PTAs and the WTO are complementary to an efficient multilateral trading
system, and both deserve support.
More ominously, the current state of
affairs might be seen as ultimate proof that
PTAs are stumbling blocks to the multilateral system. According to this interpretation,
the WTO still has important liberalization
work to do, but it has stalled out short of its
goal because of the existence and ready availability of PTAs. From this perspective, liberalization under the GATT/WTO may have
ground to a halt short of the international
efficiency frontier, but PTAs should be seen
as a root cause of the WTO’s current woes,
rather than its legitimate successor.
A third possibility is that governments
may have already achieved the international
efficiency frontier under the GATT/WTO
liberalization process—or if not yet, they
could achieve it with selective fixes—so that
the WTO is in better shape than it appears;
rather it is the kind of additional liberalization
associated with the recent rise of PTAs that
represents a failure of efficient international
trade policy cooperation. With this interpretation, PTAs are liberalization run amok.
In this paper, we make use of a growing
economics literature on international trade
agreements to sort through these interpretations and suggest answers to the questions
posed above. To facilitate our discussion,
we adopt a simple organizing principle: we
group papers in the literature by their stance
on what makes a trade agreement valuable
to its member governments, that is, by the
nature of the “problem” that a trade agreement is supposed to “solve” for its member
governments. According to this organizing principle, there are four strands of the
literature.
The oldest and most established strand of
the literature is the “terms-of-trade” theory
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of trade agreements. This theory posits that
governments use trade agreements to undo
the policy inefficiencies that are associated
with unilateral policy choices when those
choices can shift the costs of intervention
onto trading partners through movements in
foreign exporter prices (terms of trade). In
this theory, addressing an international externality (which travels through the terms of
trade) is the central purpose of a trade agreement. The “commitment” theory also has a
well-established history in the literature,

but here the central role for an international
externality is absent. Instead, governments
value trade agreements as a way to tie their
hands (make commitments) against their
own lobbies and citizens. The two remaining strands of the literature, what we call
the “delocation/profit shifting” and the “offshoring” theories of trade agreements, are
more recent arrivals. They can be viewed as
attempts to identify new international externalities that go beyond the terms-of-trade
externality to include the local prices in
each country, and that can give rise to and
shape international trade agreements. The
delocation/profit-shifting theory argues that
such n
on-terms-of-trade externalities have
been important for understanding real-world
trade agreements all along, while the offshoring theory suggests that n
 on-terms-of-trade
externalities may only have become prominent with the recent rise of offshoring and
international supply chains.
As might be anticipated, the strength of
the literature’s support for the various interpretations of recent developments depends
on which purposes are central to real-world
trade agreements. While we discuss below
evidence that lends support to all four theories, a growing body of evidence points
to the terms-of-trade theory as central for
understanding the actual trade agreements
that we see. We therefore first evaluate
these developments from the perspective
of the terms-of-trade theory, surveying both
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the theoretical and empirical literature to
assess the various interpretations and establish some initial answers. We then survey
the commitment, delocation/
profit-shifting
and offshoring theories, describing where
they yield different assessments of these
interpretations, and we utilize this description in combination with a survey of the
relevant empirical literature to suggest qualifications to the answers provided by the
terms-of-trade theory.
To preview, the literature we survey does
not support the view that the WTO is passé.
On the contrary, from the perspective of the
terms-of-trade-theory strand of the litera
ture, the WTO appears to be structured in
a way that is likely to encourage policy outcomes that are viewed as efficiency enhancing by WTO member governments, while the
analogous claim for 
PTA-led liberalization
is less clear. The commitment, delocation/
profit-shifting, and offshoring theories do
raise important caveats to unqualified support for the WTO, and there are features of
PTAs that these theories support. But until
more empirical evidence suggests otherwise, these other strands of the literature
do not establish that PTAs, rather than the
WTO, should be entrusted with the rules of
globalization.
To set the stage, we next provide a brief
overview of the main institutional features
of the world trading system, focusing on
the multilateral framework provided by the
GATT/WTO and the current state of PTAs.
Section 3 reviews the terms-of-trade theory
of trade agreements and surveys the empirical literature that relates to its essential tenets.
In sections 4 and 5, we use the terms-of-trade
strand of the literature as a lens through
which to evaluate the GATT/WTO and PTA
approaches to trade liberalization, and from
this perspective we interpret recent developments in the world trading system. Section 6
surveys the literature on the commitment,
delocation/profit-shifting, and offshoring
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theories of trade agreements and identifies
insights from each that suggest qualifications
to the answers provided by the terms-oftrade theory. Section 7 turns to an evaluation
of dispute settlement in the world trading
system. Finally, section 8 concludes, identifies directions for future research, and discusses the possible role of critical mass and
plurilateral agreements in strengthening and
revitalizing the GATT/WTO approach.
2. The World Trading System:
A Brief Overview
Individuals and firms ultimately drive globalization, but governments set the rules of
the game, and the rules can be very important
to the outcome. Here, we briefly summarize
the two main sets of rules for the world trading system: the policy commitments and their
enforcement under the GATT/WTO, and the
sets of rules associated with the web of PTAs
currently in force. We describe how the recent
wave of PTAs is changing the rules of globalization along a number of important dimensions, relative to the rules established by the
GATT/WTO and even previous PTAs, and
we suggest that there are important choices
embedded in these two institutional forms.
2.1 The GATT/WTO Multilateral System
We begin with some background on the
GATT/WTO multilateral system.
2.1.1 A Short History of Tariff Liberalization
under the GATT and WTO
From the backdrop of the S
 moot–Hawley
tariffs imposed by the United States in
1930 and the international retaliatory
response that followed, the GATT was created in 1947 with twenty-three countries
and grew in membership over the next five
decades before being consolidated into
the WTO in 1995. As of 2015, the WTO
counts 161 member e conomies—including
both the European Union and each of the

t
wenty-eight European Union member
states individually.3
The t
rans-Atlantic economies of the
United States, Canada, and a number of
European countries were not only a driving force behind the creation of the GATT,
but they provide perhaps the most familiar story line for how the GATT facilitated
gradual, multilateral trade liberalization and
allowed countries to sustain an extensive
period of low most-favored-nation (MFN)
tariffs. These countries used the GATT
forum to reduce MFN tariffs reciprocally
through periodic negotiating rounds (WTO
2007), and they then locked in those low tariffs through legally binding commitments.
Table 1 illustrates the multilateral trade liberalization process of negotiations (percentage tariff cuts) covering 1947–94, and table 2
documents the resulting average applied ad
valorem tariff rates for a number of these
countries in 1952 and again in 2005 after
eight rounds of GATT negotiations.4

3 The European Union is a member of the WTO; for
legal reasons it was officially known until 2009 as the
European Communities. The twenty-eight individual
countries of the European Union are also WTO members
in their own right. The European Union is a single customs union with a single trade policy and tariff, and the
European Commission “speaks” on behalf of the European
Union member states in most WTO matters. Nevertheless,
most other customs unions are not represented in the
WTO in this manner, with individual countries retaining
WTO membership rights and obligations.
4 By 1952, average import tariffs expressed in ad valorem
terms had already fallen substantially from peak levels in
the 1930s and 1940s due to a combination of inflation,
as many were imposed as specific duties, and the negotiated liberalization of the first three GATT rounds. Irwin
(1995, table 5.2) reports average tariff rates in 1931 (after
the US imposition of its Smoot–Hawley tariff) for France,
Germany, and Italy of 38, 40, and 48 percent, respectively.
Irwin (2011, 2012) describes the p
 olitical-economy forces
behind the import protection that increased sharply during
the Great Depression, and Irwin, Mavroidis, and Sykes
(2008) describe the negotiations that ultimately led to
establishment of the GATT in the late 1940s. WTO (2007)
also provides an extensive analysis tracking the multilateral trade liberalization that took place over the sixty-year
period following the GATT 1947 inception.
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Table 1

GATT/WTO—60 Years of Tariff Reductions
Implementation period

Weighted
tariff reduction

Round covered

1948

Geneva (1947)

1950

Annecy (1949)

1952

Torquay (1950–1951)

1956–1958

Geneva (1955–1956)

1962–1964

Dillon Round (1961–1962)

1968–1972

Kennedy Round (1964–1967)

1980–1987

Tokyo Round (1973–1979)

1995–1999

Uruguay Round (1986–1994)

Weights based on
MFN imports (year)

−26

1939

−4

1949

−3

1947

−3

1954

−4

−38
−33
−38

1960
1964
1977 (or 1976)
1988 (or 1989)

Notes: MFN tariff reduction of industrial countries for industrial products, excluding petroleum. Tariff reductions
for the first five rounds refer to the United States only. The calculation of average rates of reductions are weighted
by MFN import values.
Source: © World Trade Organization (WTO) 2016. World Trade Report 2007: Six Decades of Multilateral Trade
Cooperation: What Have We Learnt? table 5.

Table 2

Applied Tariff Rates of Selected GATT/WTO Members, 1952 and 2005
Economy

1952

2005

Austria

17

4.2

Benelux

9

4.2

Denmark
France

5

4.2

19

4.2

Germany

16

4.2

Italy

24

4.2

Sweden
United Kingdom

6

4.2

17

4.2

European Union (EU–25)

—

4.2

Canada

11

3.8

United States

16

3.7

Notes: Computed as simple average of fifty-two products in 1952 and of all tariff lines in 2005.
Source: © World Trade Organization (WTO) 2016. World Trade Report 2007: Six Decades of Multilateral Trade
Cooperation: What Have We Learnt? appendix table 7.

1130

Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. LIV (December 2016)

The trans-Atlantic GATT experience is
not, however, how countries have universally liberalized their MFN tariffs, or even
entered into the GATT/WTO system. There
are two prominent classes of exceptions that
are best illustrated by the GATT/WTO experience of other member countries.
First, some countries did not enter the
system at its inception; indeed, many “latecomers” did not seek or were not admitted
entrance into the agreement until well after
the initial set of GATT Contracting Parties
had already substantially negotiated MFN
tariff liberalization. As such, the GATT/WTO
has had the flexibility to accommodate accessions by major economies, including West
Germany in 1951, Japan in 1955, China in
2001, and Russia in 2012.5
Second, many developing countries chose
not to participate in the reciprocal tariff liberalization negotiations that took place under
successive GATT rounds. Instead, countries
including GATT founders India and Brazil
requested and utilized “special and differential treatment” exemptions from reciprocity
in order to pursue import substitution policies. While such countries may currently
apply relatively low (in historical terms)
MFN tariffs, their liberalization episodes
frequently were not undertaken reciprocally,
but instead unilaterally (e.g., India) or in
concert with a period of preferential liberalization (e.g., Brazil). These and other countries also did not follow the trans-Atlantic
approach of gradually lowering their MFN
tariffs over decades; instead, their period of
low and sustained multilateral tariffs began
suddenly and not until the 1990s. And unlike
the United States and the European Union,
the relatively low MFN tariff rates that countries like Brazil and India apply have not
5 China

was an original contracting party to the GATT,
but withdrew in 1950. The other two original contracting
parties to subsequently withdraw from the GATT were
Lebanon and Syria.

been legally bound under the WTO at similarly low levels.
Finally, the WTO’s 161 members notwithstanding, there are at least three dozen
countries that are not yet members. While
most are developing countries and some liberalized their trade regimes independently
of the WTO (through either preferential or
unilateral tariff liberalization), there remain
roughly 500 million people that reside in
countries entirely outside of the WTO system. Seven percent of the global population
has not taken on WTO obligations and does
not enjoy the WTO legal benefits that we
describe in more detail below.
2.1.2 Contemporary Tariff Commitments
under the WTO
Table 3 summarizes many of the salient
features resulting from the GATT/WTO’s
“shallow” integration approach to trade liberalization, including information on contemporary multilateral tariffs across and
within the major economies. The table splits
countries into three groups—the high-income members of the Group of 20 (G20),
the emerging-economy members of the G20
(which includes the BRICS, namely, Brazil,
Russia, India, China and South Africa), and
a selected sample of other major developing
countries with 2012 populations of over 50
million—some of which are not (yet) WTO
members, as they are currently only WTO
“observers.”6 Overall, the tariff data indicate
substantial heterogeneity across countries
and industries and include many examples
of applied MFN import tariffs, as well as the
bindings that have been legally negotiated
to constrain them, that are not close to free
trade.
6 Governments with WTO observer status are
 on-members that are granted limited rights (e.g., access
n
to certain WTO meetings) and are expected to uphold certain obligations (e.g., minimal contributions to the WTO’s
budget).
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Table 3

Trade Policy under the WTO for Selected Economies, 2012
MFN
applied
rate,
simple
average
(1)

Binding
rate,
simple
average
(2)

G20 High Income
Australia
Canada
European Union
Japan
Saudi Arabia
South Korea
United States

2.7
4.3
5.5
4.6
5.1
13.3
3.4

10.0
6.9
5.2
5.2
11.3
16.6
3.5

G20 Emerging
Argentina
Brazil
China (2011)
India
Indonesia
Mexico
Russia
South Africa
Turkey

12.5
13.5
9.6
13.7
7.0
7.8
10.0
7.6
9.6

Developing, Other*
Bangladesh (2011)
Burma
DR of the Congo
Egypt
Ethiopia† (observer only)
Iran† (observer only, 2011)
Nigeria (2011)
Pakistan
Philippines
Thailand
Vietnam

14.4
5.6
NA
16.8
17.3
26.6
11.7
13.5
6.2
9.8
9.5

WTO member economy

Maximum
applied
rate
(5)

MFN
applied
rate,
agriculture
only
(6)

TTB
coverage
(7)

0.1
6.9
5.1
3.8
0.4
10.4
2.7

28.0
551.0
605.0
692.0
427.0
887.0
350.0

1.2
16.2
13.2
16.6
6.2
52.7
4.7

1.0
1.2
3.0
<0.1
NA
0.5
6.8

100.0
100.0
100.0
73.8
96.6
100.0
100.0
96.4
50.3

36.0
36.2
14.6
19.6
1.6
13.8
11.7
20.6
10.8

35.0
55.0
65.0
150.0
150.0
254.0
292.0
>1,000
225.0

10.5
10.1
15.6
33.5
7.9
21.2
13.3
8.4
41.2

3.2
1.9
1.3
6.5
1.7
1.1
NA
0.6
4.9

15.5
17.6
100.0
99.4
**
**
19.1
98.7
67.0
75.0
100.0

40.1
5.0
NA
19.2
50.8
45.7
39.0
36.1
3.1
22.6
24.7

25.0
40.0
NA
>1,000
35.0
400.0
35.0
100.0
65.0
142.0
135.0

17.2
8.6
NA
66.7
22.4
30.4
15.5
15.5
9.8
21.8
16.1

**
**
**
NA
**
**
**
0.3
0.1
0.7
NA

Coverage
of applied
duties > 15
percent
(4)

97.1
99.7
100.0
99.7
100.0
94.6
100.0

31.9
31.4
10.0
48.6
37.1
36.1
7.8
19.0
28.6
169.2
83.4
96.2
36.7
**
**
119.1
59.9
25.7
27.8
11.4

Binding
coverage
(3)

Notes: Parentheses indicate data availability for a year other than 2012. *Selected other developing countries chosen as those with 2012 populations greater than 50 million. **Indicates nonuser (or unreported user) of the policy
instrument. NA = not available. G20 = Group of 20. † Indicates WTO n
 onmember. Columns (1), (2), (5), and (6)
are ad valorem rates, and columns (3), (4), and (7) are shares of import products.
Source: Tariff data taken from WTO, ITC, and UNCTAD (2013) and temporary trade barrier (TTB) data taken from
Bown (2014).
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Consider first the United States. The simple average MFN tariff that the United States
applies to imports from any other WTO
member is 3.4 percent. One hundred percent
of the US tariff lines are bound at some level,
and the simple average binding rate is 3.5 percent. This is the rate above which a country
promises not to raise its applied MFN tariff,
and this rate serves as the formal legal commitment that a country submits to the WTO
membership. The WTO permits countries
to apply tariffs below their bound rates, provided that such offerings are made to all other
members on a nondiscriminatory (MFN)
basis. That the US applied MFN import tariff
is pushing up against the binding rate is an
indicator that it has very little scope to unilaterally increase its applied MFN import
tariffs without running afoul of WTO rules.
While average US applied and bound MFN
tariffs are quite low, there is considerable
heterogeneity both across and within even
high-income countries. Most major industrialized economies have almost universal binding
coverage and applied rates that are relatively
close to their tariff bindings. Nevertheless,
while applied MFN tariffs may be low in historical terms, they range from an average of
2.7 percent (Australia) to 13.3 percent (the
Republic of Korea, hereafter South Korea).
There also remain important examples of outliers or tariff “peaks” in high-income economies; for example, 2.7 percent of US tariffs
have applied MFN rates higher than 15 percent, with the highest rate being 350 percent.
Canada, the European Union, and South
Korea each have more than 5 percent of MFN
tariff lines with rates higher than 15 percent,
and maximum applied rates in these economies are greater than 500 percent.
Tariffs exhibit even more heterogeneity across emerging and developing economies. While average applied MFN tariffs
are also relatively low for these countries in
historical terms, the rates applied by even
the relatively advanced (G20) emerging

economies are typically substantially higher
than their h
igh-income-country counterparts. Furthermore, some countries (e.g.,
India) have not committed to legally binding
a significant share of their tariff lines at any
level. Finally, within the set of products that
countries have committed to legally bind,
there can be significant differentials between
applied rates and the binding commitment.
This last point holds for all of the G20 emerging economies (including Argentina, Brazil,
India, and Mexico) with the exception of the
relatively new WTO accession countries of
China (2001) and Russia (2012), for which
the existing membership demands included
relatively low levels of MFN tariff bindings.7
Heterogeneity across the tariff data can
be even more extreme for other major (but
poorer) developing countries. Some WTO
members (e.g., Bangladesh, Burma, Nigeria)
have committed to upper limits for tariff bindings on fewer than 20 percent of their import
tariff lines. Even on products for which these
WTO members bind their tariffs, the average
binding rates may be more than 100 percentage points higher than applied rates.
There are also important differences in
applied MFN tariff heterogeneity within
countries across sectors. As one important
example, table 3 shows many instances of
sharp differences between average applied
tariffs in agricultural products relative to
overall rates of protection. Within the G20,
a few countries such as Argentina, Australia,
and Brazil offer lower average import tariffs for agriculture than they do for other
products. For most others, however, the
rates in agriculture are substantially higher
(Anderson, Rausser, and Swinnen 2013).
Finally, applied MFN tariffs are not the
only important trade policy instrument within
7 As of 2012, Russia had not yet fully phased in its MFN
applied tariff cuts under its WTO accession terms, and
thus its average applied rate was still above its average
binding commitment.
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the multilateral WTO system. An increasing
number of countries since the early 1990s
have begun to invoke GATT/WTO exceptions to their negotiated tariff bindings and
use the temporary trade barrier (TTB) policies of antidumping, safeguards, and countervailing duties.
Before 1990, industrialized economies
such as Australia, Canada, the European
Union, and the United States dominated
overall use of TTBs, and especially the most
predominant antidumping policy (Blonigen
and Prusa 2003). Since the early 1990s, a
number of emerging economies have subsequently become major users of TTBs (Bown
2011b) as they reduced their applied import
tariffs. The last column of table 3 provides
data on the import coverage of the TTBs
cumulatively applied in 2012. As examples,
eleven different G20 economies had more
than 1 percent of their tariff lines also subject
to an imposed TTB in 2012; some of these
countries did not even have an antidumping
law in place twenty-five years earlier. Many
also had one or more episodes over this
twenty-five-year period during which the
cumulative TTB import coverage rose to as
high as 4 –6 percent.
Table 3 reveals two other features of TTB
use. First, not all WTO members use these
policies. Indeed most of the poorest WTO
members have never implemented a formal
antidumping or safeguard proceeding, a feature that can be partially explained by the
fact that the tariff bindings of these countries
are sufficiently above their applied rates that
they can adjust tariffs upward unilaterally in
response to shocks. Second, even members
of a customs union—i.e., countries that eliminate tariffs on internal trade with each other
and share a common applied MFN tariff
toward nonmembers, examples of which we
describe in more detail below—do not necessarily apply a common set of TTB policies.
In 2012, for example, customs union partners
Argentina and Brazil had different shares of
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product lines covered by TTBs, as did the
partners Turkey and the European Union.
2.1.3 GATT/WTO Commitments Relating
to Behind-the-Border Measures
The GATT traditionally eschewed efforts
to negotiate restrictions on the use of
behind-the-border measures of its member
governments. As Hudec (1990, p. 24) describes
in his depiction of the genesis of GATT’s
shallow-integration approach, while governments understood that 
behind-the-border
measures could have trade effects, the GATT
never had its heart in deep integration:
The standard trade policy rules could deal with
the common types of trade policy measure
governments usually employ to control trade.
But trade can also be affected by other “domestic” measures, such as product safety standards,
having nothing to do with trade policy. [When
GATT was created in 1947,] … governments
would never have agreed to circumscribe their
freedom in all these other areas for the sake of
a mere trade agreement.

The WTO emphasizes a s hallow-integration
approach as well but has attempted to venture into the realm of “deeper” integration,
most substantively with the aborted Doha
Round attempts to negotiate directly over the
“Singapore issues” of foreign investment and
competition policy.8 It is also important to
8 In addition to foreign investment and competition
policy, the Singapore issues included trade facilitation
and government procurement. Trade facilitation focused
on the removal of nontariff barriers “at the border” (e.g.,
procedures for clearing customs), and the Doha Round
has produced a Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA).
The attempt in the context of the Doha Round to negotiate multilateral rules for government procurement failed
along with the attempts to negotiate a multilateral agreement covering foreign investment and competition policy.
Instead, a revised version of the plurilateral Government
Procurement Agreement (GPA) first signed in 1979 was
negotiated among 43 WTO members and entered into
force on April 6, 2014. The WTO TRIPS Agreement is
a deep-integration agreement, but it is not considered a
market-access agreement (see also note 1).
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point out that many of the d
 eep-integration
issues of apparent focal interest to recent
PTAs are not entirely absent from consideration by the WTO Agreements (WTO
2012). It is simply that the GATT/WTO
shallow-integration approach has addressed
such issues differently.
For example, it is true that WTO member
governments maintain considerable freedom to implement unilaterally a variety of
public policy interventions, including those
that adversely affect trade flows. Examples
include allowances for the protection of
plant, animal, and human health, as well as
the establishment of product standards. But
the WTO provides governments with guidance so as to discourage such interventions
from becoming n
ontariff barriers applied
without a legitimate public policy motive. For
trade in goods, these exceptions and guidelines are outlined in the GATT’s basic rules
on national treatment found in Article III
and are further elaborated under the GATT’s
original Article XX, and the WTO’s agreements on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT),
and Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
(SPS). Furthermore, countries can bring
nontariff issues to light by also filing “specific
trade concerns” with relevant WTO standing
committees. Finally, the GATT/WTO provides member governments with the right
to initiate, under formal dispute-settlement
proceedings, “violation” complaints against
behind-the-border measures that violate

these guidelines, and even “non-violation”
complaints against behind-the-border measures that do not violate the guidelines
but still erode negotiated market access
commitments.
2.1.4 Dispute Settlement under the WTO
and GATT
Access to formal dispute-settlement
procedures has always been part of the
GATT/WTO system. The 1947 GATT’s
Article XXIII established the basic provisions

whereby government-to-government dispute resolution would take place, and over
the subsequent fifty years, contracting parties initiated more than 250 disputes within
the GATT fora in attempts to formally resolve
a variety of trading frictions that arose.9
Legal scholars generally characterize the
GATT-provided mediation that took place

during this period as a “diplomacy-based”
approach to dispute resolution.
Many elements of the system changed dramatically in 1995 with the WTO inception,
as the current system is much more “legalistic” than its GATT predecessor. Members
initiated nearly 500 formal WTO disputes
against one another between 1995 and 2014,
or nearly twice as many as during the GATT
period of 1947–94. The literature identifies a
number of contributing explanations, including that more countries are now actively
involved in the trading system, there is substantially more trade, and countries have
taken on more legally binding commitments.
Over time, more and more WTO members have found themselves involved in formal disputes. To date, nearly fifty out of the
161 WTO members have initiated a case as
a “complainant” (i.e., the plaintiff) and more
than fifty members have faced a dispute as
a “respondent” (i.e., the defendant). More
than half of the membership has been formally involved in at least one dispute via the
legal status as an “interested third party.”
This can be an important role even for countries without trade stakes in a particular dispute, given that jurisprudence arising from
a dispute between any two countries—e.g.,
a policy dispute pitting Colombia versus
Panama or Moldova versus Ukraine—could
have policy implications for the entire WTO
membership, including the United States
and European Union.

9 See

Bown (2002; table 1).
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The United States and the European
Union are the two most frequent WTO
litigants; combined, they have initiated

roughly 40 percent of all disputes; roughly
50 percent of all disputes involve one or
the other as a respondent; and a significant
share involves one challenging the other.
Nevertheless, many other industrialized
countries have also been frequent WTO litigants, including Australia, Canada, Japan,
New Zealand, and South Korea. Finally, the
share of WTO disputes involving developing
country members, with the exception of least
developed countries, has risen over time and
includes a large number of developing country versus developing-country disputes.10
Developing countries that are frequent WTO
litigants include Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
China, Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras,
India, Indonesia, Mexico, Panama, Peru, the
Philippines, and Thailand.
2.2 PTAs
While a central pillar of the GATT/WTO
system is the MFN principle, GATT Article
XXIV provides an exception to MFN that
allows GATT/WTO members to form PTAs
that satisfy certain features. The key stipulations are that the PTA must eliminate tariffs
on “substantially all” trade among the member countries, and that the external MFN
tariffs that member countries continue to
apply to imports from outside the PTA not
increase as a result of PTA formation.
For decades during the post–World War II
period, much of the analysis of PTAs centered
primarily on one successful experience of
regional integration—i.e., the continuing and
ongoing evolution of western Europe. The
1951 Treaty of Paris established the European
10 The poorest and least-developed country members of
the WTO system—of which there are dozens—are almost
entirely absent from participation in formal WTO dispute
settlement. Bown and Hoekman (2008) provide a discussion of the political-economic hurdles faced by these countries in the WTO that can help account for this fact.
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Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) which
was expanded with the 1957 Treaty of Rome
to create the s ix-country European Economic
Community (EEC). Today’s European Union
is the result of continued integration over the
subsequent five decades, including numerous
country accessions (twenty-eight member
countries, as of 2015) as well as substantial
“deepening” of negotiations and agreements
beyond trade preferences and toward factor
market, economic, monetary, and even political integration.
Beginning in the late 1980s, a number of
other potentially economically meaningful
PTAs arose that have subsequently been
sustained. These include the 1987 CUSFTA
(
Canada–US Free Trade Agreement)
that was subsequently expanded into the
NAFTA (North American Free Trade
Agreement) through the addition of Mexico
in 1994. There are also increasingly important developing country PTAs, including
the MERCOSUR (Mercado Común del
Sur) customs union involving Argentina,
Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay in the early
1990s, ASEAN (Association of Southeast
Asian Nations) Free Trade Area involving
Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines,
Singapore, and Thailand in the early 1990s,
and 
CAFTA–DR (Central American Free
Trade Area–Dominican Republic) involving
the United States and five Central American
economies in the 
mid-2000s. As of 2014,
the WTO reports that it has been notified
of nearly 600 reciprocal trade agreements
in existence, and nearly 400 agreements are
currently in force (WTO 2014b).11
11 The number of notifications and trade agreements in
force differ for several reasons. One is because notifications
include not only new agreements, but also the accession
of new countries to existing agreements—e.g., Croatia’s
accession to the European Union in 2013. Second, some
agreements notified to the GATT/WTO later become
“inactive” (or no longer in force), when they become
superseded by a subsequent agreement that was later notified and which is currently in force—e.g., CUSFTA is no
longer in force as it was superseded by NAFTA.
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2.2.1 Tariffs and B
 ehind-the-Border
Measures in PTAs
There are two key areas in which PTAs
push beyond the multilateral, WTO commitments. The first is by reducing import
tariffs even lower than WTO levels, albeit
on a discriminatory basis. The second is by
negotiating beyond tariffs directly over new,
behind-the-border policy instruments.
WTO (2011) provides a recent and relatively comprehensive characterization of the
patterns of tariffs and trade taking place under
PTAs. With the sharp increase in PTAs since
1990, the value of trade between PTA members has grown faster than the world average; not surprisingly, the share of intra-PTA
trade in world trade has nearly doubled from
18 percent in 1990 to 35 percent in 2008.12
And when intra-EU trade flows are included
in these statistics, intra-PTA trade as a share
of world trade increased from 28 percent to
51 percent over this period. However, the
WTO (2011) data analysis, based on a matching of product-level trade flows to tariffs and
preferential tariffs to MFN tariffs, reveals
a number of other stylized facts, some of
which challenge the conventional wisdom
regarding the degree to which PTAs serve as
a force for discriminatory tariff liberalization.
First, while many theoretical models typically assume PTAs result in zero applied
tariffs between partners, real-world PTAs do
not always lead to zero tariffs on all intra-PTA
goods trade. Empirically, the many negotiated exceptions within PTAs have resulted in
a significant number of PTA tariffs remaining at levels above zero, including 8 percent
of tariffs for the major PTAs of the United
States, Canada, European Union, and Japan
(Damuri 2012). Indeed, in an analysis of the
PTAs involving eighty-five countries and
90 percent of world trade in 2007, the WTO
12 The data reported here and below derives specifically
from section II of WTO (2011, pp. 47–86).

(2011, pp. 124–25) finds that roughly 66 percent of tariff lines with MFN tariff “peaks”
(MFN rates defined as greater than 15 percent) have not been reduced at all through
PTAs. Hence, while existing PTAs should
be viewed as a significant force in eliminating (roughly one third of, and on a discriminatory basis) the tariff peaks that remain
among WTO members, a majority of these
tariff peaks are nevertheless still in place.
Second, while a large and increasing share
of world trade takes place between PTA
members, this share substantially overstates
the amount of preferential trade between
members. In many instances, there is no
preference margin because the MFN tariffs
are also zero. Furthermore, even where positive preference margins exist, exporters may
not utilize available preferences because of
both the resource costs (to sourcing inputs
from less efficient suppliers in PTA markets) and bureaucratic costs (to proving legal
compliance) due to rules of origin and local
value-added requirements needed to gain

access to the lower preferential rates.13
How much trade really takes place under
preferential tariffs? First, between 49 percent (including intra-EU trade) and 65 percent (excluding 
intra-EU trade) of world
trade takes place between countries that are
not part of a common PTA.14 Second, excluding intra-EU trade, the WTO estimates that
only 16 percent of global trade is eligible for
any preferential tariffs and less than 2 percent
is eligible to receive preferences with margins above 10 percentage points. Including
intra-EU trade in these statistics implies

13 See, however, Keck and Lendle (2014) for a recent
challenge to the position that preferences often go
unutilized.
14 Considering these figures with and without intra-EU
trade flows may be important depending on the context,
given that the European Union is a unique PTA, in that it is
not only a customs union but has undertaken deeper integration along many dimensions—including factor markets
and monetary integration for a substantial subset of member countries—and also steps toward political integration.
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that 30 percent of global trade is eligible for
any preferential tariffs and 4 percent is eligible for margins over 10 percentage points.
Despite the explosive increase in PTA adoption, the WTO estimates that overall, excluding (including) intra-EU trade, 84 percent
(70 percent) of world merchandise trade still
takes place on an MFN basis.
These numbers can help put the impact
of existing PTAs in perspective. PTAs have
served as the primary conduit for tariff discrimination in the WTO system. And they
have led to discriminatory tariff reductions
below MFN levels that are far from insignificant. But it would appear that, to date, PTAs
have not delivered discriminatory tariff liberalization on a wide enough scale to cause
widespread “trade diversion” (the reduction
in imports from third countries; see Viner
1950).15
Finally, an increasingly important characteristic of many of the current PTA negotiations is that they are no longer primarily about
tariff liberalization, but instead are pushing
toward deeper integration that addresses
nontariff and 

behind-the-border policies.16
The nascent literature on deeper integration
currently splits new PTA issue areas into two
categories. The first are “WTO-plus” PTA
provisions—i.e., those that also exist under
15 A potentially important caveat to this last observation, however, is suggested by the results of Handley
(2014) and Handley and Limão (2015), which we discuss
further below: in the presence of policy uncertainty there
can be large differences between the trade effects of an
applied MFN tariff of zero that is bound at a much higher
level in the WTO and a PTA tariff that is both applied and
bound at zero. Such differences are missed by a focus on
preference margins relating to applied tariffs alone, and
inferences about the degree of trade diversion caused by
existing PTAs that adopt this focus could be significantly
understated as a result. See also the discussion in Bhagwati
(2008) and the survey in Panagariya (2000).
16 Some of these n
 ontariff policies under negotiation
are applied at the border. For example, policies like antidumping and safeguards are applied at the border but frequently as quotas or price undertakings. Other examples
of n
 ontariff barriers that arise at the border may include
customs regulations, import valuation, etc.
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the WTO, but where PTA members use
their agreement to take on commitments to
go further. Tariffs are the clearest example;
e.g., WTO members make legally binding
MFN tariff commitments, and PTAs involve
partners lowering at least some of those tariffs toward each other even further. Other
examples include services, intellectual property rights, and product standards—each of
which has at least some basic WTO coverage.
The second category for PTA provisions are
“WTO-extra” areas, and these involve issues
that are not yet explicitly addressed by the
WTO. Examples of WTO-extra areas include
labor standards, environmental standards,
foreign direct investment provisions, movement of capital, competition policy, data
protection, and even potential cooperation
over other domestic regulations in order to
help achieve improved levels of “regulatory
coherence” across PTA member countries.
Horn, Mavroidis, and Sapir (2010) characterize the “depth” of PTA provisions by
applying this categorization to the many US
and EU PTAs in existence as of 2008.17 The
initial evidence was that EU PTAs tend to
have many more WTO-extra provisions, but
that the pattern is reversed when the analysis conditions on the legal enforceability
(under dispute settlement) of the provisions,
as US PTAs contain more legally enforceable
WTO-extra provisions. In 

follow-up work,
the WTO (2011, Section D) extended this
approach in order to characterize fourteen
different WTO-plus provisions and thirty-eight different WTO-extra provisions for
a wider sample of PTAs, including a number
involving only developing countries. Their
17 Other recent contributions characterizing and assessing such PTA provisions include work by WTO Secretariat
legal staff (Chase et al. 2013) and political scientists (Allee
and Elsig 2015). Note that the latter assess a larger coverage of dispute-settlement provisions in preferential agreements in a publicly available “design of trade agreements”
(DESTA) database (Dür, Baccini, and Elsig 2014). See also
WTO (2011).
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work has e stablished a new and rich set of
databases for future research to explore the
heterogeneity in application of these provisions across different PTAs.
2.2.2 Dispute Settlement under PTAs
In contrast to the WTO, there is very little empirical record of sustained and effective dispute resolution taking place under
the major PTAs. With the exception of the
European Union, dispute-settlement provisions in most PTAs have rarely been used,
and when actually triggered, their record
of resolving disputes is mixed at best.18 It
is also not uncommon for the use of PTA
dispute-settlement procedures to generate third-country spillovers, and thus wider
disputes that are left for the WTO system
to resolve, or for PTA members to simply ignore the existence of their PTA’s dispute-settlement provisions in order to take
frictions directly to the WTO for resolution.
We illustrate with examples from two different PTAs.
Consider first the MERCOSUR customs
union and its dispute-settlement procedures.
While Tallberg and Smith (2014) report that
very few (roughly twenty) disputes were
18 The Euroepan Union has a different institutional
design, including a supranational framework that initiates disputes against member states from within and thus
does not rely exclusively on the “
state-to-state” framework of dispute resolution found in the WTO and many
other PTAs. One result is that the EU’s dispute-settlement
provisions have led to thousands of disputes. Tallberg
and Smith (2014, p. 126) report that the supranational
European Commission initiated more than 30,000 cases
over 1978–2009 against its member states. Furthermore,
the commission only referred 11.5 percent of these initiated disputes to the European Court of Justice for a legal
decision. On the other hand, EU member states have initiated only a handful of disputes against one another. Finally,
the EU’s free trade agreement with Iceland, Liechtenstein,
and Norway under EFTA contains a supranational
Surveillance Authority (SA) modeled similarly to the
European Commission; Tallberg and Smith (2014, p. 138)
report that the SA initiated roughly 400 disputes against
the three EFTA member states over 1 994–2008, and that
the member states filed zero EFTA disputes against one
another during this period.

initiated under MERCOSUR between
1993 and 2005, one particularly high profile MERCOSUR dispute ended with
Brazil imposing a new import restriction
on retreaded tires from non-MERCOSUR
partners, but not on its MERCOSUR partners. This policy discrimination arose after a
MERCOSUR legal ruling in 2002 that PTA
partners must be exempted from application
of such import restrictions. Citing a similar MERCOSUR rule, in 1997 Argentina
had imposed a new import restriction on
footwear from n
on-MERCOSUR partners, but not on its MERCOSUR partners.
Because MERCOSUR rules apparently
required that imports from MERCOSUR
partners be exempted from the policies,
Brazil’s and Argentina’s newly imposed
import-restricting policies provided an additional implicit preference to PTA partners
relative to non-partners. In both instances,
non-MERCOSUR countries, including the
European Union and Indonesia, challenged
the discriminatory treatment under formal
WTO dispute-settlement procedures.19
Like MERCOSUR, NAFTA also has its
own dispute-settlement provisions, and
they have also rarely been triggered; e.g.,
fewer than fifteen disputes were initiated
under NAFTA between 1994 and 2010, and
NAFTA dispute settlement largely fell into
disuse after 2001 (Tallberg and Smith 2014).
Nevertheless, the small number of NAFTA
disputes should not necessarily be interpreted as evidence that its PTA partners are
not experiencing bilateral trading frictions
that require third party mediation. The three
NAFTA partners (United States, Canada, and
Mexico) have taken more than twice as many
disputes against one another to formal WTO
dispute settlement since NAFTA’s inception
than they have taken to the NAFTA forum.
19 These disputes are described in greater detail in section 7.3 below. Bown and Trachtman (2009) provide a discussion of the WTO dispute over Brazil—Retreaded Tyres.
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And some of these bilateral frictions—e.g.,
over U
 S–Canada trade in softwood lumber;
over US–Mexico trade in the related products of sugar, corn, h
 igh-fructose corn syrup,
and ultimately soft drinks—actually started
as formal NAFTA disputes but could not be
resolved under the NAFTA forum. The disputes escalated and ultimately spilled over
to require resolution through formal WTO
litigation.20
2.3 Different Paths Forward
The WTO and PTAs are on different trajectories. The extent of their divergence to date
may still be modest, but the “mega-regional”
PTAs currently under consideration, such
as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (TTIP) between the United
States and European Union, or the Trans
Pacific Partnership (TPP) between the
United States, Japan, and other Pacific trading partners, could change this dramatically.
In short, globalization is looking increasingly different under these two sets of rules.
Perhaps nowhere is this better illustrated in
current affairs than by the potential implications depending on whether the United
States and the European Union throw their
weight behind the WTO and a reenergized
Doha Round, or rather put their efforts
into negotiating new PTAs. Consider the
likely differences in globalization’s outcomes
depending on which of these strategies is
pursued.
If the United States and the European
Union were to put their full support behind
a reenergized Doha Round, even the most
ambitious conclusion of the round would
by all accounts entail relatively small cuts
in average tariffs and more substantial, but
20 Davey and Sapir (2009) discuss the evolution of the
 S–Mexico disputes over sweeteners that ultimately culU
minated in the WTO’s Mexico—Taxes on Soft Drinks case,
and Bown and Sykes (2008) describe the fifth WTO dispute brought by Canada over US—Softwood Lumber.
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still modest, reductions in the remaining tariff peaks (and agricultural export subsidies).
And any nod to deep integration would
likely be modest. Contrast this description
of a successful WTO Doha Round with what
has been learned about the TTIP and TPP
initiatives.
Consider first the TTIP negotiations.
The TTIP has adopted as its main focus the
streamlining of domestic standards across
the Atlantic. The BBC puts it this way:
Direct tariffs on goods and services between
the two are already low, but there are other
barriers such as regulatory and safety standards, inspection procedures, and preferences
for domestic business. Removing these could
significantly reduce the costs for companies
doing transatlantic business.

Consider next the TPP. Here again, the
focus is on harmonizing domestic standards. As Marketplace Morning Report
(1/28/2014) put it, “The T
rans-Pacific
Partnership has been called NAFTA on steroids.” The New York Times continues:
If successful, the TPP agreement would
eliminate most remaining tariffs on nearly
$2 trillion in goods and services exchanged
between the United States, Australia, Brunei,
Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New
Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam. [But
the TPP] … would go far beyond lowering
tariffs, with provisions requiring countries to
maintain compatible regulatory regimes, facilitate corporate financial transactions, establish
copyright and patent protections to govern
intellectual property rights and to safeguard
foreign investors.

Evidently, the likely form of liberalization
under m
 ega-regional initiatives differs substantially from that which might be expected
through 
reenergized multilateral negotiations in the WTO. It is thus important to have
a reasoned and informed general perspective
about the relative merits of regional and multilateral liberalization initiatives. Toward this
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goal, in the next five sections, we consider the
implications of the theoretical and empirical literature on trade agreements. It is also
important in this context to consider possible
means through which the WTO might be further revitalized. We postpone discussion of
this issue until the concluding section.
3.

The Terms-of-Trade Theory
of Trade Agreements

In this section, we offer a brief review and
empirical assessment of the essential predictions of the 
terms-of-trade theory, and
we use the theory as a lens through which
to view the broad contours of existing WTO
policy commitments, offering an initial consideration of the possibility that the WTO
membership might have already arrived at
the international-efficiency frontier.
3.1 Theory
To present the essential predictions of
the 
terms-of-trade theory, we develop a
benchmark two-country, two-good perfectly
competitive general-equilibirium trade
model. We first develop the model under
the assumption that governments have only
tariffs as instruments of policy intervention, and consider the purpose of a trade
agreement. We then extend the benchmark
model to allow that governments also have
behind-the-border policy instruments at

their disposal, in order to consider whether
the purpose of a trade agreement is changed
in this richer policy setting.
3.1.1 Trade Model
We assume that readers are familiar with
the two-country t wo-good perfectly competitive general-equilibirium trade model, and
we focus here only on the essential notation
and equations.21 The two countries, home
21 A

more complete description of the model appears
in any undergraduate international economics textbook (or

(no ∗
 ) and foreign (∗), produce, consume,
and trade two goods, xand y , under conditions of perfect competition, with home
the natural importer of xand foreign the
natural importer of y
. The relative price
facing home producers and consumers
in their local market is p
 ≡ p x  / p y, while
the relative price facing foreign producers and consumers in their local market is
p  ∗  ≡ p x∗    / p y∗  . With nonprohibitive home and
foreign ad valorem tariffs denoted respectively by t and t  ∗, and with τ ≡ (1 + t) and
τ  ∗  ≡ (1 + t  ∗), international goods-market
arbitrage implies 
p = τ p  w  ≡ p(τ, p  w) and
∗
w ∗
∗ ∗ w
p    = p  /τ    ≡ p  (τ  , p  ), where p  w  ≡ p x∗  /p y
is the “world” (i.e., untaxed) relative price.
The foreign terms of trade are given by p  w,
and the home terms of trade by 1 /p  w.
Production (as well as the distribution
and level of factor incomes) is fully determined in each country by the local relative
price in that country, while each country’s
consumption depends on both the local relative price in that country and the terms of
trade (with the latter, together with the local
price, determining the tariff revenue collected by the country and distributed to its
consumers). Each country’s trade is simply
the difference between its consumption and
production. Hence, for any local and world
prices, home imports of xcan be written as
M( p, p  w)and home exports of ycan be written as E( p, p  w). The analogous functions for
foreign are M  ∗ ( p  ∗, p  w) and E  ∗ ( p  ∗, p  w). For
any prices, the home and foreign national
budget constraints are then given by the
respective trade balance equations
(1)	p  w  M( p, p  w) = E( p, p  w),

and

(2)	M  ∗  ( p  ∗, p  w) = p  w E  ∗ ( p  ∗, p  w), 

see Bagwell and Staiger 2010b for a recent d
 evelopment
of the model in the context of the trade-agreements
literature).
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with the equilibrium world price p̃   w(τ, τ  ∗)
then determined by the market clearing condition for x ,
(3) 
M( p(τ, p  w), p  w) = E  ∗( p  ∗  (τ  ∗, p  w), p  w), 
and with Walras’ law ensuring that the
y
-market clears as well. Finally, with
market-clearing local and world prices

written as p
 = p(τ, p̃   w), p  ∗ = p  ∗(τ  ∗, p̃   w),
w
w
and p̃   = p̃   (τ, τ  ∗), we impose the following
standard price assumptions to rule out the
Metzler and Lerner paradoxes:
dp(τ, p̃   w(τ, τ  ∗))
dp  ∗  (τ  ∗, p̃   w(τ, τ  ∗))
  
  
(4)  _____________
 
> 0 >  _____________
 ;
dτ
d τ  ∗
∂  p̃   w(τ, τ  ∗)
∂  p̃   w(τ, τ  ∗)
   .
 
< 0 <  ________
	 ________
∂τ
∂  τ  ∗

According to (4), each country’s tariff is “protective” of its import-competing sector (i.e.,
the imposition of a tariff raises the local price
of the import good), and each country is
“large” in world markets and can improve its
terms of trade with an increase in its tariff.
3.1.2 Government Preferences
When it comes to the goals of trade policy,
r eal-world governments have diverse sets of
preferences, in some cases adopting trade
policies that would seem to promote aggregate national income, while in other cases
adopting trade policies with a clear distributional goal in mind. This diversity is reflected
in the trade-policy literature, where assumed
government preferences range from national
income maximization (see Dixit 1987;
Johnson 1 953; Kennan and Riezman 1988;
and Mayer 1981 for important formalizations, and Kowalczyk and Riezman 2011 for
a recent survey), to those of a representative
democracy, as reflected in the preferences
of the median voter (see Mayer 1984 for the
initial formulation; and Dutt and Mitra 2002;
and Dhingra 2014 for important follow-up

1141

work), to those of a government influenced
by lobbies (for early formalizations, see
Olson 1965; Caves 1976; Brock and Magee
1978; Feenstra and Bhagwati 1982; Findlay
and Wellisz 1982; Hillman 1982; and Baldwin
1987; and see Grossman and Helpman 1994
and 1995b, for the canonical treatment in
the more recent literature).
The diversity of government preferences,
both in the real world and in the formal
trade-policy literature, raises the question of
whether these preference differences across
governments might translate into different
purposes across the trade agreements that
governments negotiate. To ensure that our
answers regarding the purpose of a trade
agreement are not dependent on adopting a particular formulation of government
preferences from this diverse set, we follow
Bagwell and Staiger (1999a, 2002) and adopt
a “reduced-form” approach to modeling
government preferences, representing the
objectives of the home and foreign governments with the general functions W( p, p̃   w)
and W   ∗( p  ∗, p̃   w), respectively. We thus represent welfare in terms of the prices that the
tariffs induce, rather than directly in terms
of the tariffs themselves. We place no restrictions on a government’s preferences over its
local prices. As local prices determine the
level and distribution of factor incomes, this
allows us to incorporate all of the formal
models of trade-policy motives mentioned
above. We do impose one assumption on
the government welfare functions, namely,
that holding its local price fixed, the welfare
of a government increases when its terms of
trade improve:
(5)	W p̃   w ( p, p̃   w) < 0 < W p∗̃   w ( p  ∗, p̃   w).
This assumption, which amounts to a statement that each government would like more
tariff revenue if it could achieve this extra
revenue without experiencing any change in
its local price, is met by each of the formal
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models of trade policy determination that we
mentioned above.22
3.1.3 Nash Tariffs
In the absence of a trade agreement, the
two governments choose their tariffs unilaterally and noncooperatively, and we assume
that these choices are characterized by an
interior Nash equilibrium. The fi
rst-order
conditions that define the Nash tariffs are
dW( p, p̃   w)
dτ

dp
dτ

∂  p̃   w
∂τ

 
=  Wp    __   + W p̃   w  ____ = 0, and
(6)   ________
d W    ∗ ( p  ∗, p̃   w)
d τ  

d p  ∗
d τ  

∂ p̃   w
∂ τ  

  ∗  ∗     ____∗   + W p∗̃   w   ___∗   = 0.
   __________
∗   =  Wp
The top equation of (6) defines the home
government’s b
 est-response tariff, while the
bottom equation defines the foreign government’s b
 est-response tariff, with the Nash
tariffs defined where both governments are
on their respective reaction curves.
Notice that, as the top equation of (6)
highlights, in the Nash equilibrium the
home government strikes a balance between
the effects on its welfare of the local-price
and w
 orld-price movements induced by its
tariff choice. The welfare implications of
the local-price movement are domestic in
nature, reflecting the trade-off for the home
government between the benefits of any distributional changes (e.g., induced political
support) and the costs of the induced economic distortions. By contrast, the welfare
implications of the world-price movement
are international in nature, as they reflect
the benefits to the home government of
shifting some of the costs of its policy choice
onto the foreign country. The cost shifting occurs because an improvement in the
22 We also assume sufficient concavity of 
W and W   ∗
so that the second-order conditions for the optimization
problems that we consider below are satisfied.

home country’s terms of trade is necessarily
a deterioration in the foreign country’s terms
of trade. An analogous interpretation holds
for the foreign government, as the bottom
equation of (6) highlights.
In the special case where governments
maximize national income with their unilateral tariff choices, (6) defines the standard
(Johnson 1953) “optimal tariff” for each
country, which is simply the inverse of the
trading partner’s export supply elasticity. As
Johnson demonstrated, when governments
seek to maximize national income, setting
a tariff at this level is the optimal way for a
country to exploit its monopoly power on
world markets. For this case, on the margin the tariff creates costly distortions in the
local market (the 
local-price movements
in the first terms in (6)) but some of these
costs are borne by the trading partner (via
the world-price movements in the second
terms in (6)). For the more general cases of
government preferences included in (6), the
local-price movements carry additional welfare implications for the governments and
this leads to Nash tariffs that will, in general,
differ from the Johnson “optimal tariff” formula, but the trade-off faced by each government in setting its unilaterally optimal
tariff is otherwise the same.
3.1.4 Efficiency Frontier
If a trade agreement is to be useful to
governments, there must be an inefficiency
associated with the Nash tariff choices of
the governments when evaluated with reference to their objectives. A trade agreement
can then provide value to both governments
by correcting this inefficiency. Absent such
an inefficiency, it would not be possible
for a trade agreement to yield Pareto benefits for the governments involved. We
therefore next characterize the efficiency
frontier.
The
international
efficiency
frontier is defined by the set of tariffs that
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satisfy the familiar tangency condition
dτ   |  ∗ .23 Making use of the
____
  dτ∗  |  dW=0  =  ____
∗ dW  =0
dτ  

dτ  

home and foreign government welfare func, this tantions 
W( p, p̃   w) and W   ∗( p  ∗, p̃   w)
gency condition can be written as
∂  p̃   w

d p  ∗

∂  p̃   w

Wp  ∗  ∗    ____∗   + Wp  ∗̃   w    ___
 
[τ Wp    + Wp  ̃   w]   ____
 
∂ τ  ∗
∂ τ  ∗
d τ  
_____________
  =  ______________
  
  
  .
(7)    
dp
dτ

∂  p̃   w
∂τ

Wp    __   + Wp  ̃   w  ___ 

∂  p̃   w
∂τ

 [___
  1∗  Wp  ∗  ∗    + Wp  ∗̃   w  ]  ___ 
τ  

The characterization of the efficiency frontier provided by (7) is a generalization of the
more familiar Mayer (1981) locus of efficient
tariffs for the case of n
 ational income maximizing governments. As is w
 ell-known, when
governments maximize national income,
reciprocal free trade (τ = 1 = τ  ∗) is efficient; yet as Mayer pointed out, this is but
one point on the efficiency frontier defined
by the locus of points τ = 1 /τ   ∗ that ensure
equality of the home and foreign local prices
p and p  ∗. Under the assumption that governments maximize national income and
with the particular forms for W( p, p̃   w) and
W   ∗ ( p  ∗, p̃   w)that this implies, (7) reduces to
the Mayer locus τ = 1 / τ   ∗.
With the efficiency frontier defined, it is
now a simple matter to use (6) and (7) to
confirm that Nash policies are indeed inefficient in this model. Hence, according to
the 
terms-of-trade theory, an inefficiency
exists when governments set their tariffs
noncooperatively, and therefore there is a
role for a trade agreement to address this
inefficiency and improve the welfare of each
government.

23 When international lump sum transfers are available at the negotiation stage, as is typically assumed in the
trade-agreements literature when partial equilibrium models of trade are employed, internationally efficient policies
maximize the joint government surplus, with the division of
surplus then allocated across participating governments via
lump sum transfers. In later sections, when we refer to efficient policies in the context of partial equilibrium models,
we will adopt this joint-government-surplus-maximizing
perspective unless otherwise noted.
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3.1.5 Interpreting the Purpose of a
Trade Agreement
The inefficiency of Nash policies is not
surprising. After all, the c ost-shifting motives
that are embodied in the second term of each
reaction curve in (6) impose a negative externality on the trading partner, pointing to an
obvious source of inefficiency. And in fact it
can be confirmed that Nash tariffs are higher
than efficient tariffs.24 But recalling that our
reduced-form government preferences are
specified in a way that is sufficiently general
to capture all of the leading models of trade
policy determination, it seems reasonable
to expect that additional sources of inefficiency might also arise depending on which
model of trade policy determination is relevant; in this light, it would be surprising if
the cost-shifting externality were the only
source of inefficiency that a trade agreement
can correct in our model. Yet this is what the
terms-of-trade theory implies.
To see this, let us suppose that the home
and foreign governments were replaced by
hypothetical governments that were not
motivated by the terms-of-trade implications
of their unilateral trade-policy choices; that
is, let us consider a hypothetical home government for which W p̃   w  ≡ 0and a hypothetical foreign government for which W p∗̃   w   ≡ 0.
If these hypothetical governments were to
select their tariffs 
noncooperatively, then
according to (6) their tariff choices would
satisfy
  p  ∗, p̃   w) .
(8)	W p  ( p, p̃   w) = 0 = Wp  ∗  ∗  ( 
Following Bagwell and Staiger (1999a, 2002),
we refer to tariffs that satisfy (8) as politically optimal tariffs. If politically optimal
tariffs are efficient, where as in (7) efficiency
is evaluated relative to actual home- and
24 See

Bagwell and Staiger (1999a, 2002).
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foreign-government preferences, then we
may conclude that the terms-of-trade externality is the sole rationale for a trade agreement in this model. But it is immediate that
(7) is satisfied when evaluated at tariffs that
satisfy (8) and hence, politically optimal tariffs are efficient.
Of course, as (7) suggests, there will, in
general, be an entire locus of tariff combinations that satisfy the condition for efficiency,
and the politically optimal tariffs represent
only one point on this locus. The politically
optimal tariffs are arguably focal, however,
as they remedy the terms-of-trade inefficiency in a direct way. For example, in the
case where governments maximize national
welfare, we have already observed that
efficient tariffs lie on the locus defined by
τ = 1 / τ  ∗, as Mayer (1981) showed. The politically optimal tariffs in this case correspond
to the reciprocal free trade point τ = τ  ∗  = 1,
which seems focal because it conforms to
the trade policies that national income maximizing governments would have adopted
in the first place, if they were not motivated
by
terms-of-trade/optimal-tariff

considerations.25
Having determined that the cost-shifting
externality is the only source of inefficiency of the Nash policies according to the
terms-of-trade theory, it is worth empha
sizing now the role that the large-country
assumption plays in establishing a purpose
for a trade agreement in this theory. In a
world of small countries where no country can impact its terms of trade with its
tariff choices, no country can engage in
25 Our claim that politically optimal tariffs are focal does
not translate into a claim that a trade agreement necessarily delivers the politically optimal tariffs. That depends, in
part, on whether politically optimal tariffs lie on the contract curve, which in turn requires that countries not be
too asymmetric. For example, as is well known, in the case
of national income-maximizing governments, a sufficiently
big country can “win the tariff war,” meaning that it is better off in the Nash equilibrium than at reciprocal free trade
(see Johnson 1 953, and Kennan and Riezman 1988).

international 
cost shifting and Nash policies are therefore efficient. According to the
terms-of-trade theory, then, the inefficiencies that a trade agreement can address are
associated with the policies of governments
that exercise market power on world markets. This is, of course, the same conclusion
that Johnson (1953) drew, but that is in fact
the striking point: the introduction of government preferences that can capture the
wide diversity of government motives that
we see in the real world does not qualify,
complicate, or change this conclusion.
When it comes to the purpose of a trade
agreement, therefore, the terms-of-trade
theory embodies a very simple idea. A
trade agreement can be valuable to governments, but only if in the absence of an
agreement governments would attempt to
shift costs onto one another and as a consequence adopt inefficient unilateral policies.
The terms-of-trade externality is simply
the mechanism by which this cost shifting
occurs. But while simple and intuitive at
one level, the practical relevance of this idea
has traditionally met with deep skepticism
among many economists. Some of this skepticism reflects a lack of empirical evidence
relating to the central tenets of the theory,
such as the degree and prevalence of market power that real-world governments can
wield in international markets and whether
their unilateral tariff choices reflect this market power when they possess it, and in section 3.2 we survey the recent empirical work
that is beginning to fill this gap. But some of
the skepticism reflects a more visceral objection to the plausibility of the theory. Here,
we briefly consider three of the main objections of this kind.
A first objection is that the terms-of-trade
theory unrealistically posits that governments seek to maximize national income with
their tariff choices. But as we have just illustrated, while the terms-of-trade theory was
originally posed by Johnson (
1953) under
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this assumption, it holds equally well when
governments have political motivations. A
second objection is that there is a disconnect
between the theory and the way real-world
governments think. This objection is often
expressed by the view that real-world governments almost never mention the “terms
of trade” in their policy discussions, and
instead the language of real trade agreements and the negotiators who craft them
emphasizes “market access.” But this disconnect may be more apparent than real,
because the insights of the terms-of-trade
theory can be easily translated into the language of market access. Specifically, when a
government raises its import tariff, it shifts
in its import demand curve, and the resulting “price effect” under which the home
country enjoys a 
terms-of-trade improvement is accompanied by a “volume effect”
under which the foreign country experiences
a reduction in access to the home market.
Using this link between price and volume
effects, the terms-of-trade theory can then
be recast using the market-access language
that trade-policy negotiators favor.26 A third
objection relates to the role played by tariff revenue in the theory’s account of the
terms-of-trade motives of governments, and
the apparent unimportance of tariff revenue
to real-world governments. There are two
main responses to this objection. First, as we
describe in the next section, the c ost-shifting
motives at the center of the terms-of-trade
theory do not hinge on government pursuit
of tariff revenue.27 Second, it is not clear that
tariff revenue should be seen as unimportant to r eal-world governments. For example,
as Kim (2013) points out, the United States
collected $31 billion in tariff revenue for FY
26 Bagwell and Staiger (2002) provide a formal definition of market access and further develop the relationship
between the terms-of-trade theory and the language of
market access.
27 See also the discussion of local-content requirements
in section 4.5.
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2012, an amount comparable to what the
United States spent in FY 2012 on foreign
aid ($23 billion) and foreign military assistance ($14 billion) combined.
3.1.6	Behind-the-Border Measures
We now briefly discuss an extension of the
benchmark model in which governments also
have behind-the-border policy instruments
at their disposal, and consider whether the
purpose of a trade agreement is changed
in this richer policy setting. Our extended
model broadly mirrors that of Bagwell and
Staiger (2001a).
Specifically, we introduce into the trade
model of the previous section a home standard, 
σ
, and a foreign standard, σ 
∗. To
fix ideas, we interpret these standards as
a labor regulation (e.g., maximum legal
work hours per week) in each country that
impacts that country’s production possibilities: for a given local price in a country, we
assume that changes in its standard shifts its
production of xand y, and hence its import
demand and export supply functions, and
therefore the market clearing world price.
Proceeding to derive the market clearing
world price as before, we therefore now have
)
. In addition to the
p̃   w= p̃   w(σ, σ  ∗, τ, τ  ∗
assumed responses of p̃   wto τ and τ  ∗ contained in (4) above, we now assume that
each country can also improve its terms of
trade with an increase in its standard (i.e., we
assume ∂ p̃   w/ ∂ σ < 0and ∂ p̃   w/ ∂ σ  ∗  > 0).
We assume that each government cares
directly about its standard, but does not care
directly about the standard imposed in the
other country. Hence, the choice of standards
can impose international pecuniary externalities (through p̃   w), but by assumption does
not impose n
on-pecuniary externalities at
the international level. With this we can now
express the government welfare functions
in this extended model by W(σ, p, p̃   w) and
W  ∗  (σ  ∗, p  ∗, p̃   w). We continue to impose the
structure in (5) on these extended g overnment
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welfare functions, and we continue to leave
unrestricted how governments care about
changes in their own local prices. We also
leave unrestricted how governments care
about changes in their own standards.
There are now four fi
 rst-order conditions
that define the Nash tariff and standards
choices:
dW(σ, p, p̃   w)
dτ

∂  p̃   w
∂τ

dp
dτ

(9)  _________=  Wp    ___+ W p̃   w  ____= 0,
dW(σ, p, p̃   w)
∂ p̃   w
_________
 
=  Wσ    + [τ Wp    + W p̃   w ]  ____= 0,
∂σ
dσ

dW  ∗(σ  ∗, p  ∗  , p̃   w)
dτ  

∂ p̃   w
∂ τ  

dp  ∗
dτ  

 ____________
  
  = Wp  ∗  ∗     ___∗   + W p∗̃   w   ___∗   = 0, and
∗
dW  ∗(σ  ∗, p  ∗, p̃   w)
dσ  

____________ 
   
∗
∂ p̃   w
∂ σ  

= Wσ  ∗   ∗  + [__
  1∗  Wp  ∗  ∗    + Wp  ∗̃   w ]    ____∗   = 0.
τ  

In addition to the two conditions defining
the home and foreign b
 est-response tariffs,
which are unchanged from our earlier discussion and which therefore have the same
interpretation, there is an additional condition for each government in (9) that defines
its best-response standard. Here, each government weighs the direct impact on its
welfare of its standards choice against the
impact of this choice on its welfare that runs
through the induced local- and world-price
effects.
Turning to the efficient policies in this
extended setting, there are now three tangency conditions that must be satisfied for
efficiency:
∂ p̃   w

d p  ∗

∂ p̃   w

Wp  ∗  ∗     ____∗   + W p∗̃   w   ___∗ 
[τ Wp    + W p̃   w  ]  ___∗ 
∂ τ  
∂ τ  
d τ  
  
  
  =   _______________
  
  
  ,
(10)  _____________
dp
dτ

∂ p̃   w
∂τ

Wp    __   + W p̃   w  ___ 

∂ p̃   w
∂τ

 [___
  1∗  Wp  ∗  ∗    + W p∗̃   w ]   ___ 
τ  

Wp  

σ
	 ______
  =  p̃   w  ______
  , and
w
w

W  
∂ p̃   / ∂ σ

∂ p̃   / ∂ τ

Wp  ∗  ∗  
p  ∗ _______
∗ 
 σ  ∗  
W

___
   .
	 _______
w
∗   = −   ∗    
τ    ∂ p̃   w/ ∂ τ  ∗
∂ p̃   / ∂ σ  

The top condition in (10) is the same tangency condition as in (7) that defined the
efficiency frontier in our benchmark model.
This condition can be interpreted as ensuring that the home and foreign tariffs are
set so that the volume of trade between the
two countries is at an efficient level.28 The
remaining two conditions can then be interpreted as ensuring that each country’s mix of
border and b
 ehind-the-border policies delivers, in an efficient way, this efficient level of
trade volume.
Finally, we may again define politically
optimal policies and make use of these hypothetical constructs to investigate the purpose
of a trade agreement in this extended setting. We therefore consider a hypothetical
home government for which W 
 p̃   w  ≡ 0and a
hypothetical foreign government for which
W p∗̃   w ≡ 0. If these hypothetical governments
were to select their tariffs and standards
noncooperatively, then according to (9), their
tariff and standards choices would satisfy
(11) W p  (σ, p, p̃   w) = 0 = Wσ  (σ, p, p̃   w), and
∗ ∗ w
∗  σ  , p  , p̃   
).
	
Wp  ∗  ∗ (  σ  ∗, p  ∗, p̃   w) = 0 = Wσ  ∗  (


As before, if these politically optimal policies
are efficient, where as in (10) efficiency is
evaluated with reference to actual home and
foreign government preferences, then we
may conclude that the terms-of-trade externality remains the sole rationale for a trade
agreement in this extended model. But it is
immediate that (10) is satisfied when evaluated at tariffs and standards that satisfy (11);
hence, politically optimal tariffs and standards are indeed efficient.
In fact, as is suggested by this result,
regardless of the extent of behind-the-border
measures that governments may have at their
28 See Bagwell and Staiger (2001a) for elaboration on
this interpretation and the remaining interpretations of the
efficiency conditions that we describe in the text.
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disposal, according to the 
terms-of-trade
theory the purpose of a trade agreement
remains the same. Governments use trade
agreements to undo the policy inefficiencies
that arise with unilateral policy choices when
those choices can shift the costs of intervention onto trading partners through movements in foreign exporter prices (terms of
trade).
We may now emphasize a further insight
offered by the 
terms-of-trade theory that
follows from its stance on the purpose of a
trade agreement. Specifically, as the only
“problem” for a trade agreement to “solve” is
terms-of-trade manipulation, and as the tariff is the fi
 rst-best policy for terms-of-trade
manipulation, the 
terms-of-trade theory
implies that the tariff is the only policy
that is distorted in the Nash equilibrium:
behind-the-border measures are set effi
ciently under Nash choices. This insight is
lurking in the conditions presented above,
and it can be confirmed by noting that the top
two conditions of (9) imply the middle condition of (10), while the bottom two conditions
of (9) imply the bottom condition of (10).
Hence, the only efficiency condition that is
not met in the Nash equilibrium according
to the t erms-of-trade theory is the top condition of (10) that determines the efficient level
of tariffs (which are lower than their Nash
levels) and the efficient level of trade volume
(which is higher than the Nash level). In this
sense, the terms-of-trade theory provides a
foundation for trade agreements that adopt a
shallow approach to integration.29
Our formal discussion here has focused
on a particular form of b
 ehind-the-border
measure that is best thought of as a production standard, such as a workplace
regulation or a regulation on the use of an

o pen-access resource in the production process. So it is important to note that the points
we have emphasized apply more broadly
to 
behind-the-border measures of various
kinds, including tax and subsidy policies and
various forms of standards beyond production standards.30 Of particular relevance to
the world trading system are product standards, such as minimum b
 urn-through rates
for doors or prohibitions on lead additives to
paint, that can raise the costs of supplying
a market but, unlike import tariffs, do not
raise revenue. In light of the prominent role
played by tariff revenue in our account of
the terms-of-trade motives of governments
described above, it might be thought that
those motives do not apply to such standards.
But our discussion applies equally well to
these kinds of b
 ehind-the-border measures,
once it is understood that international
cost-shifting occurs when such product standards are imposed, as long as foreign exporters do not pass the full cost of meeting the
product standards on to consumers in the
country where the standard applies.31

29 More specifically and as we describe in more detail
below, the terms-of-trade theory supports an approach to
behind-the-border measures that revolves around reliance
on a “market-access preservation” rule.

30 For an extension of these points to the case of domestic tax/subsidy policies, see Bagwell and Staiger (2006).
31 See Staiger and Sykes (2011) for a treatment of product standards in this context.

3.2 Evidence
We now survey the evidence related to
the central tenets of the 
terms-of-trade
theory. We focus on three basic questions.
First, how significant and widespread is
the market power that countries possess in
world markets? Second, do the unilateral
tariff choices of countries reflect the market
power that they possess? And third, does
the pattern of negotiated tariff liberalization that we observe correlate with the pattern of observed market power in the way
that the theory suggests it should? Answers
to these questions seem central to all of the
theory’s predictions, and so we focus on
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them here, postponing until later points in
our survey a discussion of the empirical work
relating to various other predictions of the
terms-of-trade theory.
3.2.1 Market Power
Do countries routinely possess a degree
of market power in world markets that
would allow them to manipulate their terms
of trade? To answer this first question, we
begin by observing that there is a large body
of indirect evidence that suggests an affirmative answer. We are referring here to the literature on exchange-rate p
 ass-through.
To establish the connection between the
exchange-rate pass-through literature and an
answer to our first question, we proceed in
two steps. First, we note that Feenstra (1989)
shows theoretically that the pass-through to
domestic prices associated with exchangerate shocks can be thought of as comparable
in magnitude to the pass-through associated
with tariff changes, and he offers econometric evidence supporting this hypothesis
of symmetric pass-through between tariffs
and exchange rates in the data. Second, we
note that, while we have adopted above a
general-equilibrium setting to present the
terms-of-trade theory, the theory can also be
developed in a 
partial-equilibrium model,
where cost shifting then occurs through
changes in the terms of trade provided that
foreign exporters bear some of the incidence of the import tariff so that it is not
fully passed through to domestic prices.32
That is, incomplete pass-through of the tariff
to domestic prices is synonymous with cost
shifting, and the exercise of importer market power. Hence, by the second step, the
terms-of-trade effects of a tariff arise whenever the incidence of the tariff is not fully
passed through to domestic prices; and by
32 See Bagwell and Staiger (2001b) for a development of
the terms-of-trade theory of trade agreements in the context of a partial-equilibrium model.

the first step, we may look to the vast empirical literature on exchange-rate pass-through
for indirect evidence about the degree of tariff pass-through.
What does the exchange-rate p
 ass-through
literature imply for the answer to our first
question? First, in light of the conclusion
from Goldberg and Knetter’s (1997) survey of this literature that pass-through rates
average about 60 percent, it would appear
that the existence of countries that possess
substantial market power in world markets
is routine. Second, after surveying this literature in his handbook chapter, Feenstra (1995,
p. 1569) concludes that, while there is strong
evidence that pass-through is less than complete, the magnitude of pass-through differs
substantially across industries and therefore
“. . . we should not have any presumption
about the extent of terms of trade gain due
to tariffs, but must treat each industry on a
case-by-case basis.”
Turning to the direct evidence on this first
question, in a provocative paper, Magee and
Magee (2008) construct measures of world
market concentration and trade elasticities
to argue that even a “large” country like
the United States has little market power
to exert on world markets, suggesting that
market power can safely be ignored when
considering the effects of tariffs. But for the
most part, the literature has produced results
that are consistent with the conclusions from
the indirect evidence emphasized above.
For example, the studies of Kreinin (1961),
Winters and Chang (2000), Chang and
Winters (2002), Anderson and van Wincoop
(2002), and Bown and Crowley (2006), among
others, all offer evidence that unilateral tariff changes can significantly affect a country’s
terms of trade. On the other hand, in their
study of New Zealand’s unilateral trade liberalization of the 1980’s, Winkelmann and
Winkelmann (1998) find only weak evidence
of incomplete p
 ass-through of New Zealand
tariffs to prices in the New Zealand e conomy,
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and only in a few industries, and conclude
that New Zealand truly is an example of a
small country in most products. Finally, using
high-frequency data on the price of raw sugar
in New York City from 1890 to 1930, Irwin
(2014) finds that about 60percent of any US
tariff increase was borne by foreign exporters with only 4 0percent passed through to
domestic-consumer prices.33
These studies seem to confirm the basic
conclusion of Feenstra (1995), that there
is abundant evidence of substantial market
power, but its presence varies greatly from
industry to industry and country to country.
This conclusion is further reinforced by the
most comprehensive study to date on the
issue, that of Broda, Limão, and Weinstein
(2008). Focusing on the unilateral tariff
choices of fifteen countries prior to their
membership in the GATT/WTO, Broda et
al. estimate the foreign-export supply elasticities faced by each of these countries, which
as they note, provides an inverse measure
of the market power that each was able to
exert on the foreign-export (world) prices.
With these estimates, they confirm that most
countries, even apparently “small” countries,
have significant ability to alter their terms of
trade on many imported products with their
tariff choices.
3.2.2 Unilateral Tariffs
We next turn to the second question raised
above: do the unilateral tariff choices of
countries reflect the market power that they
possess?
An early paper that provides evidence
on this question is Olarreaga, Soloaga, and
Winters (1999). Examining the determinants
of the common external tariff adopted by
MERCOSUR in 1996 (a period when the
33 Irwin (2014) also finds a striking asymmetry between
 ass-through rates for tariff increases and tariff reductions,
p
with the latter passed through fully to consumers. He attributes this asymmetry to asymmetric demand responses.
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common external tariff of MERCOSUR was
essentially unconstrained by WTO commitments), they conclude that terms-of-trade
effects account for a substantial part
(between 6 and 28percent) of the explained
variation in the structure of MERCOSUR
tariffs, despite the fact that during the period
of their analysis, MERCOSUR had only a
1percent market share of world trade.
This question is also addressed by the
Broda, Limão, and Weinstein (2008) paper
discussed above. Specifically, after estimating the foreign-export supply elasticities
faced by each of the fi
 fteenn
 on-GATT/WTO
member countries in their sample, Broda et
al. relate this measure of the power to affect
world prices to the unilateral (i.e., prior to
WTO accession) tariff choices that each
country made. They find that, prior to joining
the WTO, these countries set tariffs an average of 9 percentage points higher on imports
for which they could exert large effects on
world prices, as compared to the tariffs they
set on imports where their ability to affect
world prices was limited—an impact whose
magnitude is roughly comparable to the size
of the average tariffs in these countries. They
also find that this 
terms-of-trade motive
explains more of the cross-industry variation
in tariffs than is explained by commonly used
political-economy variables.
Hence, according to the Olarreaga,
Soloaga, and Winters (1999) and Broda,
Limão, and Weinstein (2008) findings, governments who set their trade policies unilaterally and noncooperatively respond
to 
terms-of-trade motives and the market
power that they possess strongly and in the
way that the theory predicts. These findings are reinforced by the recent paper of
Dhingra (2014). Dhingra shows that the
median-voter model of n
 oncooperative tariff
determination is strongly rejected by the data
in its traditional small-country formulation,
but that its central predictions receive strong
cross-country empirical support, once it is
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cast in a large-country setting and the existence of market power and terms-of-trade
motives are taken into account when predicting the cross-country pattern of tariffs.
3.2.3 Negotiated Tariffs
Finally, we consider the third of our three
questions: does the pattern of negotiated
tariff liberalization that we observe correlate with the pattern of observed market
power in the way that the theory suggests it
should? As with the literature that takes up
this question, we focus below on the pattern of negotiated tariff liberalization in the
GATT/WTO, rather than PTAs. We consider
the pattern of liberalization that has taken
place within PTAs and its compatibility with
the terms-of-trade theory in the context of
later discussions.
In light of the literature’s finding surveyed
just above that market power is a strong
determinant of unilateral tariff choices,
one way to pose this third question is to ask
whether the same can be said for negotiated tariffs. If market power is an equally
strong determinant of negotiated tariffs,
then this would indicate a lack of support
for the view that trade agreements serve to
limit the exercise of market power by their
member governments; on the other hand,
if negotiated tariffs are unrelated to market power, then together with the findings
reported in the literature that unilateral
tariffs are strongly related to market power,
this would suggest that trade agreements do
indeed limit the exercise of market power.
This is the approach that Broda, Limão,
and Weinstein (2008) take. Focusing on the
United States, they find that US n
 ontariff
barriers and 
so-called “statutory” tariff rates—neither of which has been the
subject of negotiations within the GATT/
WTO—are significantly and positively
related to the degree of market power that
the United States exerts on the world prices
of its import products, while the US MFN

tariffs—which have been subjected to the
many rounds of GATT/WTO negotiations—
exhibit no such relationship.
A related approach is taken by Nicita,
Olarreaga, and Silva (2013). They focus on
the nature of the tariff commitments made
by WTO member countries—commitments
that, as we have described above, take the
form of bindings defining the maximum
allowable level for the tariff—and exploit
the fact that countries differ in the degree to
which their negotiated WTO tariff commitments constrain their applied tariffs (i.e., the
tariff levels that they actually set). Nicita et al.
observe that tariffs that are unconstrained
by WTO bindings should exhibit a positive
correlation with market power, for the reasons associated with unilateral tariffs that we
describe above. But Nicita et al. also derive
a new prediction: they argue that tariffs constrained by WTO bindings (the “cooperative
tariffs” ) should exhibit a negative correlation
with market power. This prediction follows
under their assumptions that (a) exporters
enjoy extra political-economy weight in the
objectives of their governments, and (b)
their governments lack trade instruments of
their own (e.g., export subsidies) to shift surplus to these exporters. Under these assumptions, the only way for a government to help
its exporters is to negotiate a tariff cut in the
foreign markets served by its exporters, and
the political payoff to the government from
negotiating such tariff cuts will be higher the
greater the importer market power is in the
foreign market where the negotiating efforts
are focused (and hence the greater the
exporter price effect of the tariff cuts). On
this basis, they predict that the cooperative
tariff levels will be negatively correlated with
importer market power. Examining the tariffs of 101WTO members, Nicita et al. find
that the sign of the correlation between tariff levels and market power indeed switches
from positive to negative as the WTO tariff
bindings vary from levels that are well above
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applied tariff rates to levels that are at the
applied tariff rates.34
Beshkar, Bond, and Rho (2015) derive a
related prediction in an extension of the
basic terms-of-trade model that emphasizes
the 
trade-off between commitments and
flexibility. (We discuss their paper further
in section 4.2.) Within this extended model,
they show that applied tariffs are more likely
to be set at their W
 TO-bound levels at any
point in time the greater the market power
is for that product possessed by the importing government; and with a sufficiently high
level of import market power, applied tariffs
are always set at the level of the negotiated
binding. Beshkar et al. find strong evidence
for these predicted relationships between
negotiated tariff commitments and importer
market power with data on the tariffs of 1 09
WTO member countries.
A different approach to this question is
taken by Bagwell and Staiger (2011). They
use the terms-of-trade theory to derive an
expression for the component of the noncooperative tariff that embodies the international 
cost-shifting motive. They then
use this expression to derive the pattern
of negotiated tariff cuts that is implied by
the 
terms-of-trade theory; intuitively, if
the 
cost-shifting component is big, then
the negotiated tariff cut implied by the
terms-of-trade theory should be large.

Working from this basic insight, Bagwell and
Staiger show that the tariff cuts predicted by
the terms-of-trade theory can be expressed
as a function of pre-negotiation import volumes and prices, and measures of the power
to affect world prices. The predicted relationship is then confronted with data from
34 Nicita, Olarreaga, and Silva (2013) also report that
the expected positive correlation between tariffs and market power emerges in their data only once the WTO tariff commitments are sufficiently above the applied tariff
levels. They view this as something of a puzzle, and suggest that it may reflect some form of implicit cooperation
among WTO member countries.
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the accession negotiations of sixteen countries that joined the WTO subsequent to its
creation in 1995, and strong and robust support for the predictions of the terms-of-trade
theory are found in the observed pattern of
negotiated tariff concessions.
Ludema and Mayda (2013) advance the
literature on this question by allowing that
free-rider issues associated with the MFN
principle (which we discuss at length further below) might impede governments
from fully addressing terms-of-trade manipulation in their GATT/WTO tariff negotiations. Augmenting the basic terms-of-trade
model with a model of endogenous bargaining participation, they show that negotiated
tariffs should be negatively related to the
product of the importer’s market power and
exporter concentration. Intuitively, the lower
exporter concentration is, the more severe
the free-rider problem associated with MFN
will be, and the less effective negotiations
will be in ridding the tariff of its c ost-shifting
component. Further, the larger the market
power, the larger this cost-shifting component will be. Ludema and Mayda take this
prediction to the tariff data for thirtyW
 TO
member countries and find strong support,
concluding (p. 1837) that “…the internalization of terms of trade effects through WTO
negotiations has lowered the average tariff
of these countries by 2 2 to 2 7 percentcompared to its noncooperative level.”
Yet a different perspective on answering this question is provided by Bown
and Crowley (2013b), who investigate
empirically some of the predictions of the
terms-of-trade theory when that theory is

developed in a repeated-tariff game setting
subject to stochastic trade volume shocks
and where 
self-enforcement constraints
are binding.35 A basic prediction of the
35 Bagwell and Staiger (1990) develop this model, which
we describe along with additional discussion of the findings
of Bown and Crowley (2013b) in section 4.2.
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terms-of-trade theory in this setting is that,
where the self-enforcement constraint is
binding, cooperative tariffs must rise somewhat in the face of import surges in order to
mitigate the increased temptation implied by
the higher import volume to shift costs onto
foreign exporters with an even higher tariff. Among the additional predictions of the
model highlighted by Bown and Crowley is
that, for a given import surge, a cooperative
tariff increase is more likely on a product if
the market power possessed by the importing government on that product is higher.
Utilizing data on the time-varying protective measures (antidumping and safeguard
actions) of the United States over the period
1997–2006, the authors confirm these and
other predictions of the terms-of-trade theory in this setting.
Summarizing, the empirical papers surveyed above provide a growing body of evidence consistent with the central tenets of
the 
terms-of-trade theory of trade agreements. While we discuss below evidence
that lends some support as well to the other
strands of the trade-agreement literature,
our review here suggests that, at a minimum, the terms-of-trade theory is central
for understanding actual trade agreements,
and provides a reasonable basis from which
to seek initial answers to our survey’s motivating questions.
3.3 Has Globalization under the WTO
Gone Far Enough?
With the broad features of the
terms-of-trade theory of trade agreements
described, we now pose a first and basic question. Viewed from the lens of this theory, might
it be possible to conclude that globalization
under the GATT/WTO has already allowed
its member governments to reach the international efficiency frontier? This is a question
that we must confront in the ensuing pages
in the process of answering the motivating
questions of our survey. But we pause here to

 ispel one natural misconception, namely, that
d
an immediately plausible answer to this question might be “No, as long as trade is not truly
free.” The terms-of-trade theory requires a
more nuanced answer because, according to
this theory, the purpose of a trade agreement
is not to secure free trade, but to remove
the inefficient cost-shifting component from
the unilateral tariff choices of its member
governments. As we have observed, this
outcome could be compatible with free trade,
but only under certain strong assumptions
about the preferences of governments—
assumptions that seem unlikely to be met
in the real world. Accordingly, the continued existence of tariffs is not by itself evidence of further work to be done. To know
whether globalization under the WTO has
gone far enough requires, according to the
terms-of-trade theory, a more nuanced assessment of the theoretical and empirical issues
addressed by the literature we survey below.
Much as the continued existence of tariffs
cannot by itself be interpreted as a sign of
lingering inefficiencies in the GATT/WTO
system, neither can one interpret the lack
of negotiated GATT/WTO commitments
on b
ehind-the-border measures as a sure
sign of GATT/WTO failings according to the
terms-of-trade theory. Indeed, as is suggested
by our discussion of behind-the-border measures above and as we highlight further
below, the GATT/WTO shallow-integration
approach is compatible with efficiency in the
presence of certain kinds of accompanying
rules, rules that we will suggest at a broad
level find representation in the GATT/WTO.
Again with regard to b
 ehind-the-border measures, to know whether globalization under
the WTO has gone far enough requires,
according to the terms-of-trade theory, a
more nuanced assessment.
Finally, we emphasize two important
points that are implicit in our discussion here
and should be kept in mind as we proceed
through the survey. First, for the most part the
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terms-of-trade theory of trade agreements
treats government preferences as fixed and
sovereign, much as consumer preferences
are taken as sovereign in standard consumer
theory, and seeks to understand trade agreements as agreements that lead to Pareto
improvements for the member governments
when gauged from the perspective of their
own preferences. This is clearly not the only
possible assumption, and below we also discuss some papers in this strand of the literature that entertain alternative assumptions.
But the assumption does resonate well with
the “member driven” nature of real-world
trade agreements, especially the GATT/
WTO. As we later discuss, the commitment
theory strand of the trade agreements literature can be interpreted as adopting a major
departure from this assumption, and so we
consider these alternatives in more depth
when we survey that strand of the literature.
A second point is that the terms-of-trade
theory (and the other strands of the trade
agreements literature as well) takes the policy
instruments that a government has at its disposal as fixed. Hence, while it is w
 ell-known
(Bhagwati and Ramaswami 1963) that a tariff
is a second-best instrument for virtually every
domestic policy goal that could be imagined,
the trade-agreements literature starts from
the view that there are often constraints (usually unmodeled) that prevent governments
from using the fi
 rst-best instruments for their
policy goals and lead them to use tariffs to
achieve these goals instead. And given that
these governments are constrained to use
tariffs for, e.g., distributional reasons, the
trade-agreements literature then explores the
role of trade agreements in eliminating inefficiencies from their tariff choices.36 This feature is important to keep in mind, as without
36 We discuss some partial exceptions in the literature at
later points in our survey, such as Limão and Tovar (2011),
but even there the availability of fi
 rst-best instruments are
ruled out by assumption.
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it the notion that the use of tariffs could ever
be compatible with a position on the efficiency frontier (beyond tariffs that reside on
the Mayer locus) would seem strange.
4.

Evaluating the GATT/WTO Approach
to Trade Liberalization

We now turn to an evaluation of the
GATT/WTO approach to trade liberalization
from the perspective of the 
terms-of-trade
theory of trade agreements literature. This
strand of the literature seeks to evaluate the
design and performance of the GATT/WTO
as an institution that could plausibly help
governments in their attempts to solve the
terms-of-trade externality problem that we

described in section 3. We use our survey
of this literature to ask: Is the GATT/WTO
well-designed at a fundamental level to help
governments address the t erms-of-trade problem? And can the successes and failures of the
GATT/WTO record be broadly understood to
reflect the strengths and weaknesses of these
design features when interpreted within the
context of the terms-of-trade problem? If the
answers to these questions are affirmative,
then we tentatively conclude that the GATT/
WTO is an institution worthy of the continued support of economists. This is not to say
that PTAs might not also be deserving of support—we take up that question in the next
section—but rather to say that the GATT/
WTO appears fundamentally w
 ell-designed
and thus worthy of support when viewed from
the perspective of the terms-of-trade theory.37
37 Our discussion here presupposes that institutions
matter for solving problems of international trade policy
cooperation. As Maggi (2014) emphasizes, this assumption
indicates the existence of underlying frictions, even though
these frictions are not often explicitly modeled. That instutitions matter in this context seems clear from the historical
experience with international trade policy cooperation, and
the many failed attempts at international cooperation that
preceded the creation of GATT. See Bagwell and Staiger
(2010b) and the literature cited therein for further discussion of the historical antecedents of GATT.
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We organize our discussion into six
parts. Section 4.1 considers the GATT pillars of reciprocity and the 
most-favored
nation (MFN) clause, and the general
self-enforcing nature of GATT/WTO commitments. Sections 4.2 through 4.5 survey
the literature on more specific features of
the GATT/WTO approach that are central
to identifying current concerns. Throughout,
we highlight a number of significant challenges facing the GATT/WTO approach.
Section 4.6 summarizes by offering an initial
terms-of-trade-theory-based perspective on
how the GATT/WTO has worked, its current
woes and possible fixes.
4.1 Reciprocity, MFN, and Enforcement
In this section, we review research
based on the terms-of-trade approach that
examines the three pillars of the GATT/
WTO architecture: reciprocity, MFN, and
enforcement.
4.1.2 Reciprocity
Governments reach agreements to lower
tariffs through GATT/WTO negotiation
rounds. It is often observed that these negotiations reflect a norm of reciprocity and
entail a “balance of concessions,” whereby
each government makes the “concession”
of lowering its import tariffs in exchange for
receiving the benefit of a similar concession
from a trading partner. Such a norm would
be difficult to interpret in a model with small
countries. The reciprocity norm, however,
admits a straightforward interpretation when
countries are large.
To develop this point, we return to the
terms-of-trade model described in sec
tion 3. Let us suppose that the two governments start at the Nash tariffs. We
know from our earlier discussion that
these tariffs are inefficiently high, due to
the terms-of-trade externality. Since each
government selects its best-response tariff
at a Nash equilibrium, no government can

gain from a unilateral tariff cut. This simple
observation provides an immediate interpretation for why a government regards its
own tariff cut as a concession. Governments
may enjoy mutual gains, however, if they
jointly reduce tariffs. Indeed, as Bagwell
and Staiger (1999a, 2002) show, when governments start at the Nash tariffs, (τ   N, τ  ∗N),
as defined by (6), they can mutually gain
from moving to a new pair of tariffs (τ, τ  ∗)
only if they both offer strictly lower tariffs,
so that τ < τ   N and τ  ∗  < τ  ∗N. A general form
of reciprocity is thus necessary for mutual
gains.
We may also interpret reciprocity at a
more specific level. Following Bagwell and
Staiger (1999a, 2002), let us associate the
principle of reciprocity with mutual changes
in trade policy that bring about changes in
the volume of each country’s imports that
are of equal value to changes in the volume
of its exports. Formally, for given initial and
subsequent tariff pairs, (τ   0, τ  ∗0) and (τ  1, τ  ∗1),
respectively, a set of tariff changes Δτ   ≡   τ  1  − τ  0
and Δ
  τ  ∗  ≡ τ  ∗1  − τ  ∗0 satisfies the principle of
reciprocity if
(12) p ̃   w0  [M( p  1, p̃   w1) − M( p  0, p̃   w0)]  
    = [E( p  1, p̃   w1) − E( p  0, p̃   w0)], 
where p̃   w0  ≡ p̃   w(τ  0, τ  ∗0), p̃   w1  ≡ p̃   w(τ  1, τ  ∗1),
p  0  = p(τ  0, p̃   w0), p  1  = p(τ  1, p̃   w1), and tradevolume changes are valued at the initial
world price, p̃   w0. In this t wo-good model, as
Bagwell and Staiger establish, a set of tariff
changes satisfies the principle of reciprocity
if and only if the world price is unchanged
.This finding may be
so that p̃   w0  = p̃   w1
easily confirmed by applying (1) to (12),
where (1) is applied at both the initial and
subsequent tariff pairs.
Is liberalization according to the principle of reciprocity sufficient for mutual
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gains? To address this question, we start at
the Nash tariffs as characterized in (6) and
consider for simplicity the preferences of
the home government. Given (4) and (5), it
is s traightforward to see that W p  < 0 when
tariffs are at their Nash levels. Thus, at
Nash tariffs, the home government would
prefer more trade (a lower relative price of
imports) if it could achieve a greater trade
volume without inducing a loss in the home
country’s terms of trade. A unilateral tariff
cut delivers greater trade volume for the
home country, but it does so at the cost of
a deterioration in the home country’s terms
of trade. By contrast, mutual changes in
trade policy that satisfy the principle of
reciprocity enable the home country (and
similarly the foreign country) to enjoy
greater trade volume without suffering a
terms-of-trade loss. Thus, and as Bagwell
and Staiger (1999a, 2002) show, starting at
the Nash equilibrium, trade liberalization
that satisfies the principle of reciprocity is
sure to raise each government’s welfare,
at least initially.38 This finding offers an
interpretation for the reciprocity norm that
guides 
trade-liberalization negotiations in
GATT/WTO.
While more evidence is needed, recent
empirical work offers some support for
the important role played by reciprocity
in GATT/WTO tariff negotiations. In an
early effort, Shirono (2004) considers the
Uruguay Round and finds that the negotiated tariff reductions conform well with
the reciprocity norm. Limão (2006, 2007)
considers US tariff cuts in the Uruguay
38 In

a symmetric setting, if governments were to liberalize according to the principle of reciprocity and move,
thereby, from the Nash equilibrium to the politically optimal tariffs, then they would enjoy mutual gains all along
this path. In an asymmetric setting, if governments were
to liberalize according to the principle of reciprocity, then
mutual benefits may disappear before the efficiency frontier is reached. In both settings, mutual gains are enjoyed
provided that the liberalization does not go too far.
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Round and also reports evidence consistent
with the 
application of reciprocity. After
constructing a measure of m

 arket-access
concessions and identifying instruments
that address possible endogeneity concerns, he presents evidence of reciprocity
for US products that were not subject to
nontariff barriers. Among such goods, US
import tariff reductions embody a general form of reciprocity, being greater for
goods exported from countries whose own
tariff cuts provided greater market access
to US exports. Karacaovali and Limão
(2008) provide similar support for reciprocity in a related exercise for the European
Union. Finally, we also note that evidence
of reciprocity may be stronger in some
product groups than in others. Gulotty
(2014) focuses on tariff liberalization by the
United States in the Uruguay Round and
reports evidence that sectors with highly
contract-intensive products, character
istic of global production, do not exhibit
reciprocity.
The principle of reciprocity is a key pillar of the GATT/WTO approach to trade
liberalization. Our discussion to this point
considers the principle of reciprocity as
a bargaining norm that characterizes the
manner in which tariffs are reduced in
GATT/WTO negotiations. The principle of
reciprocity, however, also explicitly arises
in GATT/WTO rules that govern the manner in which tariffs may be raised as part
of renegotiation or dispute resolution
procedures.
4.1.3	Most-Favored Nation Treatment
A second pillar of the GATT/WTO architecture is the principle of n
 ondiscrimination.
For member countries, this principle
requires that a country apply the same tariff on a given import good, regardless of
which country exports the good. This principle is embodied in the m
 ost-favored nation
(MFN) rule, under which no exporter of a
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given good can be treated any less favorably
than any other exporter.
To interpret and evaluate the principle of
nondiscrimination, we extend the terms-oftrade model in a simple fashion to allow for
three countries. As before, the home country imports good x and exports good y . We
now assume, however, that there are two
foreign countries. Foreign countries 1 and
2each trade with the home country, importing good y and exporting good x, and we
assume for simplicity that the two foreign
countries do not trade with each other. The
local price in the home country is again represented as p ≡ p x/p y, while the local price
in foreign country i, where i = 1, 2, is given
by p  ∗i  ≡ p x∗i  /p y∗i  . The world price for trade
between the home country and foreign
country 
iis denoted as p 
 wi  ≡ p x∗i  /p y and
represents the terms of trade for foreign
country i. Let t  i represent the home-country
ad valorem tariff applied to imports from
foreign country i, and let t  ∗i denote the ad
valorem tariff of foreign country i applied
to imports from the home country. Defining
τ    i  ≡ 1 + t  i and τ  ∗i  ≡ 1 + t  ∗i, we then
have from arbitrage conditions that
p  ∗i  = p  wi/τ  ∗i and p = τ  1 p  w1  = τ   2 p  w2. From
here, we see that if the home country
adopts discriminatory tariffs, defined
by τ  1  ≠ τ   2, then different world prices,
p  w1  ≠ p  w2, obtain for its two foreign trading partners. The foreign country that
receives the lower import tariff enjoys
a better terms of trade. If instead the
home country satisfies the principle of
nondiscrimination (i.e., the MFN rule),

defined by τ  1  = τ   2  ≡ τ, then p  w1  = p  w2  ≡ p  w
follows, and so the two foreign countries
enjoy the same terms of trade, p  w. Under
the MFN rule, the home country’s terms of
trade are given as 1/p  w.
Our next steps are to determine
market-clearing prices and represent each
government’s welfare function. We begin
with the simplest case, where the home

country’s tariffs satisfy the MFN rule. In
that case, as noted, a single world price
obtains. The market-clearing world price,
),may then be deterp̃   w(τ, τ  ∗1, τ  ∗2
mined similarly to how we do so above
for the 
two-country model. With the
market-clearing

local
prices
then
given as p
(τ, p̃   w) = τ p̃   w and p  ∗i  (τ  ∗i, p̃   w)
= p̃   w/τ  ∗i ,we may represent the respective government welfare functions as
W(p, p̃   w), W  ∗1 ( p  ∗1, p̃   w), and W  ∗2 ( p  ∗2, p̃   w).
Following Bagwell and Staiger (1999a,
2002), we may now again impose two
key assumptions: each country can
improve its terms of trade by raising its
import tariff (i.e., ∂

 p̃   w(τ, τ  ∗1, τ  ∗2)/ ∂ τ  ∗i 
w
∗1 ∗2
; and each gov> 0 > ∂ p̃   (τ, τ  , τ  )/∂ τ)
ernment prefers an improvement in its
terms of trade, holding fixed its local price
(i.e., Wp  ̃   w (p, p̃   w) < 0 < Wp  ∗ĩ   w  ( p  ∗i, p̃   w)).
Analogous steps apply as well for the case
in which the home country utilizes discriminatory tariffs, although in that case the home
country’s terms of trade are more complex
to define. As Bagwell and Staiger (1999a,
2002) discuss, when the home country’s tariffs are discriminatory, the home country’s
multilateral terms of trade are defined as
a weighted average of its bilateral terms of
trade, 1 / p  w1 and 1 / p  w2, where the weights
are export shares and thus depend on foreign local prices. It follows that international
externalities associated with foreign import
tariffs then travel through home’s multilateral terms of trade via foreign local-price
channels, as well as bilateral t erms-of-trade
channels. Intuitively, when the home government employs discriminatory tariffs, it
cares not just about the bilateral terms of
trade but also about the share of exports
that comes from each partner, as it enjoys
greater tariff revenue when a higher share
of a given import volume comes from
the partner on which the import tariff is
highest. The formal counterpart to this
intuition is that the home country enjoys
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improved multilateral terms of trade when
a greater share of its imports comes from
the partner on which it places the highest
import tariff.
With the three-country model described,
we now consider the value of the principle
of nondiscrimination.39 A simple observation is already at hand: when the MFN
rule is used, international externalities
associated with tariff choices are channeled through the world price alone, just
as in the two-country model. A key implication is that the main findings presented
above for the t wo-country model carry over
as well to the multi-country model when
the MFN rule is imposed. Specifically, as
Bagwell and Staiger (1999a, 2002) show, if
home-country tariffs are nondiscriminatory,
then Nash tariffs are inefficient, politically
optimal tariffs are efficient, and a small liberalization between the home country and
a foreign trading partner that starts at the
Nash tariffs and that satisfies the principle
of reciprocity is sure to generate mutual
gains for the two negotiating governments.40 The latter finding suggests a broad
complementarity between the principles
of reciprocity and 
nondiscrimination: the
latter principle ensures that international
externalities travel through the world price,
which is a channel that the former principle
is well-equipped to manage.
The m
 ulti-country model also allows
consideration of sequential negotiations
between trading partners. The possibility
of sequential negotiations is easily motivated in the trade-agreement context. First,
39 For analyses of the MFN rule in other modeling
frameworks, see Bagwell and Staiger (2001a), Choi (1995),
McCalman (2002), and Saggi (2004), for example. Bagwell
and Staiger (2010b) and Horn and Mavroidis (2001) offer
further discussion of research on the legal and economic
aspects of the nondiscrimination principle.
40 By contrast, due to the presence of local-price externalities, politically optimal tariffs are not efficient when
discriminatory tariffs are used.
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within a given negotiation round, some
bilateral negotiations may precede others,
suggesting that strategic considerations
associated with sequential negotiations
may come into play. Second, liberalization
efforts in the GATT/WTO system have
occurred over more than sixty-five years in
the context of eight different negotiation
rounds, and so negotiations among a given
set of countries naturally occur through
time across different negotiation rounds.
Finally, accession dates differ across GATT/
WTO members, so that some countries
participating in a given negotiation round
may not have participated in earlier rounds.
To capture new insights associated with
the sequential nature of negotiations, we
assume that the home government initially
negotiates with the government of foreign
country 1and subsequently negotiates
with the government of foreign country 2 .
A key question is whether the principle of
nondiscrimination may be interpreted as

having efficiency-enhancing implications in
this sequential context.
We begin by putting this question in
broader context and highlighting potential
inefficiencies that the MFN rule may introduce. As Caplin and Krishna (1988) emphasize, the MFN rule is a restriction on the set
of instruments and thus shifts in the bargaining frontier; hence, an efficiency-enhancing
role for nondiscrimination is available only
if the bargaining process in the absence of
the MFN rule delivers inefficient outcomes.
Furthermore, in the context of sequential
negotiations, it is commonly argued that
the MFN rule may lead to a “free-rider”
problem, whereby a country refrains from
offering significant concessions since it
expects anyhow to enjoy MFN tariff cuts
from trading partners undertaking their
own negotiations. As Caplin and Krishna
argue, the MFN 
free-rider concern suggests that bargaining under the MFN rule
may fail to deliver efficient outcomes even
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relative to the MFN-constrained efficiency
frontier.41
We now consider sequential bargaining in the three-country model, where the
first-stage bargain between the governments
of the home country and foreign country 1
determines (τ  1, τ  ∗1) and the second-stage
bargain between the governments of the
home country and foreign country 2 determines (τ  2, τ  ∗2). Our first step is to identify
a bargaining inefficiency that arises in the
absence of the MFN rule. As Bagwell and
Staiger (2005b) show, under a slight strengthening of the assumptions given above, any
proposed efficient tariff vector is vulnerable
to bilateral opportunism: by appropriately
lowering the second-stage tariffs that they
apply to one another, the governments of
the home country and foreign country 2can
enjoy mutual welfare gains that come about
at the expense of the government of foreign
country 1. Intuitively, such s econd-stage tariff reductions lead to a terms-of-trade loss
for foreign country 1 ,and for two reasons.
First, the discriminatory tariff cut that the
home government offers stimulates export
supply in foreign country 2and thus generates downward pressure on the world price
of foreign country 1’s export good. Second,
the tariff cut offered by the government of
foreign country 2 induces greater demand
for the home export good and thus generates
upward pressure on the world price of foreign country 1’s import good.

41 Ludema
(1991) shows, however, that an
 FN-efficient bargaining outcome is possible, if particiM
pating countries have the option to reject an agreement
and continue bargaining when another country free rides
and refuses to cut its own tariffs. For bargaining within a
given round, Ludema’s finding suggests that the threat of
delayed agreement may be an important defense against
free riding. His model, however, may be less well-suited
for bargaining that occurs over time and across rounds, as
then negotiations in one round may be undertaken with a
view toward endogenously affecting the outside options for
acceding countries in future rounds.

In the absence of the MFN rule, bilateral
opportunism in the second-stage bargain
thus ensures an inefficient outcome. The
prospect of second-stage bilateral opportunism may feed back and limit the scope of the
first-stage bargain as well. If the government
of foreign country 1were to foresee that the
value of any fi
 rst-stage concession obtained
from the home government might be eroded
by an even greater concession extended
to foreign country 2, then the government
of foreign country 1 might be cautious in
extending its own fi
 rst-stage concession. In
light of the inevitable bargaining inefficiencies that arise in the absence of the MFN rule,
we move now to the second step of our discussion and examine whether the MFN rule
addresses the bilateral opportunism problem
and thereby promotes efficiency. As Schwartz
and Sykes (1997) argue, it is natural to expect
that the MFN rule could be helpful in this
regard. After all, the c oncession-erosion concern is addressed under the MFN rule, since
foreign country 1 is then assured of receiving any home tariff cut that is subsequently
offered to foreign country 2
. In terms of
our discussion in the preceding paragraph,
the MFN rule addresses the first reason for
the terms-of-trade loss of foreign country 1.
Unfortunately, however, the MFN rule does
not address the second reason. Even if the
home tariff satisfies the MFN rule, foreign
country 1may suffer a terms-of-trade loss
due to the tariff cut extended by foreign
country 2. Building on this point, Bagwell
and Staiger (2005a) show that a subset of the
tariffs that are efficient within the MFN class
are also vulnerable to bilateral opportunism,
even when the MFN rule is imposed. The
principle of nondiscrimination is thus helpful but not completely effective in eliminating the scope for bilateral opportunism.
Is there a simple rule which, in combination with the MFN rule, fully eliminates the
scope for bilateral opportunism? In fact, as
Bagwell and Staiger (2005b) show, bilateral
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opportunism is impossible if any bilateral
negotiation must satisfy both the principle
of 
nondiscrimination and the principle of
reciprocity. As in the 
two-country model,
under the principle of reciprocity, a negotiation between the governments of the home
country and foreign country 
2maintains
the world price between these countries.
In addition, as argued above, the principle
of 
nondiscrimination implies that foreign
countries 1and 2have a common terms of
trade, p̃   w. It follows that a bilateral negotiation between the governments of the home
country and foreign country 2 that satisfies
the principles of 
nondiscrimination and
reciprocity leaves unaltered foreign country 1’s terms of trade. Since foreign country 1’s tariff is not altered, foreign country
1
’s local price, p 
 ∗1  = p̃   w/τ  ∗1, also remains
unchanged. We thus arrive at the following
welfare-preservation result: if the governments of the home country and foreign country 2engage in a bilateral negotiation that
satisfies the principles of n
 ondiscrimination
and reciprocity, then government welfare
in foreign country 1, W  ∗1 ( p  ∗1  , p̃   w), is preserved. This result implies as well that the
MFN rule does not generate a free-riding
incentive when bilateral negotiations also
abide by the principle of reciprocity.42
To see the intuition behind the
welfare-preservation result, let us suppose
that the governments of the home country
and foreign country 2enter into a bilateral negotiation in which they lower their
respective tariffs. Under the MFN rule,
exporters from foreign country 1then face
a lower home import tariff, which in isolation provides improved access to the
home market. But the impact of foreign
42 In recent work, Ossa (2014) argues that the presence
of differentiated products can interfere with the ability of
reciprocity and MFN to neutralized third-party effects.
An interesting direction for future research is to assess the
welfare-preservation result in other modeling frameworks.
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country 2’s tariff cut also must be considered.
In foreign country 2 , this tariff cut lowers the
local price of the import good relative to the
export good, and thus both stimulates consumption of the import good and production of the export good. For both of these
reasons, foreign country 2 ’s export volume
increases. Hence, and as the Lerner symmetry theorem would suggest, foreign country 2’s import tariff cut has the same effect
as would an export subsidy increase. Thus,
while exporters in foreign country 1 enjoy a
lower home import tariff, they also face, in
effect, subsidized competing exporters from
foreign country 2. Under the principles of
reciprocity and n
ondiscrimination, these
effects exactly balance out, with the increase
in home import demand exactly fulfilled by
the expanded export volume from foreign
country 2. Exporters in foreign country 1
thus ultimately do not gain additional access
to the home market, which is to say that the
bilateral negotiation has no impact on foreign country 1’s terms of trade.
Bagwell and Staiger (2010a) provide further analysis of sequential bargaining in the
three-country model. They assume that the
home government negotiates sequentially
with the two foreign governments, where the
home government makes take-it-or-leave-it
offers and negotiations are over MFN tariffs
as well as lump-sum international transfers.
The assumption that such transfers are feasible is extreme but ensures tractability. The
MFN rule alone is then completely ineffective in addressing bilateral opportunism:
for any proposed MFN-efficient outcome,
the governments of the home country and
foreign country 2can adjust the tariffs and
transfers under their control so as to enjoy
mutual gains that come at the expense of the
government of foreign country 1.
In addition to this “
backward-stealing
problem,” they identify a “
forwardmanipulation problem”: the home government may keep its MFN tariff inefficiently
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high in its initial negotiation, and thus engage
in “foot dragging,” in order to endogenously
generate a less attractive outside option (i.e.,
disagreement point) for its subsequent negotiation partner. Hence, governments generally would be unable to achieve an e fficient
outcome, even if the 
backward-stealing
problem were addressed.43 Bagwell and
Staiger (2010a) argue, however, that efficient
outcomes may be reached when the MFN
rule is combined with other bargaining rules.
The forward-manipulation problem, in particular, may be addressed if the opportunities for renegotiation are so “sweeping” as to
disconnect the initial negotiation outcome
from the outside option in the subsequent
negotiation. At the same time, we note that
other problems may arise if the renegotiation
option is too readily available, as then the significance of any GATT/WTO tariff commitment would be put in question.
We turn now to the empirical evidence
that concerns the n
ondiscrimination principle. A first form of evidence considers
the 
trade-volume impacts associated with
GATT/WTO membership and relates these
impacts to the theoretical implications developed above. Subramanian and Wei (2007)
find that GATT/WTO membership is associated with large and significant trade-volume
impacts for developed countries, but that
the 
trade-volume impacts of membership
are small or nonexistent for most developing
countries.44 Since developed countries have
43 Limão (2007) explores a related f orward-manipulation
strategy. In his model, a government engages in foot dragging in order to influence a future bargain involving a
preferential trade agreement with n
 on-trade objectives.
We provide further discussion of preferential trade agreements in section 5.
44 The uneven trade effects of GATT/WTO membership found by Subramanian and Wei overturn the findings
of an earlier paper by Rose (2004) that constrained the
trade effects of GATT/WTO membership to be the same
for all countries and found no membership effect at all.
Evidence that the trade effects of GATT/WTO membership are restricted primarily to developed countries has
subsequently been confirmed by a number of papers (see,

been the most active participants in GATT/
WTO rounds, one interpretation of this
finding draws from the w
 elfare-preservation
result presented above. In particular, if
developed countries negotiate tariff reductions that broadly adhere to the principles
of reciprocity and n
 ondiscrimination, then
the trade-volume impacts on third-party
countries should be limited. As Bagwell and
Staiger (2014) discuss, an implication of this
interpretation of relevance for the Doha
Round is that substantial trade-volume gains
for developing countries from negotiated
tariff reductions may be achieved most effectively if, in markets where they are large,
developing countries negotiate reciprocally
with each other and with developed countries. This implication runs counter to the
nonreciprocal approach for developing countries in the Doha Round, as codified under
“special and differential treatment” clauses.
A second interpretation of the Subramanian–
Wei finding is that developed countries have
managed to circumvent the MFN rule and
discriminate against nonparticipating GATT/
WTO members. Further empirical analysis
of this interpretation is certainly warranted.
We note, however, that in the specific context
of GATT/WTO bilateral dispute-settlement
negotiations, Bown (2004c) finds evidence
that countries comply with the MFN rule.45

for example, Chang and Lee 2011; Eicher and Henn 2011;
and Dutt, Mihov, and Van Zandt 2013, though Eicher
and Henn attribute to PTAs most of the trade effects that
Subramanian and Wei attributed to WTO membership).
45 Subramanian and Wei (2007) report small and insignificant impacts of a developing country’s WTO membership on its overall imports, which under balanced trade
implies comparably small and insignificant impacts on its
overall exports. They also report that developing countries—whether or not they are WTO members—export
more to developed countries that are WTO members, and
in their conclusion emphasize this as a possible source of
gain for developing countries associated with the WTO.
Their findings on overall trade are the relevant findings for
our purposes, which is why we emphasize these findings
in the text.
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A second form of evidence relates
GATT/WTO negotiated import tariff reductions to industry and country characteristics.
Ludema and Mayda (2009, 2013) relate negotiated bilateral tariff reductions to measures
that capture foreign exporter concentration
and importer market power. In particular,
Ludema and Mayda (2013) find evidence
that the level of the importer’s tariff resulting from negotiations is negatively related
to the product of two terms: exporter concentration (as measured by the Herfindahl–
Hirschman index) and the importer’s market
power (as measured by the inverse elasticity
of export supply, on a p
 roduct-by-product
basis). The positive effect of market power
on a country’s MFN tariff thus diminishes
as exporter concentration increases, which
is consistent with the view that negotiations are especially effective in “undoing”
terms-of-trade-driven inefficiencies when

exporter concentration is large. The important role played by exporter concentration
supports the existence of an MFN free-rider
effect. They also provide evidence that the
free-rider effect is quantitatively important:
they estimate that between 12 and 25 percent of potential liberalization, on average,
goes unrealized, with most of this gap falling on the exports of developing countries
due to their low-concentration product mix.
Their findings thus also suggest a novel
concentration-based interpretation of the

Subramanian–Wei (2007) finding.
4.1.4 Enforcement and Repeated-Game
Models
Our preceding discussion assumes that
a negotiated trade agreement can be
enforced. While this abstraction is helpful
for interpreting and evaluating the principles of reciprocity and nondiscrimination,
the manner in which a trade agreement is
enforced is also essential to understand.
According to the terms-of-trade theory of
trade agreements, the strategic environment
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confronting governments setting trade policy corresponds to a prisoners’ dilemma
setting. In a symmetric, two-country and
two-good model, for example, if govern
ments were to attempt to cooperate with
a common tariff strictly below the Nash
level, then each government would have an
incentive to “cheat” by raising its tariff to
the b
 est-response level. What deters governments from cheating? Since there is no
GATT/WTO jail or other external enforcement device, a government cooperates in a
trade agreement if and only if the government perceives that such behavior is in its
self interest. In other words, and as argued
by McMillan (1986, 1989), Dixit (1987),
and Bagwell and Staiger (1990), the theory of repeated games suggests that a trade
agreement must be self-enforcing so that,
for each government, the short-term gain
from cheating is smaller than the long-term
discounted cost of any consequent breakdown in cooperation.
We highlight here three implications
of this repeated-game perspective. First,
this perspective suggests an interpretation of the decision by initial GATT contracting parties to concentrate protective
measures, with certain exceptions, into
tariffs. As Bagwell and Sykes (2004) argue,
by “tariffying” quantitative restrictions
such as quotas, governments facilitate
mutually beneficial and reciprocal trade
liberalization. Specifically, by imposing
tariffs rather than allocating quotas across
foreign exporters, governments make
market-access gains easier to assess and

thereby reduce negotiation transactions
costs, reduce the uncertainty facing perhaps risk-averse exporters and thus enhance
the value of market-access concessions, and
increase the transparency of trade-policy
conduct so that cheating is less tempting.
The latter point corresponds to the familiar notion from repeated-game theory that
cooperation is typically easier to achieve
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when players’ actions are publicly observable or transparent.46
As Maggi (1999) shows, a second and
related implication of the repeated-game
perspective is that a trade agreement may
facilitate s
elf-enforcing cooperation by
enhancing third-party transparency. Maggi
distinguishes between bilateral and multilateral enforcement mechanisms. Under a
bilateral enforcement mechanism, if country
A deviates with respect to the tariff that it
applies to country B, then countries A and
B revert to a Nash trade war. Countries A
and B continue to cooperate with country C,
however. By contrast, under a multilateral
enforcement mechanism, if country A deviates with respect to the tariff that it applies to
country B, then country A reverts to a Nash
trade war with both countries B and C. Maggi
shows that a multilateral enforcement mechanism can achieve greater cooperation than
is possible under a bilateral enforcement
mechanism. Correspondingly, when a trade
institution ensures that any deviation would
be observed by all member countries, the
future cost of cheating could be quite severe
indeed, which in turn implies that more efficient tariffs can be achieved without violating the self-enforcement constraint.
A third implication of the repeated-game
perspective is that novel predictions may
be generated when the 
self-enforcement
constraint binds and political or economic
shocks occur.47 Intuitively, when a change in
the environment upsets the balance between
the short-term incentive to cheat and the
long-term discounted value of cooperation,
46 An additional and important advantage that tariffs
have over quantitative restrictions on trade is that the
latter may be more difficult to apply and enforce on a
nondiscriminatory basis. See, e.g., Curzon (1965, p. 130)
for an early discussion of this issue.
47 As Furusawa (1999) shows, the 
repeated-game
approach also suggests that greater patience is not always
beneficial for a country in trade-agreement negotiations,
when the negotiation outcome also must be self-enforcing.

an adjustment in trade policy may be
required to bring the s elf-enforcement constraint back into balance. We develop this
point further in section 4.2, when we interpret GATT/WTO safeguard rules.
A final point is that our discussion here
concerns retaliation that occurs off the equilibrium path in the repeated game. The role
of such retaliation is to induce compliance;
however, off-equilibrium-path retaliation is,
by definition, not predicted by the model
and thus should be distinguished from retaliation that actually appears in WTO rules
and practice. At various points below, we
note that on-equilibrium-path retaliation
consistent with WTO rules and practice
emerges naturally in the model once the
repeated-game model is extended to include
privately observed shocks.
4.1.5 Implications of Basic WTO Principles
and Rules
We summarize above research on reciprocity, 
nondiscrimination, and enforcement, all from the perspective of the
terms-of-trade theory. Our discussion suggests that the principles of reciprocity and
nondiscrimination appear w
 ell-designed for
addressing the inefficiencies associated with
the terms-of-trade externality. The theory
also provides a natural means for interpreting the self-enforcing nature of trade
agreements. At the same time, our review
directs attention to significant challenges
that confront the GATT/WTO approach.
The possibility of t
hird-party externalities warrants particular attention, whether
such externalities are positive (and raise
free-riding concerns) or negative (and raise
bilateral-opportunism concerns). The the
ory reviewed above suggests that third-party
externalities are eliminated when tariff policies adhere to the principles of reciprocity
and nondiscrimination. The extent to which
negotiated tariff cuts satisfy the principle
of reciprocity may differ somewhat across
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 arket settings, however, and GATT/WTO
m
rules allow for exceptions to the MFN
rule, with the most important exception
being the provisions for preferential trading agreements. Addressing the potential
for third-party externalities thus remains an
ongoing challenge for the GATT/WTO.
Our review also encourages consideration of the interaction between potential 
free-rider benefits and the benefits of
GATT/WTO membership for developing
countries. Recent empirical work indicates
that many developing countries have not
experienced significant t rade-volume benefits
from GATT/WTO membership. The research
reviewed above delivers two possible interpretations. First, if f ree-rider benefits are significant, then countries may perceive modest
gains from pursuing t rade-liberalization negotiations in general, but perhaps especially
with developing countries whose exporters
often operate in unconcentrated industries.
Second, if free-rider benefits are largely
eliminated, then developing countries may
benefit little from pursuing a nonreciprocal
approach to trade liberalization. Together,
these interpretations suggest that the benefits
of GATT/WTO membership for developing
countries may be enhanced if negotiated tariff reductions adhere closely to the principles
of reciprocity and n
 ondiscrimination and if,
in markets where they are large, developing
countries negotiate reciprocally with each
other and with developed countries.
4.2 Bindings, Binding Overhang, and
Safeguards/Contingent Protection
A fundamental design feature of the
GATT/WTO is that governments negotiate “tariff bindings” or “bound-tariff levels”
rather than exact-tariff levels. For a given
country and good, a bound tariff, which
is also referred to as a “tariff cap,” identifies the maximal import tariff that can be
applied. A tariff cap thus permits “downward flexibility,” in that a government can
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apply a tariff that is strictly below the tariff
cap. In that event, “binding overhang” is
said to occur.48 But a tariff cap constrains
“upward flexibility,” since under normal circumstances the applied tariff cannot exceed
the cap. Some potential for upward flexibility does exist within the GATT/WTO agreement, however, when certain contingencies
arise. In this section, we review economic
research utilizing the terms-of-trade theory
that interprets tariff caps, binding overhang,
and contingent protection or “safeguards.”
We develop our discussion in the context
of a standard 
partial-equilibrium model
with two symmetric countries and three
goods.49 One of the goods is the import good
for the home country, while another good
is the import good for the foreign country.
The third good is a standard numeraire
good, which is produced in both countries under constant returns to scale where
labor is the only factor in the model. For
the two non-numeraire goods, production
occurs in each country under conditions
of perfect competition and with diminishing marginal productivity. The resulting
supply functions are upward sloping. We
assume further that the consumers in both
countries have a common utility function,
which is additively separable and takes a
quasi-linear form. The consumption of the
numeraire good exhibits constant marginal
utility while the consumption of each of the
non-numeraire goods exhibits diminishing
marginal utility. The latter property delivers
downward sloping demand functions for the
non-numeraire goods. Finally, each country
has available a tariff for its import good, and
we assume that trade in the numeraire good
is untaxed.
48 The phrase “water” or “water in the binding” is sometimes used interchangeably with “binding overhang.”
49 Symmetry here means that the two countries are
“mirror images” of one another. This model is frequently
used in trade-policy research. See, for example, Bagwell
and Staiger (2001b).
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4.2.1 Tariff Bindings and Tariff Caps
With this standard model in mind, we now
consider the interpretation of tariff caps. At
the time of negotiation, we imagine that
governments are in an “ex ante” stage, with
each government being uncertain about the
importance that it will place in the future
on profits in the import-competing sector
relative to consumer welfare. After government preference shocks are realized,
tariffs are applied in a manner consistent
with the negotiated trade agreement. In
this “ex post” stage, a government’s optimal
unilateral tariff and also the efficient tariff
are higher when the government’s “type”
(i.e., the welfare weight that the government attaches to import-competing profits)
is larger, where efficiency here is defined
relative to ex post joint government welfare. Due to the terms-of-trade externality,
the optimal unilateral tariff is higher than
the efficient tariff for any government type,
provided only that the efficient tariff does
not prohibit all trade. In this context, the
challenge is to design a trade agreement
that permits some flexibility, so that applied
tariffs may respond to preference shocks
and thereby facilitate greater efficiency,
without opening the door to opportunistic
tariff hikes.
To fix ideas, we begin with a couple of
extreme scenarios in which governments
can design a trade agreement in the presence of preference shocks that achieves
full efficiency (i.e., an efficient tariff in
each state). First, if governments’ realized types were publicly observed and
verifiable, and if there were no contracting costs, then governments could write a
“
state-contingent” contract that delivers
full efficiency. Second, even if each government’s type was privately observed, standard arguments establish that governments
could again achieve full efficiency if a
lump-sum contingent transfer instrument


were available.50 These scenarios are
extreme, however. Governments are likely
to have some private (or at least unverifiable) information about their preferences,
and explicit monetary transfers are not
required in GATT/WTO rules and are rarely
used in WTO dispute resolution.51
Motivated by these considerations, we
therefore turn now to a scenario in which governments negotiate a trade agreement under
uncertainty, have private information about
their respective preferences at the time that
tariffs are applied, and do not have available
an instrument with which to effect contingent transfers. Allowing for a continuum of
possible government types that are distributed uniformly, Bagwell and Staiger (2005a)
consider this scenario in a linear-quadratic
model and compare two possible trade
agreements.52 In the first agreement, governments adopt a rigid tariff rule, under
which each government commits to an exact
tariff level for all types. Since a government’s
type enters its welfare function in a linear
fashion, the most efficient agreement of this
kind places the rigid tariff at the level that
is efficient for the average type.53 They then
compare this agreement with one in which
each government adopts a weak-binding tariff rule, consistent with GATT/WTO rules,
under which it commits to a tariff cap. They
find that the most efficient w
 eak-binding
yields strictly higher expected joint government welfare than does the most efficient
50 See Bagwell and Staiger (2005a) for details in the
trade-agreement context.
51 Further, even monetary transfers may entail inefficiencies, due to the distortions associated with raising
funds through taxation.
52 In a linear-quadratic model, economic agents have
quadratic payoffs and the corresponding demand and supply functions are linear.
53 As discussed in footnote 23, under the assumption
that governments have available at the negotiation stage an
instrument with which to make n
 oncontingent, lump-sum
transfers, efficiency in the ex ante negotiation stage for this
partial-equilibrium model is evaluated relative to expected
joint government welfare.

Bagwell et al.: Is the WTO Passé?
rigid tariff, and that the most efficient weak
binding is strictly higher than the most efficient rigid tariff. Intuitively, under a weak
binding, the applied tariff exhibits binding
overhang when a government draws a low
type, and so the binding only constrains the
applied tariff when the government’s type is
high and the efficient tariff is thus also high.
Amador and Bagwell (2013) generalize
this analysis in several directions. Allowing
for more general payoff and distribution
functions, they derive conditions under
which a trade agreement with a tariff cap
(i.e., a weak-binding tariff rule) maximizes
expected joint government welfare among
all incentive-compatible trade agreements.
They thus provide a first theoretical explanation for the use of tariff caps in an optimal trade agreement. Their approach is to
represent the problem of finding an optimal
trade agreement for the import good of the
home country as a delegation problem, in
which the principal’s expected welfare corresponds to the associated expected joint welfare of the two governments and the agent
is the government of the home country.54 In
this context, a trade agreement identifies a
set of permissible tariffs. In the ex ante stage
of trade-agreement design, the two governments thus choose the set of permissible tariffs for the home-country import good that
maximizes ex ante joint welfare while satisfying the incentive-compatibility constraint
that the home government will choose its
preferred tariff from this set, after observing
its type. The tariffs induced by rigid-tariff
rules and 
weak-binding tariff rules are of
course candidate solutions, but so, too, are
many discontinuous tariff functions. Amador
and Bagwell further allow that the trade
agreement may specify that tariff choices are
54 A delegation game is a p
 rincipal–agent game in which
the agent has private information and transfers are infeasible. The delegation game was first introduced and analyzed
by Holmstrom (1977).
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bundled with m
 oney-burning expenditures
perhaps corresponding to administrative
procedures. They characterize a rich
set of environments, which includes the
linear-quadratic model with a uniform distribution as a special case, in which the optimal
trade agreement takes the simple form of a
tariff cap. The optimal trade agreement then
also exhibits binding overhang and does not
employ money burning.55
Beshkar, Bond, and Rho (2015) extend
the linear-quadratic model to a setting with
asymmetric countries. They restrict attention to tariff caps and provide theoretical and
empirical support for the prediction that the
optimal tariff cap is higher, and thus the likelihood of binding overhang is greater, when
importer market power is lower. To gain
some intuition for their theoretical findings,
it is helpful to consider the extreme case of
a small country. Since the tariff policy of a
small country imposes no 
terms-of-trade
externality on its trading partner, the optimal trade agreement would permit such a
country to impose its unilaterally optimal
trade policy for whatever preference shock it
experiences. A high (i.e., unrestrictive) tariff
cap achieves this goal. More generally, when
a country has more market power in a sector,
its tariff policy imposes a greater externality
on its trading partner, and so a lower tariff
55 Related results arise in other settings as well. Amador
and Bagwell (2013) move beyond the partial-equilibrium
model with perfect competition and use their main propositions to establish conditions under which a tariff cap
is also optimal for a m
 onopolistic-competition model of
trade with a fixed number of firms. (Ossa 2012, explores
a similar model while focusing on other issues.) Amador
and Bagwell (2012) similarly employ these propositions
to provide conditions for the optimality of a tariff cap in
a linear-quadratic model with a uniform distribution when
private information concerns the weight that tariff revenue receives in the government welfare function. Finally,
the models discussed here assume a continuum of possible types. As Bagwell (2009) confirms, the optimal trade
agreement does not take the form of a tariff cap in the
linear-quadratic model when government preferences concerning the relative importance of import-competing firms
are drawn from two possible types.
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cap, with an associated reduced frequency of
binding overhang, is optimal. Using data on
applied and bound tariffs for WTO member
countries, they then provide strong empirical
support for this prediction.56
Tariff caps and binding overhang have also
received attention in other modeling frameworks. In a model with contracting costs,
Horn, Maggi, and Staiger (2010) compare a
weak binding rule and a rigid tariff rule. The
framework is different from that considered
by Bagwell and Staiger (2005a), but interestingly points to a related set of insights as
regards bindings and overhang. Horn, Maggi,
and Staiger (2010) show that a weak binding
rule is preferred to a rigid tariff rule, since the
former permits e fficiency-enhancing downward flexibility, and they also note that the
weak binding rule is characterized by binding overhang. A different approach is pursued by Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (2007).
As we also discuss in section 6.1, they analyze
a model in which trade agreements address
both commitment and terms-of-trade problems. In their model, binding overhang
does not occur in equilibrium; however, the
potential to apply a tariff below the bound
level induces ex post lobbying that has the
beneficial effect of diminishing an ex ante
problem of excess investment.
The 
tariff-cap theory described above
establishes a rationale for tariff caps when
governments have private information and
contingent transfers are infeasible. As we
argue next, in addition to providing an interpretation of tariff caps and binding overhang,
this theory provides a foundation from which
to understand contingent protection. A key
idea is that contingent protection may potentially enhance efficiency by “linking” tariff
choices through time for a given government
or across governments and creating, thereby,
56 See Bacchetta and Piermartini (2011) for additional
empirical evidence regarding tariff caps and binding
overhang.

some scope for imperfect contingent transfers. More generally, contingent protection
provides a form of upward flexibility that, in
some cases, may enhance efficiency when
certain shocks occur. At the same time, it
also must be emphasized that tariff caps
are a valuable means of “stabilizing” tariff
commitments and diminishing the potential for “unwinding” tariff commitments.57
The optimal rules for contingent protection thus reflect a delicate balance between
maintaining reduced tariffs in response to
the terms-of-trade externality and providing
some upward flexibility in light of various
shocks that may confront governments.
4.2.2 Contingent Protection Such as
Safeguards and Antidumping
Bagwell and Staiger (2005a) explore a role
for contingent protection when governments
experience preference shocks that are privately observed. Formally, they consider a
repeated-game model in which government’s
privately observed types are iid through time,
and they show that expected joint government
welfare may be improved when the tariff
choices of any given government are appropriately linked through time.58 Their analysis
is motivated by the “escape clause” defined
in the WTO Agreement on Safeguards. This
agreement describes contingencies under
which a country can set a tariff above the
tariff cap and thus achieve some degree of
upward flexibility.59 As Bagwell and Staiger
note, an interesting feature of the WTO
57 For further discussion of the importance of tariff
stabilization, see Curzon (1965, chapter 4). Focusing on
India, Bown and Tovar (2011) provide empirical evidence
that countries use antidumping and safeguard exceptions
to unwind commitments to lower tariffs in the presence of
domestic political-economic pressure.
58 Their work builds on a literature in game theory that
associates continuation values with transfers. See Athey
and Bagwell (2001) and Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin
(1994).
59 For an overview of the the WTO safeguards agreement, see Wauters (2010).
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safeguards agreement is that it embodies
a dynamic-use constraint: if a government
imposes escape-clause p
rotection in an
industry for X years, then it is not allowed
to reimpose escape-clause protection in that
industry for the next X years. This constraint
introduces an opportunity cost to a government from selecting an escape-clause tariff,
so that incentive compatibility is achieved
when only a government with a sufficiently
high type in the current period imposes an
escape-clause tariff. The d
 ynamic-use constraint may thus promote further efficiency
by facilitating more efficient tariffs when a
government draws a sufficiently high type.
The prospect of improved efficiency emerges
because a government that goes above the
cap today effectively makes a transfer to the
other government in the form of an improved
continuation value.
Martin and Vergote (2008) develop a
related set of insights for a situation in
which the tariff choices of one government
are linked to those of the other government. They consider antidumping duties as
allowed under certain contingencies in the
WTO Anti-dumping Agreement. Motivated
by empirical work by Blonigen and Bown
(2003), Feinberg and Reynolds (2006), and
Prusa and Skeath (2002) that provides evidence of a retaliatory role for antidumping
duties, Martin and Vergote argue that such
on-equilibrium-path retaliation may facilitate
efficiency gains by ensuring that the home
government protects its import-competing
industry with an antidumping duty only
when the current importance of that industry to the home government is sufficiently
great. In this case, when the home government imposes an antidumping duty, a link
is forged to a future retaliatory antidumping
duty of the foreign country. Upon raising
its applied tariff via an antidumping duty,
the home government thereby again makes
a transfer to the foreign government in the
form of an improved continuation value.
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Our discussion of contingent t rade-policies
above focuses on the idea that the potential for upward flexibility might improve
efficiency when governments are privately
informed about their preferences, if contingent transfers achieved through continuation
values ensure that only governments with
high types exercise this potential. The WTO
Safeguards Agreement and also the WTO
Anti-dumping Agreement, however, explicitly indicate contingencies under which
upward flexibility can be exercised. For
example, the WTO Safeguards Agreement
permits the application of a safeguard tariff when the domestic industry is seriously
injured as a result of increased imports. If
such contingencies are interpreted as defining verifiable market conditions, then an
alternative modeling approach is suggested
under which a government that seeks to
impose a contingent trade policy must incur
the necessary costs to publicly verify that
the relevant contingent state is present.60
Beshkar and Bond (2016) offer a first example of this modeling approach. They analyze
a partial-equilibrium model with asymmetric
country sizes that features costly state verification, in the specific sense that at a cost, the
importing government can publicly verify
the welfare weight that determines its type.
A novel feature of their model is that both
caps and escape clauses are endogenously
determined as part of an optimal trade
agreement. Interestingly, they find that circumstances under which the possibilities of
overhang (downward flexibility) and escape
(upward flexibility) coexist are relatively rare.
Intuitively, when higher types use the escape
clause, the cap can be set at a lower level;
this implies, in turn, that the likelihood of
overhang is small.
60 As Sykes (2003) discusses, however, the extent to
which the WTO Safeguards Agreement and subsequent
legal cases serve to articulate a clear set of contingencies
may be questioned.
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An alternative theory of escape clauses
dispenses with the possibility of private
information and focuses instead on the
self-enforcement constraints that underlie

any cooperative trade agreement. Bagwell
and Staiger (1990) offer a first paper of this
kind. They consider a 
partial-equilibrium
model with two countries, in which publicly
observed trade-volume shocks occur in an iid
fashion over time. When a country imports
a large volume, it has an increased incentive to cheat on a cooperative agreement
and select its unilaterally optimal tariff. The
cost of such behavior is that it may induce
governments to abandon cooperation and
revert to Nash trade policies in the future.
If governments maximize national income
and are sufficiently patient, then they can
enforce free-trade policies for all possible
trade-volume shocks. If governments have
moderate patience, however, then they can
enforce free-trade policies only in periods
with low trade volumes. When trade volumes
take higher values, the incentive to cheat
is acute at free-trade policies and the gains
from defection overwhelm the discounted
future cost of initiating a Nash trade war.
Governments with moderate patience can
still cooperate in the presence of large trade
volume shocks, but they do so by setting positive (and b
elow-Nash) tariffs. Intuitively,
by cooperating with a positive tariff, governments reduce the incentive to cheat
and bring it back in line with the future discounted cost of Nash reversion. The positive
tariffs that accompany high trade-volume
shocks can be interpreted in terms of an
escape clause, and Bagwell and Staiger show
that an escape clause of this kind is a feature
of an optimal self-enforcing trade agreement
for governments with moderate patience.61
Bown and Crowley (2013b) provide a first
empirical investigation of the cross-sectional
61 Their work builds on methods developed by
Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) for the study of collusion.

and intertemporal predictions of the
Bagwell–Staiger (1990) model. As discussed,
that model predicts that an import tariff
increase is more likely when the import volume increases. In addition, conditioning on
a positive import surge, the model predicts
that the probability of a tariff increase is
positively associated with less elastic import
demand and export supply functions and also
with less variable import demand volumes.
Since the escape clause featured in the
Bagwell–Staiger model could correspond

to any instrument of special protection,
such as a safeguard tariff or an a ntidumping
duty, Bown and Crowley analyze the model’s
predictions using data on US import tariff
increases arising under the US antidumping
and safeguard laws and find strong support
for the predictions of the model.
A special feature of the Bagwell–Staiger
(1990) model is that trade-volume shocks are
iid through time. A trade-volume shock thus
affects the incentive to cheat in the current
period, but has no direct impact on the discounted future value of cooperation. Bagwell
and Staiger (2003) extend the model to allow
for both iid shocks to the t rade-volume level
and stochastic but persistent trends in the
growth rate for trade volume.62 At any given
point in time, governments observe the current shock to the 
trade-volume level and
observe, as well, whether the trading relationship is in a fast- or slow-growth phase,
where the relationship moves between
the two phases according to a Markov process. They find that the most cooperative
trade agreement for governments with
moderate patience is countercyclical: all
else equal, the most cooperative tariffs are
62 Hochman and Segev (2010) extend the 
Bagwell–
Staiger (1990) model in a different direction by allowing that governments may imperfectly observe the
trade-volume shock before applying tariffs. Another interesting extension is considered by Tabakis (2010), who
examines the use of special protection when countries are
transitioning into preferential trading agreements.
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lower in a fast-growth phase. The key intuition is that governments have more to lose
from initiating a trade war in a (persistent)
fast-growth phase; as a consequence, they
can then withstand the heightened incentive to cheat that a lower cooperative tariff
implies.63 Bown and Crowley (2013a) provide an empirical investigation of the macroeconomic determinants of 
time-varying
trade policy. Using quarterly data for the
United States, European Union, Australia,
Canada, and South Korea, they find evidence
of a countercyclical trade policy response in
the 
pre–Great Recession period (namely,
the first quarter of 1988 through the third
quarter of 2008).64 Their findings are broadly
consistent with the theoretical predictions in
Bagwell and Staiger (2003), as well as those
in Crowley’s (2011) reciprocal-dumping
model, which predicts an increase in import
restrictions in response to macroeconomic
weakness abroad.
A different perspective on safeguards is
offered by Sykes (1991, 2003). He observes
that instruments of special protection are
often applied to assist declining domestic
industries. Firms in such an industry retain a
large share of the benefits of p
 rice-increasing
protection, since temporary protection is
unlikely to encourage entry in a declining
industry. Thus, firms in a declining industry
may lobby hard for protection and, therefore,
figure prominently in the domestic government’s welfare function. Foreign exporters
are naturally harmed by the domestic tariff; however, if the foreign export industry is
growing, then they may complain little about
facing protection, since their profits would
eventually be lost to entry anyhow. These
firms, therefore, may not figure prominently
63 This work builds on methods used by Bagwell and
Staiger (1997a) to analyze collusion over the business cycle.
64 Bown and Crowley (2014) provide additional empirical support from a sample of thirteen emerging economies
and use of annual data covering the period 1 995–2010.
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in the foreign government’s welfare function.
Thus, governments in an ex ante state may
be attracted to a safeguard rule for declining industries, since the welfare benefit to
the government that uses the safeguard may
exceed the welfare cost to the government
whose exporters face the safeguard.
4.2.3 Implications and New Directions
Our survey highlights that tariff caps and
binding overhang occur in an optimal trade
agreement when governments are privately
informed about their preferences and contingent transfers are infeasible. With this
foundation in place, we then consider three
complementary theories for the use of special instruments of protection. First, when
governments experience privately observed
preference shocks, upward flexibility might
promote further efficiency, provided that
higher tariffs are only used by governments
facing high political pressures. This incentive
compatibility constraint, in turn, can be met,
when current tariffs are linked to future tariffs
so that contingent transfers can be achieved, at
least to some degree, through changes in continuation values. The incentive-compatibility
constraint also can be met when costly state
verification is feasible. Second, optimal cooperation when trade volumes are volatile entails
a low baseline tariff coupled with an escape
clause that allows for higher tariffs when
trade-volume shocks are high. Safeguards

emerge in an optimal trade agreement
in this setting and indeed complement tariff
liberalization, as the baseline tariff would be
higher were safeguards not allowed. Finally,
safeguards may enable governments to
achieve greater welfare by rewarding (penalizing) industries that figure more (less) prominently in governments’ welfare functions.
This theory associates the use of safeguards
with declining industries. While more empirical work is needed, we also identify studies
that provide empirical support for themes
emerging from the theoretical analyses.
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We conclude this section by mentioning
a new literature that assesses the value of
tariff bindings, as distinct from reductions
in applied tariffs, in the presence of policy
uncertainty.65 Handley (2014) and Handley
and Limão (2015) focus on the implications
of policy uncertainty when exporters face
sunk-market entry costs. They observe that
tariff bindings reduce policy uncertainty by
constraining the range of possible tariffs,
limiting losses in the w
 orst-case scenario and
thereby stimulating entry into export markets.
Formalizing this insight, they use their models to empirically quantify the trade effects
of WTO bindings (for Australia, in Handley
2014) and PTA bindings (for Portugal joining
the European Union, in Handley and Limão
2015), reporting large trade effects for each
case. The study of tariff caps and policy
uncertainty represents an especially promising direction for new research.
4.3 Subsidies
The appropriate treatment of subsidies
in a trade agreement is subtle. On the one
hand, a domestic production subsidy can be a
“first-best” instrument with which to address
a market failure that results in an inefficiently
low level of output. A production subsidy may
also be an attractive instrument for a government with political-economic objectives that
wishes to redistribute surplus to producers
in a given industry. On the other hand, some
restrictions on the use of domestic production subsidies are necessary, since otherwise
a government could always give a domestic
production subsidy to an import-competing
industry so as to undermine the benefits
offered to other countries through negotiated tariff cuts. The appropriate treatment
of export subsidies is also subtle. An export
65 In addition to the Handley (2014) and Handley and
Limão (2015) papers we discuss in the text, other recent
papers in this emerging literature include Limão and
Maggi (2015) and Pierce and Schott (2016).

subsidy lowers the world price for the export
good and thus generates a terms-of-trade
gain for importing countries, but it may also
displace exports from other countries and
alter entry and exit patterns across countries.
In this section, we review the GATT/WTO
legal treatment of subsidies and discuss economic research utilizing the terms-of-trade
theory that interprets and evaluates this
treatment.66
4.3.1 Subsidy Rules under the GATT
versus the WTO
The treatment of subsidies in GATT was
relatively tolerant: a foreign trading partner
could respond to the subsidies of the domestic country through two possible means.67
First, the foreign government could unilaterally impose a countervailing duty (CVD) if
its import-competing industry experienced
material injury as a consequence of an export
subsidy given to producers in the domestic
country. Second, the foreign government
could file a non-violation complaint if it had
previously negotiated a tariff reduction from
the domestic government on a given product
and the domestic government later offered
a subsidy to its import-competing producers of that product. To succeed, the foreign
government would have to show that a new
or increased domestic subsidy program
emerged that had the effect of nullifying or
impairing the m
 arket-access benefits that the
foreign government had reasonably expected
at the time of the tariff negotiation.68 In this
case, the domestic government would not
be required to remove the subsidy; however,
it would be expected to make policy adjustments that restored the foreign country’s
66 For closely related discussions, see also Bagwell
(2008) and Bagwell, Staiger, and Sykes (2013).
67 Sykes (2005a) offers a detailed discussion of the evolution of subsidy rules under GATT and the WTO.
68 See Petersmann (1997, pp. 1
 51–4) for discussion of
the conditions under which a subsidy could be determined
to upset market-access expectations.
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negotiated market access. In addition, as
part of GATT negotiations, several countries
agreed to restrict the use of export subsidies,
especially for n
 on-agricultural goods.
The treatment of subsidies in the WTO’s
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures (the SCM Agreement) is much
more restrictive. First, except as allowed for
in the Agreement on Agriculture, export subsidies (and also local-content subsidies) are
prohibited. Second, “specific” subsidies that
have “adverse effects” on other members
are actionable, where adverse effects could
take the form of an injury to an industry in
another member country, the nullification or
impairment of benefits expected by another
WTO Member, and “serious prejudice” to
the interests of another WTO Member. The
first two forms of adverse effects are broadly
reflected in the GATT treatment of subsidies and may be associated with the use of
CVDs and n
 on-violation complaints by the
adversely impacted member country. The
more novel ingredient is serious prejudice,
which may occur if the effect of a subsidy
offered by the domestic country is to cause
a loss of exports by a WTO member into the
domestic market or a third-country market. Importantly, a domestic production
subsidy can be actionable under the SCM
Agreement independently of whether the
subsidy nullifies or impairs the m
 arket-access
expectations associated with an earlier tariff
negotiation.69

69 As regards countermeasures, if the domestic government refuses to remove an export subsidy, then the
complaining member government may take “appropriate countermeasures.” For an actionable subsidy, in the
absence of an agreement on compensation, and if steps to
remove the adverse effects are not undertaken or if the
subsidy itself is not withdrawn, then the complaining member may be granted authority to impose countermeasures
that are “commensurate” with the adverse effects attributable to the subsidy. See Lawrence (2003, pp. 5 4–60);
Mavroidis (2000); Spamann (2006); and Bown and Ruta
(2010) for further discussion.
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WTO rules thus treat subsidies in a fairly
severe manner. In contrast to import tariffs, for which caps are negotiated, export
subsidies are banned. As well, under WTO
rules, a country that uses a domestic production subsidy must withdraw it, or remove
its adverse effects, even if the subsidy itself
does not upset any negotiated m
 arket-access
expectation. We consider next research that
interprets and evaluates the WTO’s treatment of subsidies.
4.3.2 Production Subsidies
We begin with the treatment of domestic
production subsidies. On the one hand, and
as mentioned above, a domestic production
subsidy is a fi
 rst-best instrument with which
to address a market failure that leads to an
inefficiently low level of production.70 A
domestic production subsidy also may be an
attractive instrument for a government with
political-economic preferences that seeks to
redistribute surplus to the import-competing
industry. On the other hand, if the use of
domestic production subsidies were completely unregulated, then governments would
be unable to achieve efficient outcomes
through reciprocal tariff negotiations alone.
Intuitively, in the absence of any restrictions
on the use of such subsidies, a government
that exchanged reciprocal tariff cuts with a
trading partner could subsequently “undo”
the market-access consequences of its own
tariff cut by providing a production subsidy
to its domestic import-competing industry. This discussion suggests that domestic production subsidies have a potential
efficiency-enhancing role to play, but that
their use must be regulated in some manner.
Given these considerations, we may ask: how
70 An import tariff is another instrument that might be
used to expand domestic production levels; however, an
import tariff is a second-best instrument. An import tariff is
equivalent to a consumption tax and a production subsidy,
and thus affects both consumer and producer margins.
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should domestic production subsidies be
treated in a trade agreement?
The described trade-offs suggest a potential answer to this question: grant each
government flexibility over its domestic
policies, provided that the overall effect of
its chosen domestic policies does not erode
the 
market-access commitments made
through its preceding tariff negotiations.
Under this approach, after tariffs are negotiated, a government would be allowed to
adjust its domestic policies in any way, so
long as the overall effect does not result in
a 
terms-of-trade loss for its trading partner. To analyze this approach, Bagwell and
Staiger (2006) augment the 
two-country,
general-equilibrium terms-of-trade model

considered above to include domestic tax/
subsidy policies. Assuming that the set of
domestic instruments available to governments is sufficiently rich to create a degree
of policy redundancy, they find that GATT
rules enable governments to achieve an efficient outcome using tariff negotiations.71 A
key feature of GATT rules in this context is
that a government can file a non-violation
complaint if it suffers a terms-of-trade loss
as a consequence of a change in the domestic policies of its trading partner. The WTO’s
SCM Agreement places further restrictions
on the use of domestic production subsidies.
These restrictions limit policy redundancy
and may thereby prevent governments from
achieving efficient outcomes through tariff
negotiations.
Bagwell and Staiger (2006) also consider
a setting with limited instruments. In this
setting, GATT rules are no longer sufficient
for achieving efficiency through tariff negotiations. Intuitively, in a limited-instrument
setting, a government may be unable to
reposition its subsidy to an efficient level
71 Sufficient policy redundancy is satisfied if each government has available an import tax, a domestic production
subsidy, and a domestic consumption tax.

without imposing a terms-of-trade loss on
its trading partner. Indeed, when the set of
instruments is limited, the SCM Agreement
could represent an improvement over GATT
rules. For example, if governments respectively maximize national income and no market failure exists that creates a corrective role
for domestic production subsidies, then the
use of subsidies would be inefficient. More
broadly, though, market failures and/or
redistributive goals suggest a potential role
for domestic production subsidies in an efficient outcome for governments. As Bagwell
and Staiger argue, tight restrictions on subsidies could then have a “chilling effect” on
tariff negotiations.72 To the extent that the
SCM Agreement imposes tight restrictions
on the use of domestic production subsidies,
GATT rules on subsidies may then be preferred to those in the WTO.
GATT non-violation rules on domestic policies identify an attractive approach in granting flexibility to governments up to the point
where an externality is imposed on trading
partners. At a practical level, however, it also
must be acknowledged that 
non-violation
rules have their own limitations.73 As two
illustrations, we mention that it may not be
obvious what a government should reasonably expect at the time of negotiation, and it
also may not be clear where to draw the line
in terms of which sorts of domestic policy
changes are appropriately disciplined using
non-violation nullification-and-impairment
complaints.

72 The idea is that governments may be hesitant to
negotiate tariff bindings if subsidies are disciplined heavily,
since tariffs may then be the best remaining means of providing assistance to domestic import-competing industries.
73 Another important caveat is that a 
marketaccess-preservation rule may fail to be optimal in settings
with private information, as Lee (2016) argues. We discuss
his and related papers in greater detail in section 5.
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4.3.3 Export Subsidies in Two-Country
Models
We turn now to the treatment of export
subsidies. We begin with a basic o bservation:
in the simple t wo-country, two-good generalequilibrium terms-of-trade model described
above, an increase in the domestic country’s
export subsidy would have the same effect
on prices, and thus government welfare
functions, as would a decrease in its import
tariff. This observation, known as the Lerner
symmetry theorem, follows since either policy change would lower (raise) the relative
price of the domestic import good in the
domestic (world) market. One implication
is that both policy changes would generate
a terms-of-trade loss (gain) for the domestic
(foreign) country. Since each government’s
welfare is expressed as a function of the relative price in its country and its country’s
terms of trade, it follows that the two policy
changes affect government welfare functions
in the same fashion as well. Hence, our arguments above carry over immediately when
governments select export instead of import
policies. In particular, Nash export policies
are inefficient and result in too little trade,
and governments can mutually gain from
an agreement on export policies only if they
agree to make reciprocal adjustments that
lead to greater trade volume.
This result is familiar when governments
respectively maximize national income. In
that case, free trade is efficient, but each
government’s optimal unilateral policy is an
export tariff. The key intuition is that a government can use an export tariff to induce its
competitive export industry to restrict output as would a monopolist, where monopoly
rents are now retained in the form of tariff
revenue. In the resulting Nash equilibrium,
both governments impose export tariffs, and
the trade volume is inefficiently low. More
generally, the sign of a government’s unilaterally optimal export policy depends on the
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government’s specific preferences. The Nash
export policy is an export subsidy for a government that gives sufficient welfare weight
to the interests of its export sector.74 The fundamental point, though, is the governments’
noncooperative export policies, whatever
their sign, induce too little trade from the
governments’ joint perspective.
A trade agreement can thus generate
mutual gains for governments only if it facilitates reciprocal increases in export subsidies
(or reciprocal decreases in export tariffs) relative to noncooperative levels. Intuitively, an
increase in a country’s export subsidy generates a positive terms-of-trade externality for
its trading partner, whose consumers now
enjoy a lower price on their import good.
While this argument makes sense within
the context of the terms-of-trade approach
to trade agreements, it runs completely
counter to the treatment of export subsidies in the WTO. There are thus two possibilities: either the WTO’s prohibition on
export subsidies is misguided, or the simple
two-country, c ompetitive-markets version of
terms-of-trade theory is missing something
important. To explore the latter possibility, we discuss next a sequence of enriched
terms-of-trade models within which to

further explore the treatment of export
subsidies.
4.3.4 Export Subsidies in Third-Market
Models
One potential cost of export subsidies not
featured in the above discussion is that an
export subsidy offered in one country lowers the world price and thereby imposes a
negative terms-of-trade externality on other
exporting countries. To explore this issue,
we follow the “
strategic-trade” literature

74 See, for example, Bagwell and Staiger (2001b) and
Grossman and Helpman (1995b).
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and construct a “
third-market” model.75
Specifically, we illustrate our points using
a simple p
 artial-equilibrium model with a
single good, where all firms are located in
Countries 1 and 2 and all consumers are
located in Country 3. Firms in Countries 1
and 2 then compete for sales to consumers
in Country 3. We ask two questions. First,
when would a government have a unilateral
incentive to offer an export subsidy? Second,
when, if at all, should an international trade
agreement discipline the use of export
subsidies?
Following the pioneering model of
Brander and Spencer (1985), we focus on
a setting in which a fixed number of firms
engage in Cournot competition for sales in
Country 3. The key issues involved can be
illustrated in a simple third-market model
with two firms, wherein Firm 1 is located
in Country 1, Firm 2 is located in Country
2 and all consumers are located in Country
3. In the absence of any subsidy, Firms 1 and
2 have the same constant marginal cost. The
governments of Countries 1 and 2 respectively maximize national income. The game
has two stages. The governments simultaneously select their respective specific (i.e., per
unit) export subsidies, and after observing
these selections Firms 1 and 2 simultaneously select their respective output levels.
75 As we discuss in section 6.2, some recent research
evaluates whether the strategic-trade and “delocation” theories of export subsidies can be interpreted as providing
a rationale for trade agreements that is distinct from that
provided by the terms-of-trade externality. Bagwell and
Staiger (2012a, 2015) argue, however, that the problem for
a trade agreement to solve in the p
 rofit-shifting and delocation settings can be given a terms-of-trade interpretation,
provided that both import and export policies are available.
In particular, they show that politically optimal policies
remain efficient in these settings when a full set of trade
policies is available. We thus include some discussion of
these theories here, as part of our discussion of the implications of the terms-of-trade approach for the treatment
of export subsidies, while postponing further discussion
of the rationale of trade agreements in these settings until
section 6.2.

A key finding is that, starting at free trade, a
government that maximizes national income
now has a unilateral incentive to offer an
export subsidy. As is now well known, an
export subsidy lowers the cost of the exporting firm and thus shifts out this firm’s output reaction curve. The strategic advantage
of such a shift is that the other exporting
firm responds by reducing its own output.
An export subsidy thus “shifts profits” to the
subsidizing country. The overall effect of a
strategic export subsidy is to expand aggregate output and thus induce a fall in the
world price. Hence, as in the competitive
model, an export subsidy generates a positive
terms-of-trade externality for the importing
country. A new feature of the third-market
model is that an export subsidy generates as
well a negative terms-of-trade externality for
the other exporting country.
Of course, the other exporting country
has a similar incentive to subsidize exports,
and the resulting subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium involves export subsidies from
both exporting countries. The two exporting
countries end up worse off when export subsidies are legal, since their strategic efforts
offset and simply result in a lower world
price. Consumer and global economic welfares, however, are higher when subsidies are
allowed than would be the case were subsidies banned. The described model therefore
provides an interpretation for why exporting
countries would seek a ban on export subsidies as a means to keep the price high, but
it suggests that an international trade agreement designed to maximize the combined
welfare of all countries in fact should encourage even greater use of export subsidies than
occurs in the noncooperative equilibrium.76
76 The market is initially distorted with too little production as a consequence of oligopolistic competition. The
equilibrium with strategic export subsidies expands output closer to the competitive level, and a trade agreement
could further improve global welfare by increasing subsidy
levels so that the competitive level of output is produced.
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This simple third-market model has been
extended in many directions to allow for
alternative forms of imperfect competition,
multiple exporting firms in exporting countries, consumers in exporting countries,
endogenous cost technologies, and other
considerations.77 Such extensions provide
important qualifications about the sign of
the unilaterally optimal export policy, but a
robust feature of models with a fixed number
of firms is that a more expansionary export
policy provides a positive 
terms-of-trade
externality to importing consumers.
Returning now to the two questions
identified above, we note that the simple
third-market model described here provides
an interpretation for the unilateral appeal
of export subsidies, but it also suggests that
export subsidies may be u
 ndersupplied. The
model thus does not provide a foundation
from which to understand a cap on export
subsidies, much less the WTO’s prohibition
on export subsidies. The model also fails to
provide an interpretation for the fact that the
WTO treats export subsidies more severely
than import tariffs.78 In short, we conclude
that the simple third-market model fails to
rationalize the treatment of export subsidies
in the WTO.79
77 Eaton and Grossman (1986) and Maggi (1996) provide the key studies examining the dependence of the
sign of optimal export policies on the form of imperfect
competition in the product market. Bagwell and Staiger
(1994) argue that the sign of the optimal strategic R&D
policy is less sensitive to the form of imperfect competition. See Brander (1995) for a review of the s trategic-trade
literature.
78 We develop these conclusions for a model with
imperfect competition. As Bagwell and Staiger (2001c)
show, if governments have political-economic objectives
that give sufficient weight to export interests, then similar conclusions hold in a third-market model with perfect
competition when marginal cost is increasing.
79 The simple 
third-market model described here
neglects many potential welfare costs associated with
export subsidies. Export subsidies may generate distortions in production and encourage r ent-seeking behavior,
for example. We do not intend to minimize the importance
of such considerations; however, we also point out that
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4.3.5 Export Subsidies and Industrial Policy
The models described so far do not focus
on the long-run implications of export policies for industrial structure. To explore this
issue, we now follow Venables (1985) and
consider the “delocation” effects of trade
policies in a two-country partial-equilibrium
model with t wo-way trade in a homogeneous
good. The game has three stages. In the first
stage, governments simultaneously select
(specific) import and export tariffs. Each government seeks to maximize national income
in its country. In the second stage, after
observing trade policies, potential entrants
decide whether to locate in the domestic or
foreign market, where entry entails a positive fixed cost. In any country, entry occurs
until expected profits (including the fixed
cost) are driven to zero. Finally, in the third
stage, after observing trade policies and the
numbers of firms located in each of the two
countries, the entering firms simultaneously
choose Cournot output levels, where an individual firm selects both an output level for
the market in which it is located, as well as
a separate output level for exportation into
the other market. The two markets are segmented, and a positive (per unit) transport
cost must be incurred for exported units.
A key feature of this model is that it exhibits a Metzler paradox: if a government raises
its import tariff (or raises its export subsidy),
the price of the good within its country falls.
To see the intuition, suppose that we start at
global free trade with levels of entry in each
country that generate zero profit for each
firm, and suppose that the domestic government then imposes a slight import tariff (or
a slight export subsidy). Holding fixed the
numbers of firms in each country, domestic
s imilar welfare costs are associated with import tariffs. For
further discussion of these and other neglected welfare
costs associated with export subsidies, see Bagwell, Staiger,
and Sykes (2013, pp. 186–9).
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firms would then enjoy positive profits while
foreign firms would experience negative
profits. Some adjustment in the patterns of
entry across the two countries is thus necessary to restore zero profits. Due to positive
transport costs, each firm sells greater output
in its local market than in its export market.
Hence, the only way to reduce the profit of
a domestic firm while increasing the profit
of a foreign firm is to adjust entry patterns
until the domestic price falls and the foreign price rises. Consequently, the domestic
policy change must induce (reduce) entry
into the domestic (foreign) market to such
an extent that the domestic price falls (foreign price rises). In this sense, when a government imposes a higher import tariff (or
export subsidy), it “delocates” firms from the
other country to its own country.
As Venables (1985) shows, if all policies are initially set at free trade, then the
domestic government can gain by imposing
a small import tariff. Producer surplus is
unaffected by the change, since free-entry
conditions ensure that firms earn zero profit.
But a small import tariff generates positive
tariff revenue and also leads to a lower price
and higher consumer surplus in the domestic country, due to the Metzler paradox. A
small export subsidy likewise leads to a lower
price and higher consumer surplus in the
domestic country. However, the small export
subsidy imposes a cost in the form of subsidy expenses. Venables shows that, when
demand and costs are linear, a small export
subsidy also generates a net gain for the
domestic government. Both policy changes
result in a higher foreign price, lower foreign
consumer surplus, and lower foreign government welfare. Starting at free trade, therefore, Venables’ analysis shows that export
subsidies are unilaterally attractive and
impose a negative terms-of-trade externality
on the trading partner.
Bagwell and Staiger (2012b) generalize
the analysis of the linear Cournot delocation

model. They show that the Nash policies for
governments in fact are characterized by
the use of import tariffs and export tariffs.
Thus, while an export subsidy is unilaterally
attractive for a government when its import
policy is free trade, the government prefers
an export tariff when its import tariff is optimally set at a positive level. Intuitively, when
a positive import tariff is in place, an export
tariff generates additional tariff revenue on
imports by encouraging foreign entry and
thus exports. They also find that free trade in
import and export policies is efficient.
Together, these findings suggest a possible
interpretation of the treatment of export subsidies in GATT/WTO. The linear Cournot
delocation model suggests that governments
would perceive a unilateral gain from using
export subsidies only once import tariffs
were negotiated to levels sufficiently close
to free trade. From this perspective, it is not
surprising that GATT rules did not impose
strong restrictions on the use of export subsidies. Over time, however, as import tariffs
were negotiated through GATT rounds to
lower levels, governments may have perceived a unilateral gain from imposing export
subsidies. Furthermore, since free trade is an
efficient outcome in the linear Cournot delocation model, governments could achieve
mutual gains given low import tariffs if they
were to cap or even prohibit export subsidies. In this way, the model offers a potential
efficiency-enhancing interpretation of the

prohibition of export subsidies in the WTO
SCM Agreement.
Among the models reviewed above, the
linear Cournot delocation model offers the
most successful interpretation of the treatment of export subsidies in the WTO. At
the same time, we note that the model is not
completely successful. The linear Cournot
delocation model also predicts that governments would benefit from a prohibition of
import tariffs, and so it does not deliver an
interpretation for why export subsidies are
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treated more severely in the WTO than are
import tariffs. We also note that the model
rests on a specific structure (Cournot competition, segmented markets) and applies only
for governments that focus on the long-run
implications of trade policy.80 The strategic
“
profit-shifting” models described above
may be more appropriate if governments
are focused on t rade-policy implications that
manifest over the short run.
4.3.6 Implications for Subsidy Rules under
the WTO
In sum, the appropriate treatment of
subsidies in a trade agreement is a subtle
issue. Our review of the literature in this
section focuses on models for which trade
policies generate 
terms-of-trade externalities for trade partners. The review reinforces the subtle implications of subsidies:
domestic production subsidies can play both
efficiency-enhancing and opportunistic roles,
export subsidies generate positive externalities to foreign consumers and negative
externalities to foreign firms in models with
fixed industrial structures, and export subsidies may generate negative externalities to
foreign consumers in long-run settings with
endogenous entry and exit. On the whole,
our review does not provide strong support
for the specific treatment of s ubsidies in the
80 Bagwell and Lee (2015) examine trade policies in the
alternative l ong-run model of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008),
wherein firms have heterogeneous costs and engage in
monopolistic competition. They show that, starting at
global free trade, a country gains when it introduces a small
import tariff or a small export subsidy, provided in the latter case that transportation costs are low and productivity
dispersion is high. These interventions, however, lower the
welfare of the trading partner. Other work examines optimal export policy when relative wage effects are induced
through general-equilibirium channels. For example, in
Ricardian settings, Itoh and Kiyono (1987) characterize a
welfare-enhancing role for targeted export subsidies, and
Costinot et al. (2015) offer a full characterization of optimal trade policies. Relatedly, Demidova (2015) considers
a general-equilibirium version of the M
 elitz–Ottaviano
model and shows that the Metzler paradox then no longer
obtains.
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WTO. We describe work suggesting that
WTO rules on domestic production subsidies may be a step backward, relative to
GATT rules, and we also summarize a range
of models under which export subsidies are
actually undersupplied relative to the efficient level for governments. While the linear
Cournot delocation model provides a potential interpretation for an agreement to limit
or even prohibit the use of export subsidies,
the existing formal models that we review do
not identify a reason for treating export subsidies more severely than import tariffs.
4.4	Non-Violation Complaints, Shallow
Integration, and National Treatment
The
central
implication
of
the
terms-of-trade theory of trade agreements
is that governments set unilateral tariffs at
levels that are inefficiently high, since they
fail to internalize the terms-of-trade implications of their tariff policies for each other.
A trade agreement can “undo” this inefficiency by facilitating mutually advantageous
and reciprocal tariff reductions that expand
the volume of trade to more efficient levels.
Tariffs are not the only instruments, however, that impact the terms of trade. For
large countries, domestic taxes, subsidies,
and standards may also affect the terms of
trade and lead thereby to possible inefficiencies. At the same time, domestic policies may have legitimate and even fi
 rst-best
roles to play as instruments with which to
address market failures or distributional
concerns within a country. Attempts to regulate domestic policies through a trade agreement, therefore, must balance the possible
opportunistic use of such policies against the
efficiency-enhancing roles that such policies
may play. We thus arrive at the following
question: how should domestic policies be
treated in a trade agreement? In this section,
we describe research that responds to this
question while utilizing the terms-of-trade
approach to trade agreements.
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In fact, we have already encountered this
question above in the specific context of our
discussion of the treatment of domestic production subsidies. As we note there, a natural
answer to this question is that a trade agreement should grant each government flexibility when choosing its policies, provided that
the overall effect of any policy changes does
not erode the market-access commitments
achieved through its preceding tariff negotiations. Bagwell and Staiger (2001a) formally
explore this answer in a 
two-good general-equilibirium model of trade in which governments have available domestic policies
(e.g., labor or environmental standards), as
well as tariff policies. Working with a model
in which all international externalities flow
through the terms of trade, their main finding is that efficiency can be achieved through
tariff negotiations alone, provided that each
government is free to make subsequent
adjustments in its domestic and trade policies that leave its negotiated market access
commitment (i.e., the terms of trade) unaltered. As discussed in section 4.3, Bagwell
and Staiger (2006) obtain a related finding in
the specific context of domestic production
subsidies.
As noted in section 3.1, a key assumption
of the Bagwell–Staiger (2001a) model is that
each government only has a direct interest in
the domestic policy adopted by its country,
where this interest in turn may reflect various national considerations that impact the
government’s welfare (e.g., a government
may have a direct interest in the health and
safety of its citizens, or in the environmental
quality within its country’s borders). The lack
of any direct interest by any one government
in the domestic policy selected by another
government indicates that the model does
not allow for 
nonpecuniary international
externalities (e.g., global pollution). For this
family of models, the domestic policy choices
of one government therefore impact the welfare of another government only indirectly,

through the terms of trade. Notice, though,
that “race to the bottom” concerns are about
the pecuniary international externalities
(trade effects) associated with a choice of
weak standards, and so this family of models
is capable of capturing those concerns.
When international externalities travel
only through the terms of trade, the main
finding of Bagwell and Staiger (2001a) suggests that a “shallow integration” approach to
trade agreements may suffice. Governments
need not negotiate directly over domestic
policies; instead, they may negotiate over
tariffs alone, provided that the market-access
gains so achieved are secure. The important
task for an international agreement in this
context is then to ensure that negotiated
market-access concessions are secure against
opportunistic policy adjustments. Bagwell
and Staiger (2001a) and Bagwell, Mavroidis,
and Staiger (2002) argue that current
GATT/WTO rules, which focus on market
access, can with some strengthening strike
the right balance, so that governments can
set efficient domestic policies while pursuing
international negotiations over tariffs alone.
4.4.1	Non-violation Complaints and the
Preservation of Market Access
In particular, GATT rules that permit
on-violation complaints are a potentially
n
attractive means of securing m
 arket-access
concessions. A government may file a
non-violation complaint when a trading partner undertakes a policy change that nullifies or impairs the market access gains that
a government reasonably expected as part
of an earlier negotiation. For example, following a tariff negotiation, the possibility
of facing a 
non-violation complaint might
deter a government from an opportunistic
(terms-of-trade improving) relaxation in the
production standards that it requires for an
import-competing industry. Existing rules

are insufficient, however, to enable a government to adjust its policy mix following a tariff
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negotiation by raising its standards in the
import-competing industry while also raising
its import tariff so as to maintain its negotiated market-access commitment. Bagwell,
Mavroidis, and Staiger (2002) propose that a
modification to GATT rules of renegotiation,
whereby a government could use a higher
standard in an 
import-competing industry
as compensation for a higher import tariff, could in principle provide the needed
flexibility.81
Ederington (2001) explores related
themes in a model in which all international externalities travel through the terms
of trade and any agreement on tariffs and
domestic policies must be s elf-enforcing. In
his model, each government has two instruments—an import tariff and a domestic production tax—and the latter instrument has
a legitimate role, since domestic production
generates a n
 on-pecuniary externality that
resides entirely within the country in which
production occurs. Both policies affect the
terms of trade, and the challenge is to ensure
that the efficient policy mix is selected. In
Ederington’s model, the efficient domestic policy is a Pigouvian tax that offsets the
domestic distortion, and the efficient level
of the domestic tax in fact is independent
of the import tariff and thus the level of
market access. Consistent with the themes
developed above, Ederington shows that
the 
most cooperative solution is achieved
when domestic policies are set at the efficient (Pigouvian) level and import tariffs are
lowered so as to expand market access to the
level that is as close to efficient as possible
before the self-enforcement constraint of
the repeated game binds. The key intuition
is that an efficient domestic policy raises
the discounted future value of c ooperation,

81 At the same time, and as discussed at the end of section 4.3.2, we note that there may be practical limitations
with extensive reliance on GATT non-violation rules.

1179

which in turn enables governments to
enforce lower tariff levels.82
4.4.2 The Principle of National Treatment
Our discussion of the 
terms-of-trade
implications of domestic policies to this point
emphasizes the benefit that the domestic
country may enjoy when domestic production standards in an i mport-competing industry are relaxed in an opportunistic manner.
As Staiger and Sykes (2011) argue, however,
the bulk of WTO disputes concern instead
cases in which foreign suppliers complain
about standards that apply to their own products. Following a similar line of reasoning,
we may anticipate a potential incentive for
the domestic government to set standards on
foreign products in an opportunistic fashion
that could undermine the security of negotiated 
market-access gains for the foreign
exporters. A key design feature of GATT/
WTO rules that guards against such opportunism is the “national treatment” principle.
This principle, which is embodied in GATT
Article III, the WTO Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade (TBT), and the WTO
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures (SPS), restricts the ability of member governments to impose regulations on
foreign suppliers that are more stringent
than those imposed on domestic suppliers.
To formally explore the effectiveness of
the national treatment principle, Staiger and
Sykes (2011) adapt and extend the general
insights of Bagwell and Staiger (2001a) to a
product-standards setting. In the S

taiger–
Sykes model, the domestic government
82 Lee (2007) considers a related model but with the
important difference that each government is privately
informed about the magnitude of the domestic production externality in its country. As Lee shows, in this case
it may be optimal to distort the tariff in order to limit the
potential for disguised protectionism, which occurs when
a government misrepresents its information by selecting a
low production tax even though the externality cost is high.
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chooses trade policy as well as domestic tax
and regulatory policy with respect to a product that is domestically produced and also
imported. Regulatory policy has a legitimate
role to play in their model, since d
 omestic
consumption generates a negative and
non-pecuniary consumption externality that
resides entirely within the domestic country.
Staiger and Sykes show that governments
of large countries indeed have incentive to
impose discriminatory tax and regulatory policies against foreign imported products once
import tariffs are bound. The model thus
provides an interpretation of the national
treatment principle as a guard against such
opportunistic behavior. Moreover, when
product-specific consumption taxes are

infeasible, they further show that the domestic government has an incentive to impose
inefficiently stringent n

ondiscriminatory
product standards even in the presence of
a national treatment clause, since foreign
exporters bear some of the cost of achieving higher product standards that benefit
domestic consumers. In light of their findings, they conclude that the national treatment principle can play an important role in
preventing tax and regulatory discrimination
but leaves a potentially important role for
the non-violation clause to address nondiscriminatory regulations that are excessively
stringent.83
The national treatment principle has been
interpreted and evaluated in other studies,
as well. Horn (2006) and Horn, Maggi, and
Staiger (2010) examine the national treatment principle with a focus on domestic taxes
83 Staiger and Sykes (2011) also observe that one of
the findings reported by Broda, Limão, and Weinstein
(2008) and that we discussed in section 3.2 above—that
US nontariff barriers are positively related to US market power over world prices—may reflect limitations of
the GATT/WTO national treatment and n
on-violation
clauses to police 
terms-of-trade manipulation through
behind-the-border measures. See also Staiger and Sykes
(2013, forthcoming).

rather than regulatory standards. Grossman,
Horn, and Mavroidis (2013) also provide an
extensive study of the GATT national treatment provision and argue that case law, economic theory, and the negotiation record
all suggest that the purpose of the national
treatment provision is to outlaw protectionist
use of domestic policies.84
4.4.3 Moving Beyond Shallow Integration?
The case for shallow integration described
above rests on the assumption that all international externalities are pecuniary and
travel through the terms of trade. This case
can be weakened, however, when governments possess private information, a point
we discuss in section 5.3. And as Antràs and
Staiger (2012a, 2012b) argue, more complex forms of integration may be required
in the presence of offshoring, which alters
how prices are determined and complicates
the nature of international pecuniary externalities. We discuss their work in section
6.3. Similarly, “deeper” forms of integration may be needed if the trade agreement
is created with the goal of also addressing
non-pecuniary international externalities

(e.g., global pollution).85 Limão’s (2005)
model, which we discuss next, offers one
illustration of this point.
Limão (2005) explores a model of
self-enforcing cooperation among governments, with the new feature that production
in the import-competing sector generates
a negative 
non-pecuniary externality that
travels (at least to some degree) across
national borders. Each government selects
an import tariff and a domestic production
tax, and both policies affect the terms of
84 Other related studies include Battigalli and Maggi
(2003), Copeland (1990), and Costinot (2008).
85 For discussion of the extent to which GATT/WTO
rules can be used to address non-pecuniary international
externalities, see, e.g., Bagwell, Mavroidis, and Staiger
(2002) and Trebilcock, Howse, and Eliason (2013, chapters
17 and 18) and the references cited therein.
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trade. In Limão’s model, therefore, international externalities travel through the terms
of trade as well as through a non-pecuniary
channel. His findings illustrate that a
form of “deep integration” is attractive to
governments in such a setting as a means
of relaxing enforcement constraints, where
deep integration in this context refers to
a policy linkage whereby the potential for
retaliation in both policies deters deviations in any one policy alone.86 In particular,
Limão finds that governments can achieve
higher welfare in a self-enforcing agreement when the policies are linked; however,
there is no guarantee that linkage raises the
level of cooperation in each policy.87
In total, our survey of research in this
section provides support for the shallow-integration approach of the GATT/WTO
when externalities are pecuniary and travel
through the terms of trade. GATT/WTO
rules concerning non-violation complaints
and national treatment can be interpreted
from this perspective as resting on a solid
economic foundation. Anticipating discussion in later sections, we also note that the
case for shallow integration can be weakened when governments possess private
information, and arguments for deeper
integration also emerge in settings where
international externalities travel through
other channels.
4.5 Investment and Services
The creation of the WTO in 1995 includes
new agreements related to investment and
services. In this section, we consider these
new agreements and discuss economic
research utilizing the terms-of-trade theory
86 Retaliation in Limão’s (2005) repeated-game model
occurs off the equilibrium path and thus carries the interpretation of a breakdown in cooperation with respect to
the relevant policies.
87 See also Spagnolo (1999a, 1999b), who develops
related themes for a distinct class of interdependent
payoffs.
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that interprets and evaluates the provisions
contained therein.
4.5.1 Foreign Direct Investment, Local
Content, and International 
Cross-ownership
We start with the treatment of investment
in the GATT/WTO, with an initial focus on
foreign direct investment (FDI). The past
two decades have witnessed a significant
growth in FDI activity.88 This growth encourages consideration of the investment measures that host governments may impose and
the appropriate treatment of those measures
in the GATT/WTO. Investment measures
interact with GATT rules when they have
direct effects on trade; in particular, local
content, export, and t rade-balancing requirements may distort investment decisions and
generate tension with basic GATT rules
concerning national treatment and quantitative restrictions.89 As Trebilcock, Howse,
and Eliason (2013, chapter 15) discuss, the
WTO 
Trade-Related Investment Measures
88 FDI may be attractive to firms for a variety of reasons. For example, FDI may provide access to cheap
inputs, reduce trade costs, and facilitate “tariff jumping.”
FDI may also be advantageous relative to outsourcing as
a means of maintaining tighter control over technology. At
the same time, firms considering FDI confront a variety
of possible costs, including the possibility of rent expropriation via government policy changes after sunk costs are
incurred. For a survey of research on multinational firms,
see Antràs and Yeaple (2014).
89 Local content requirements concern measures that
require 
foreign-owned firms to discriminate between
domestic and imported goods that are used as inputs
for production in the host country; export requirements
concern measures that require exportation of a certain percentage of the foreign-owned firm’s output; and
trade-balancing requirements concern measures that

impose a relationship between what the foreign-owned
firm is allowed to import into the host country and the
value of its exports. In some situations, trade-balancing
requirements may be defended under GATT rules if they
are necessary to address a balance-of-payment crisis. See
Trebilcock, Howse, and Eliason (2013, Chapter 15) for further discussion of the implications of GATT rules for the
treatment of investment measures.
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Agreement (TRIMs) builds on GATT rules
to subject some measures with direct effects
on trade, such as local content requirements
and quantitative restrictions, to explicit scrutiny under GATT norms. The appeal of additional restrictions on investment measures,
however, is controversial, with some countries expressing concerns about the broader
implications of extensive investor-protection
provisions in trade agreements. Investment
was removed as a topic for further discussion in the WTO Doha Round. A number
of investment agreements have arisen, however, via bilateral investment treaties (BITs)
and as part of investor-protection provisions
in PTAs.
The purpose of restrictions on investment measures in a trade agreement can be
developed at several levels. We mention two
here.90 First, in the absence of a trade agreement that imposes restrictions on investment measures, a government might be
tempted to impose measures favoring local
input suppliers as a means of generating
advantageous price changes for its country.
Second, a trade agreement that appropriately restricts investment measures may also
encourage efficiency-enhancing FDI when
the host government is otherwise unable to
commit not to expropriate foreign rents once
the foreign firm has sunk costs. We briefly
discuss the first purpose next and note that
the second purpose is more directly associated with the “commitment theory” of trade
agreements developed in section 6.
Bagwell and Sykes (2005) examine conditions under which a local content requirement generates advantageous price changes
90 Another possible consideration is that restrictions on
investment measures may play an efficiency-enhancing
role in managing unilateral policies designed to enhance
technology spillover. A full analysis of the international
externalities associated with such policies requires a comparison of the m
 arket-access benefits that firms may enjoy
via FDI with the technological knowledge that they may
provide.

for the domestic (i.e., host) country. As
they emphasize, a local content requirement is logically distinct from import tariffs
and quotas, since a local content requirement does not generate government revenue. They consider a simple two-country
partial-equilibrium model in which a sin
gle homogenous input supplied in both the
domestic and foreign country is used by
foreign-owned firms to manufacture a final
good for sale in the domestic market. When
markets are competitive and the domestic country is small in that its local content
requirement does not affect the world (i.e.,
foreign) input price, a domestic local content requirement raises the domestic input
price, and thus redistributes domestic surplus and creates deadweight loss, but does
not generate an international externality.91
If instead a foreign monopolist supplies
the final good, then a domestic local content policy may redistribute surplus from
the foreign monopolist to domestic input
suppliers.92 Such a policy becomes more
appealing to the domestic government when
the foreign monopolist does not respond by
significantly reducing output. In turn, a significant output reduction is less likely if the
domestic country has market power (i.e., is
large) so that its local content policy induces
a fall in the foreign input price that offsets to
91 Bagwell and Sykes (2005) assume that the local input
supply function is upward sloping and that the fi
 nal-good
production technology exhibits constant returns to scale.
In the case of a small domestic country and a competitive
final-good market, a domestic local content requirement
raises the domestic input price but has no impact on the
foreign input price. Profit in the final-good sector is then
likewise unaffected, being zero in any case. The absence
of an international externality in this setting implies that
there is no obvious role for an international agreement on
local content requirements. See Corden (1971), Grossman
(1981), and Vousden (1990, chapter 2) for further analyses
of local content requirements in models with competitive
markets and small countries.
92 See Brander and Spencer (1981) for analysis of a
related model, in which an import tariff is used to extract
surplus from a foreign monopolist.
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some degree the rise in the domestic input
price. The end result is that, for settings in
which market power is present, local content
policies may be unilaterally appealing to the
domestic government and harmful to the
foreign trading partner. From this perspective, restrictions in trade agreements on the
use of local content requirements rest upon
a solid economic foundation when market
power is present.
Blanchard (2010) explores a different
aspect of the relationship between foreign
investment and trade agreements. She does
not focus on investment measures and rules
that restrict such measures; instead, she
considers the broad implications of general cross-border equity holdings for optimal tariffs and the role of the GATT/WTO.
Augmenting the 
two-country, 
two-good,
general-equilibirium model of trade
described above to include exogenous international cross-ownership, she identifies the
channels through which cross-border ownership impacts the optimal tariff. The internal effect is that a country has less incentive
to maintain a high tariff in the presence of
a larger degree of foreign ownership in the
local import-competing industry, and the
external effect is that a government likewise has less incentive to raise its tariff for
a terms-of-trade gain when its constituents
hold a greater stake in the foreign export
industry.93 Finally, the compositional effect is
that industry bias in ownership patterns may
encourage a government to manipulate local
prices to benefit industries with a relatively
higher proportion of national ownership.
As Blanchard (2010) argues, consideration
of 
cross-border ownership leads to interesting policy implications. An implication
of the external effect is that a country may
93 As Blanchard (2010) notes, her analysis of optimal
tariffs under exogenous international c ross-ownership generalizes and combines themes from previous theoretical
work.
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welcome foreign investment into its export
sector as a means of encouraging a unilateral
tariff reduction from its trading partner.94
Similarly, the internal effect implies that foreign investment into an import-competing
sector may encourage the host country to
lower its import tariff as a means of extracting rent from foreign investors. Perhaps the
most provocative implication of her analysis
is that international ownership, by encouraging governments to liberalize their tariffs unilaterally, may substitute partially (or
even in some cases completely) for negotiated tariff reductions.95 Indeed, with a sufficient degree of international c ross-border
ownership, unilateral tariffs are lower than
efficient, and the role of an international
agreement is then to facilitate reciprocal and
efficiency-enhancing restrictions in market
access.96 Finally, Blanchard argues that the
principle of reciprocity continues to serve
as an important guide to efficient outcomes,
once the definition of market access reflects
ownership positions. More generally, the
implications of cross-border ownership for
the optimal design of GATT/WTO rules is
an important subject that warrants further
attention.

94 See also Blanchard (2007) and Krishna and Mitra
(2005). Blanchard and Matschke (2015) provide some
evidence to this effect through an assessment of the impact
of US multinational firms’ affiliate offshoring behavior on
US tariff preferences.
95 While international ownership may lead in this way
to lower tariffs, Gulotty (2014) argues that greater international ownership does not similarly lead to reductions
in regulatory barriers. He argues that regulatory barriers
raise fixed costs, and that the associated reduction in entry
may lead to net gains for efficient, globalized firms. See
also Ethier (1998) for a different perspective under which
regional agreements and associated foreign direct investment activity arise endogenously in response to multilateral liberalization.
96 In relation to the 
Bagwell–Staiger (1999a, 2002)
model described above, a key difference here is that
international ownership operates via the external effect to
diminish the absolute value of W 
 p̃   w and W p∗̃   wand may even
reverse the sign of these terms.
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4.5.2 Services
We briefly consider next the treatment of
services in GATT/WTO. A variety of evidence
confirms that services play an increasingly
important role in modern economies.97 In
a survey of research on services trade and
policy, Francois and Hoekman (2010) indicate that the theoretical literature on services trade highlights the complementarity
between international services trade and
FDI, the implications of different market
structures and national regulatory policies
for services trade, and the way in which
international service firms are organized.
They also describe increasing evidence that
services liberalization is a major potential
source of economic performance gains.
Government policies that affect international service firms are disciplined in
the WTO General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS). As Trebilcock, Howse, and
Eliason (2013, chapter 13, p. 480) indicate,
the GATS is a “highly complex accord.” This
agreement recognizes that services may be
supplied through various modes and provides
a framework for m
 arket-access negotiations
across these modes. While GATS contains
a general MFN provision (subject to some
exceptions), national treatment and market access commitments apply only where
WTO members make specific commitments
to such coverage in their schedules. The
impact of GATS on services reform is challenging to estimate. Francois and Hoekman
(2010, p. 678) review the evidence to date
and conclude that “the available, limited,
evidence suggests that, with the exception
of the European Union, most services policy
reform has been unilateral. The c ontribution

of the GATS to services reform has been
negligible.” 98
Given the significant potential gains from
services liberalization, it is natural to ask why
the reciprocity mechanism that underlies
trade agreements has not played a greater
role in achieving policy reforms in services.
Francois and Hoekman (2010) review the literature relating to this question and identify
a number of potential factors. Among these
factors, we mention here one that is related
to our discussion above: given that FDI is a
significant mode for supplying non-tradable
services, Blanchard’s (2007, 2010) arguments
imply that unilateral liberalization initiatives
may substitute, to some degree, for reciprocal
trade liberalization through trade-agreement
negotiations. More generally, as Antràs and
Staiger (2012a, 2012b) argue, the rise of offshoring may have changed the nature of the
international externality that a trade agreement must address, which suggests in turn
that trade agreements may require additional restrictions for services policies that
are associated with offshoring. The purpose
and design of trade agreements for market settings with offshoring is an important
direction for research, which we discuss in
further detail in section 6.3.
Investment and services are of increasing
importance in the international economy.
The WTO includes agreements that place
restrictions on measures that affect investment and services, but the appropriate nature
of such restrictions is controversial. Drawing
on research that employs the terms-of-trade
approach to trade agreements, we argue that
restrictions in trade agreements on the use
of local content requirements can be interpreted as resting upon a solid economic

97 For further discussion, see Francois and Hoekman
(2010) and Jensen (2011).

98 As Francois and Hoekman (2010, p. 678) note, countries that acceded to the WTO after 1995 tended to make
more GATS commitments and represent a further exception, although care is required in assuming that GATS commitments are actually implemented. See also Eschenbach
and Hoekman (2006) and Hoekman (2008).
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foundation when market power is present.
We also summarize research that indicates
that international ownership may substitute
to some degree for negotiated tariff reductions. Finally, as we note, recent research
suggests a significant potential for gains from
services policy liberalization, even though
the liberalization achieved to date through
multilateral negotiations appears modest. To
our minds, all of this points to a valuable role
for future research directed toward understanding the impact of trade-related investment measures and services policies and,
correspondingly, the appropriate design of
WTO restrictions in this context.
4.6 The Story Line thus Far . . .
As interpreted through the lens of the
terms-of-trade theory, the original 1947
GATT was created to solve the central economic problem of the day: the US Smoot–
Hawley tariffs of 1930 and the international
retaliatory response that followed had led to
a terms-of-trade driven prisoners’ dilemma
with excessively high trade barriers. The task
confronting governments was to set up an
institution that could work well to internalize the international (terms-of-trade) externality at the root of the h
 igh-tariff problem,
and thereby induce governments to make
the tariff choices they would have made
had they not succumbed to the temptation
of international c ost shifting (terms-of-trade
manipulation) in the first place. If successful,
GATT would lead necessarily to lower tariffs and expanded market access from those
countries and in those industries where significant market power was present. But with
significant market power not universal in all
countries and all industries, GATT would not
lead to lower tariffs from all countries and
in all industries; and with the evident desire
of governments to use trade policy for goals
beyond that of national income maximization, GATT would also not be expected to
lead to universal free trade. Finally, while
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some constraints on domestic policies
would be needed to ensure that subsequent
adjustments in those policies did not undo
market-access commitments achieved via

tariff restraints, GATT’s lack of any deeper
integration beyond such constraints would
not imply a weakness of the GATT system.
The literature we have surveyed thus far
lends broad support to the view that, at a fundamental level, governments succeeded with
the GATT/WTO in creating an institution
that is w
 ell-designed to solve the terms-oftrade problem. Many of the GATT/WTO’s
core features appear sensible when interpreted in the context of this problem, and
many of the outcomes negotiated within the
GATT/WTO are broadly consistent with what
might be expected from such an institution.
The literature does, however, point
out some potential difficulties with the
GATT/WTO approach, and these difficulties may account for some of the central challenges that the WTO confronts
today. The evolution in the treatment of
subsidies from GATT to the WTO is especially puzzling from the perspective of the
terms-of-trade theory, both with regard to
domestic subsidies and even more so with
regard to the relatively severe treatment of
export subsidies.
Beyond the puzzling GATT/WTO treatment of subsidies, the literature emphasizes the possibility of a serious free-rider
problem under the MFN principle, and
there is some evidence that this problem
is significant. To the extent that the principles of MFN and reciprocity together allow
countries that negotiate reciprocal tariff cuts
to appropriate the gains from their bargains
and thereby keep free riding to a minimum,
the exemption from reciprocity granted to
developing countries may ironically have
kept these countries from enjoying to their
full potential the benefits of GATT/WTO
membership, again something that the evidence seems to bear out. This feature may in
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turn have contributed to a significant “latecomer” problem for the Doha Round, as the
round grapples with how to better integrate
developing and emerging economies into the
world trading system when the major developed countries have already negotiated low
average MFN tariffs.
Moreover, where there are significant
deviations from the MFN principle, such
as can arise with the formation of PTAs,
the literature points to these deviations as
complicating international externalities
beyond the simple terms-of-trade problem
that the GATT/WTO seems well-designed
to solve, suggesting in turn that the rise of
PTAs could be creating difficulties for the
GATT/WTO approach. Finally, while services trade and international investment
flows are of increasing importance to the
global economy, the literature has developed only a nascent understanding of the
international externalities associated with
them, and so the ability of the GATT/WTO
approach to function well in their presence
is still an open question.
5.

Evaluating the PTA Approach
to Trade Liberalization

We have described in the previous section
how the GATT/WTO approach to liberalization derives broad support from the theoretical and empirical terms-of-trade literature.
Does the terms-of-trade theory also support
the view that PTA-driven liberalization can
be seen as contributing to a solution to the
terms-of-trade problem? In this section we
review the relevant theoretical and empirical
literature that speaks to this question.
5.1 PTAs, External Tariffs, and Multilateral
Bargaining
We begin with a focus on the impact
of PTAs on the external (MFN) tariffs of P
TA-member countries, and ask:
might PTAs be seen to work in tandem

with the tariff liberalization efforts of the
GATT/WTO, or should PTAs be seen rather
to work against these efforts? According to
the terms-of-trade theory, noncooperative
Nash tariffs are set inefficiently high on
products where the countries possess market power; hence, one way to shed light on
this question is to assess the impact of PTAs
on the n
 oncooperative external MFN tariffs
of the member countries on such products.
If the formation of PTAs lowers these tariffs,
then it could be argued that PTAs work in
tandem with the GATT/WTO’s own efforts
to reduce these tariffs, and that PTAs are
hence building blocks for the needed multilateral liberalization that the GATT/WTO is
also orchestrating. On the other hand, if the
formation of PTAs raises these tariffs, then
PTAs would appear to increase the degree
of multilateral tariff liberalization that is
needed to reach the efficiency frontier, and
it could be argued that PTAs pose stumbling blocks to multilateral liberalization in
this case.
There is a large literature that evaluates the impact of PTA formation on the
external 
noncooperative MFN tariffs of
member countries. This literature has identified several effects of PTAs on external
tariffs, where PTAs may take the form of
free-trade agreements (FTAs) or customs
unions (CUs), with the key difference being
that, in addition to eliminating tariffs on
intra-union trade, CU members adopt a

common external tariff policy toward the
trade of nonmembers.
Two of the effects identified by this literature operate to reduce the external tariffs
of PTA members: a “tariff complementarity
effect” that can take two forms and applies
to FTAs and CUs, and a “rent destruction
effect” that applies to FTAs. Richardson
(1995) identifies a first tariff complementarity effect: when an FTA is formed between
countries that are competing importers of a
common product from third countries, each
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FTA partner has an incentive to lower its
external tariff on this product slightly below
that of its FTA partners so as to increase
its share of the tariff revenue collected on
imports from outside the FTA, and this
competition for tariff revenue between FTA
partners can lead to a downward spiral in
their external tariffs. Bagwell and Staiger
(1999b) identify a second tariff complementarity effect: in a competing-exporter
world where each FTA or CU member
competes with n
 onmembers for exports to
other members, when FTA or CU members
reduce their tariffs to zero on imports from
one another, the resulting trade diversion
(i.e., the reduction in imports by members
from n
 onmembers) encourages members to
lower the tariffs that they apply on imports
from nonmembers.99 The rent-destruction
effect is highlighted by Ornelas (2005a,
2005b, 2005c, and 2008) and is also a force
for lower external tariffs among FTA members. In a setting where special interest
lobbies push for tariff protection, Ornelas
shows that the rents from the external tariffs of one FTA member country spill over
to producers in FTA partner countries,
creating a free-rider problem for national
lobbies within the FTA that interferes with
their ability to obtain high external tariffs
from their governments.
Two further effects operate to increase the
external tariffs of PTA members, but operate only for CUs. A “market power effect”
(see Kennan and Riezman 1990, Krugman
1991, Bond and Syropoulos 1996a, 1996b,
Bagwell and Staiger 1997b and 1999b, and
Cadot, de Melo, and Olarreaga 1999) arises
when CU members are competing importers of a common product, and can collectively exert more market power on the
99 Other papers featuring a tariff complementarity
effect in various settings include Bond, Riezman, and
Syropoulos (2004), Bond, Syropoulos, and Winters (2001),
Freund (2000b), Syropoulos (1999), and Yi (1996).
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world price of that product with their common external tariff than they could individually. A separate “coordination effect”
(see Kennan and Riezman 1990) operates
to raise the e xternal tariffs of CU members
even when countries are competing exporters: when one CU member raises its external tariff on a product that it imports from
third countries, other CU members that
export that product to the first CU member
gain as they receive higher prices for their
exports to the first CU member, and this is a
positive externality of higher external tariffs
that can be internalized among CU members when they set their common external
tariff policy.
Of course, while the impact of PTA formation on 
noncooperative Nash external
MFN tariffs is suggestive of the nature of
the relationship between PTAs and the
GATT/WTO, it provides at best an incomplete picture of this relationship. First,
it is not clear that the impact of PTAs on
noncooperative MFN tariffs translates—

even with the same sign—to the impact
on cooperative MFN tariffs. For example, Limão (2007) shows that an FTA that
pursues non-trade objectives can result in
higher cooperative MFN tariffs, in circumstances where FTA partners agree to provide non-trade concessions to a country in
exchange for preferential market access
rents created and maintained by the high
external tariffs of the country. In effect,
Limão demonstrates that the FTA partners
can become a force pushing against negotiated reductions in the country’s external
MFN tariffs (and hence their rents). And
Bagwell and Staiger (1997b, 1997c, 1999b)
show that when s elf-enforcement constraints
bind in a multilateral agreement over external tariffs, the formation of FTAs and CUs
can have impacts on the m
 ost cooperative
MFN tariffs achievable that are the opposite of the impacts on the Nash external tariffs, and that vary through time if the PTAs
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are implemented in stages.100 Second, recall
that the terms-of-trade theory directs attention to the question of whether PTAs reduce
the degree of inefficient terms-of-trade
manipulation embodied in the external

tariffs of PTA partners, and the results surveyed above are not always presented with
this question in mind.101 Finally, while a
reduction in the external MFN tariffs of
PTA members triggered by the formation of
the PTA might be viewed as partially solving the terms-of-trade problem and thereby
making the remaining task easier for the
GATT/WTO, Bagwell and Staiger (1999a,
2001b) show that the introduction of PTAs
and the violation of MFN that this implies
can change (does change for FTAs, can but
need not change for CUs) the nature of the
problem that a trade agreement must solve,
from a simple terms-of-trade problem to a
more complicated problem in which international externalities also travel through
local prices. Bagwell and Staiger thus argue
that PTAs are inherently at odds with the
GATT/WTO’s approach to multilateral trade
liberalization, which seems best-suited to
address simple terms-of-trade problems.
In any case, with these various effects identified and pointing in different directions, it
is clear that theory alone cannot resolve the
issue of the impact of PTA formation on the

100 Other work that considers the effects of exogenous
PTAs on self-enforcing multilateral tariff cooperation
includes Bond and Syropoulos (1996b) and Saggi (2006).
In additional related work, Levy (1997) and Krishna (1998)
argue that FTAs can erode the political support for further
agreements to reduce MFN external tariffs, and thereby
act as stumbling blocks to multilateral trade liberalization.
A literature also exists that examines the impact of multilateral liberalization on the formation of PTAs. Using
different frameworks, Ethier (1998) and Freund (2000b)
argue that PTAs may be a response to successful multilateral liberalization.
101 For example, the rent-destruction effect identified
by Ornelas (2005a, 2005b, 2005c, and 2008) does not have
a clear prediction related to this question.

external MFN tariffs of member countries.102
We therefore turn to the empirical literature
on this question.
What is the impact of PTA tariff liberalization on subsequent efforts toward multilateral tariff liberalization?103 Limão (2006)
provides a first p
roduct-level investigation
into whether PTAs are stumbling blocks or
building blocks for multilateral liberalization.
His approach involves a comparison of two
different types of products—those for which
a country has positive imports from PTA
partners and those for which it only imports
from PTA non-partners. An examination of
subsequent US multilateral tariff changes
made as a result of the Uruguay Round provides evidence that the United States granted
smaller MFN tariff reductions in products
with positive US imports from PTA partners.
The evidence applies not only to products
imported from large PTA partners, such as
the countries in NAFTA, but also to imports
from smaller PTA partners. Given that even
those smaller US PTA partners export in
nearly 15 percent of product lines, and that
these products also have positive levels of
imports from non-PTA partners, a further
implication is that even small US PTAs were
a stumbling block to the multilateral liberalization taking place under the Uruguay
Round (consistent with the model of FTAs
with non-trade objectives in Limão 2007).
In addition to the United States, another
important environment to conduct such an
exercise is the European Union. Karacaovali
and Limão (2008) first confirm the evidence
found for the United States by showing that
the European Union cut MFN tariffs on
products not imported from PTA partners
by nearly twice as much as it cut tariffs on
products imported from partners during the
102 Bagwell and Staiger (1998) and Freund and Ornelas
(2010) reach a similar conclusion.
103 See Freund and Ornelas (2010) for a more extensive
survey of this empirical literature.
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Uruguay Round. Furthermore, the size of
the EU stumbling block effect is larger for
the products that are exported by more PTA
partners. Second, they exploit additional margins of the data on the EU PTAs by grouping
PTA partners based on whether they eventually acceded to the European Union between
the ends of the Tokyo Round and Uruguay
Round of negotiations. They find evidence
consistent with theoretical predictions that
accession countries should not trigger stumbling block effects,104 and that the stumbling
block effect is only associated with products
from countries with which the European
Union had PTAs in place at that time.
Changes to multilateral tariffs need not
only take place in the context of GATT/WTO
negotiating rounds. It is natural, however,
to analyze tariff changes achieved through
negotiation rounds when considering the
United States and European Union during
the recent period in which detailed tariff
data are available. This is true for two reasons. First, for most products, US and EU
applied MFN tariffs are relatively close to
their legal tariff bindings so that the tariffs
cannot be increased without violating multilateral commitments. Second, US and
EU tariffs were relatively low to begin with
during this period, and so there is also not
much scope for downward variation in the
form of additional unilateral reductions.
However, these two conditions do not apply
to a number of developing countries in the
international trading system that had both
(1) sufficiently high applied MFN tariffs at
the time of PTA implementation to allow
for the possibility of meaningful unilateral
reductions, and (2) legally binding commitments sufficiently above their applied MFN
104 According to the theoretical model of Karacaovali
and Limão (2008), EU accession countries would be eligible to receive a transfer or revenue collected under the
common external tariff that offsets the potential loss in
intra-PTA trade that they would suffer as a result of additional multilateral tariff reduction.
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rates to allow applied rates to legally increase
as well without violating these commitments.
Estevadeordal, Freund, and Ornelas (2008)
exploit these features of the data for ten
Latin America countries over 
1991–2000.
They assess patterns of applied MFN tariff changes following the implementation of
PTA tariff reductions, under agreements like
MERCOSUR, the Andean Community, and
other intra-Latin American PTAs formed in
the decade. These countries exhibit, on average, a positive relationship between changes
in preferential tariffs and subsequent changes
to applied MFN tariffs—evidence that Latin
America’s preferential agreements worked as
a building block toward unilateral MFN liberalization during this period. Higher shares
of intra-PTA imports are also associated with
reductions in applied MFN tariffs, even for relatively small preference margins. However, the
results are limited to the free trade areas and
do not hold for Latin America’s trade agreements that were formulated as customs unions
during that period, such as MERCOSUR.
In a related approach, C
alvo-Pardo,
Freund, and Ornelas (2011) assess multilateral tariff changes following the preferential
tariff reductions associated with the creation
of the ASEAN Free Trade Area in 1992.
ASEAN is another setting in which preferential liberalization led to applied MFN tariff
cuts, with MFN tariff cuts found to be larger
in products with larger preference margins
and thus a greater scope for trade diversion.105
105 Tovar (2012) also studies how developing countries
make unilateral changes to applied MFN tariffs after the
formation of a PTA. She examines four countries after
the formation of the CAFTA-DR in 2004. The results for
CAFTA-DR are different than the earlier studies, as they
suggest at least an initial stumbling-block effect. Countries
increased (or decreased by less) MFN tariffs on products
that had previously been subject to larger preferential tariff
reductions in the first two years after PTA implementation,
and this is somewhat offset in the subsequent two-year
period during which the countries reduced their MFN tariffs. An interesting feature of this evolving effect is that it is
consistent with the pattern expected under an FTA according to the model of Bagwell and Staiger (1997c).
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What are the potential explanations for
the differences across settings? One potential contributor is government policy responsiveness to the threat of trade diversion. The
Estevadeordal, Freund, and Ornelas (2008)
and 
Calvo-Pardo, Freund, and Ornelas
(2011) settings resulted in original PTA liberalization that led to large preference margins
(relative to p
re-PTA applied MFN rates).
Consistent with the tariff complementarity
effect, economically costly trade diversion
could have arisen if governments did not
subsequently also lower their applied MFN
tariffs. The US and EU environments, on
the other hand, subject to the Limão (2006)
and Karacaovali and Limão (2008) studies,
resulted in preference margins that were
much smaller with potentially less scope
for trade diversion. Second, the US and EU
preferences were more unilateral in nature.
The theory in Limão (2007) emphasizes the
nonreciprocal nature of US and EU preferences and that they were offered as compensation for countries that took up n
 on-trade
obligations in areas such as environmental or
labor standards, intellectual property rights
protection, and supporting the war on drugs.
An open question for research is whether
building-block effects may be more likely
to dominate in reciprocal PTAs.106 The rising importance of “WTO-extra” provisions
in PTAs (Horn, Mavroidis, and Sapir 2010)
suggests that this should be a priority area for
additional research.
Preferential tariffs and MFN tariffs are
certainly not the end of the line when it
comes to trade policy, as there are a number
106 Recent work by Mai and Stoyanov (2015) provides
initial evidence on this topic. They examine the effect of
CUSFTA on Canadian trade policy. Consistent with the
tariff complementarity effect, they find that the CUSFTA
led to declines in Canadian external tariffs. But they also
find that Canadian external tariffs declined more slowly in
industries that generated more revenue for US exporters to
Canada. This latter effect suggests an attempt by Canada to
limit preference erosion in industries of particular importance to its PTA partner (i.e., the United States).

of other potential nontariff barriers to trade.
The GATT/WTO provides several exceptions that countries can invoke to implement
higher levels of protection for legitimate
environmental, health, or other public safety
concerns, for example under Article XX.
Furthermore, most of the same major economies involved in multilateral and preferential trade liberalization since the late 1980s
are also major users of antidumping and
safeguards (Bown 2011b), another major
category of GATT/WTO exceptions allowing
countries to temporarily implement higher
levels of import protection under certain
conditions.107 While the general relationship
between PTA liberalization and 
nontariff
barriers use is not yet well understood, here
we highlight a recent paper that initiated the
investigation of this relationship.
Antidumping is the most frequently
applied TTB (temporary trade barrier) policy in use across countries and over time
since the 1980s. Prusa and Teh (2010) use a
cross-country sample involving eighty PTAs
and antidumping use dating back to 1980.
While there is only a modest impact of PTA
formation on the overall use of antidumping,
after controlling for other 
aggregate-level
determinants, there is evidence of important
differences in policy treatment between PTA
partners and non-partners. PTA implementation is associated with both a reduction in
antidumping actions against new PTA partners and an increase against non-partners.
Prusa and Teh attribute some of this
post-PTA change in behavior to PTA variation in the legal provisions affecting antidumping use—i.e., the sort of “WTO-plus”
provisions described in more detail in section 2.2. In any event, these findings suggest that reorientation of TTBs toward the
107 Bown, Karacaovali, and Tovar (2015) provide a more
general survey on the relationships between PTAs and the
use of temporary trade barriers such as antidumping and
safeguard actions.

Bagwell et al.: Is the WTO Passé?
imports of non-PTA partners could be an
important avenue by which PTAs lead to rising external tariffs.
Finally, in addition to the literature we
survey above, an active literature models the
choice countries face between PTA formation and multilateral trade bargaining.108 That
literature is concerned with the question
whether global free trade is more or less likely
to be achieved when PTAs are available as an
alternative to multilateral tariff negotiations.
Guided by the 
terms-of-trade theory, our
focus here is on a related but distinct question, namely, whether PTAs contribute to
(building blocks) or interfere with (stumbling
blocks) the ability of multilateral negotiations
to achieve (globally) efficient policy outcomes
when judged against the governments’ own
preferences. With regard to this statement of
the stumbling block/building block question,
the findings of this related literature can be
summarized as follows. First, when there are
no bargaining frictions, as is assumed by most
of the literature, efficiency would always be
achieved under multilateral negotiations if
PTAs were banned, and so PTAs can’t possibly be building blocks in the sense we are
interested in here. In this case PTAs can facilitate the attainment of global free trade, but
only when global free trade does not mark a
Pareto improvement over the outcome that
would be delivered if PTAs were banned
(see, e.g., Aghion, Antràs and Helpman 2007,
and Saggi and Yildiz 2010).109 Nevertheless,
108 Other related research considers the endogenous
network of stable PTAs when multilateral liberalization
is not included as an option. See Goyal and Joshi (2006);
Furusawa and Konishi (2007); Mrázová, Vines, and
Zissimos (2013); and Yi (1996). Another related strand
of the literature considers endogenous formation of CUs
using the core as the solution concept. See, for example,
Riezman (1985, 1999) and the survey by Kowalczyk and
Riezman (2011).
109 This is a point also made by Maggi (2014). The
attainment of global free trade does not lead to a Pareto
improvement in Aghion, Antras, and Helpman (2007)
because governments are assumed to maximize something other than real national income in the relevant case;
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in this n
o-bargaining-frictions case, PTAs
can be stumbling blocks to Pareto efficient
outcomes under certain conditions (see,
e.g., Aghion, Antràs, and Helpman 2007;
Seidmann 2009; and Saggi, Woodland, and
Yildiz 2013). Second, when there are bargaining frictions (as in McCalman 2002 and
McLaren 2002) so that a building block role
for PTAs is possible, no such building block
role has been found, but a stumbling block
role has again been shown to be possible.
Hence, while these papers show that PTAs can
serve as a building block for the attainment of
global free trade, if anything this branch of
the literature reinforces the view that PTAs
should be viewed with some caution from the
perspective of efficiency when judged against
the governments’ own preferences.
5.2 PTAs and Third-Country Externalities
According to the terms-of-trade theory,
the purpose of a trade agreement is not
to secure free trade, but to allow governments to internalize the 
terms-of-trade
externalities associated with their tariff
choices. As we discuss in section 4.1, the
GATT/WTO appears well-equipped to help
governments internalize t
erms-of-trade
externalities, in part through its norms
of reciprocity and MFN, which can help
to keep the terms-of-trade consequences
for third countries to a minimum when
subsets of countries negotiate tariff cuts.
PTAs, by definition, deviate from the MFN
norm, raising the possibility that, rather
in Saggi and Yildiz (2010), this is so because international
lump sum transfers are assumed to be unavailable. We
note, however, two qualifications. First, as Freund (2000a)
argues in an oligopoly context, the path by which global
free trade is achieved may matter. In her model, world welfare is higher when global free trade is achieved through
expanding preferential agreements, rather than through
multilateralism. Second, and as we discuss briefly in the
next section (see footnote 122), a possible commitment
theory interpretation of these findings could suggest that
PTAs enhance efficiency when viewed from an ex ante
perspective.
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than contributing to a solution to the
terms-of-trade problem, PTAs are a sur
viving vehicle for imposing terms-of-trade
externalities on third countries within the
GATT/WTO system. Under this possibility,
some PTAs may be viable, in the sense that
their member governments support their
formation, only because they have been able
to use discriminatory tariff cuts between
them to impose negative terms-of-trade
externalities on third countries and convert
those 
third-country losses into their own
gains.110 This possibility is emphasized by
Bagwell and Staiger (2005b), and it provides
one reason, according to the t erms-of-trade
theory, why the proliferation of PTAs could
reflect a development that is inefficient
from a global perspective.
A necessary feature for PTAs to impose
negative 
terms-of-trade externalities on
third countries is that the discriminatory
market access granted to PTA partners
diverts trade volumes that would otherwise have occurred between PTA member
countries and third countries. This trade
diversion effect of a PTA is the trade volume reduction that can lead to changes in
trade prices with third countries, and hence
to 
third-country 
terms-of-trade impacts.
A number of papers have emphasized the
likelihood that PTAs rely on substantial
trade diversion in order to keep them viable
(see, for example, Grossman and Helpman
1995a and Krishna 1998; and see Ornelas
2005a, 2005b, 2005c for qualifications to
this claim). The possibility described above
is a particular version of this claim, in which
the third-country terms-of-trade externality associated with trade diversion is the

110 Note that a PTA can generate a negative
terms-of-trade externality for third countries even when
a (modest) tariff complementarity effect is present, since
third countries receive smaller tariff cuts than do member
countries.

 echanism by which an otherwise nonviam
ble PTA is kept viable.
What is the evidence regarding the importance of third-country externalities imposed
by PTAs? The evidence is mixed, with some
studies finding substantial trade diversion
and terms-of-trade impacts of PTA formation on third countries and other studies
finding only insignificant effects.
Chang and Winters (2002) take up the
international externality question by investigating the experience of third-country export
prices to Brazil in light of MERCOSUR.
Relying on p
roduct-level unit values data
to proxy for export prices, they find that
intra-PTA tariff reductions are empiri
cally associated with the price declines of
third-country (Chile, South Korea, Japan,

the United States) exports to Brazil, relative to the prices of these third-countries’
exports of the same products to the rest of
the world.111 Furthermore, welfare calculations arising from the model’s estimates indicate PTA n
 on-partner countries such as the
United States and Germany experienced sizable welfare losses due to the price declines,
even after taking into account the effects of
Brazil’s subsequent MFN tariff reductions
in many of the same products. Winters and
Chang (2000) present a similar approach by
examining the impact of Spain’s 1986 EC
accession on US and Japanese exports to
Spain. They argue that these earlier results
are not as strong due to methodological and
data issues, including the reliance on data at
higher levels of aggregation. Nevertheless,
results from this study are consistent with
the Chang and Winters (2002) evidence from
MERCOSUR. In particular, they find that
each 1 percent preferential Spanish tariff cut
toward new PTA members is associated with
roughly a 0.5 percent export price decline
111 In related work, Schiff and Chang (2003) find that
even the threat of duty-free exports from Argentina into
Brazil resulted in price declines for US exports into Brazil.
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for Japanese and US exporters to Spain, relative to these new PTA partners’ (France,
Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom) export
prices of the same good.
That important negative terms-of-trade
externalities arise after PTA formation is
consistent with some, though certainly not
all, of the evidence arising from other studies. Romalis (2007), for example, finds that
the European Union’s trade with the United
States, Canada, and Mexico was negatively
impacted by the implementation of NAFTA,
confirming significant trade diversion effects,
but finds little in the way of third-country
price impacts associated with these trade
volume reductions. Both Romalis (2007) and
Clausing (2001) find only insignificant trade
diversion effects from the Canada–US FTA,
a result consistent with the analysis of Trefler
(2004), who finds that Canada’s trade creation associated with CUSFTA dominated
the welfare effects of any trade diversion.
Using data on the manufacturing trade and
FTAs for sixty-four countries over the period
1990–2002, Dai, Yotov, and Zylkin (2014)

report large trade diversion impacts of FTA
formation, with the largest third-country
impacts suffered by existing FTA members
when a country joins a new FTA from which
its other FTA partners are excluded. On the
other hand, Frazer and Van Biesebroeck
(2010) find no evidence that US preferences
under the African Growth and Opportunity
Act (AGOA) drew African exports in those
products away from the European Union in
ways that may have affected EU consumer
prices.112
112 Furthermore, there is also mixed evidence on
international externalities associated with the application
of other discriminatory trade policy, such as antidumping. Bown and Crowley (2006, 2007) find international
externalities associated with US antidumping imposed
on Japanese exports via the trade volume (“trade deflection”) and price (third-market t erms-of-trade) effects on its
exports of those products to third markets. However, Bown
and Crowley (2010) investigate similar trade restrictions
imposed on a developing country exporter (China, during
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A potential limitation of this literature is
suggested by the results of Handley (2014)
and Handley and Limão (2015), which we
have discussed at various points in the survey. They show that in the presence of policy
uncertainty, there can be large differences
between the trade effects of, on the one
hand, an applied MFN tariff of zero that is
bound at a much higher level in the WTO,
and on the other hand a PTA tariff that
is both applied and bound at zero. Such
differences are likely to be missed in studies such as those above that attempt to relate
trade effects of PTAs to preference margins
on applied tariffs alone. Also relevant is the
paper by Prusa and Teh (2010) discussed
previously: their finding that PTA formation
is associated with both a reduction in antidumping actions against PTA partners and
an increase against n
 on-partners suggests a
form of third-country externality that may
be difficult for typical studies of the trade
impacts of PTAs to measure.
Finally, in recent work, Spearot (2016)
develops a general-equilibirium version of
the Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) model that
allows for differences in firm productivity
distributions across supplying countries,
and shows how the model can be structurally estimated with product level bilateral
trade and tariff data and used for counterfactual experiments. Of particular interest to
our discussion here is Spearot’s counterfactual calculations of the impacts of a country
unilaterally eliminating all of its (post-2000)
remaining tariffs. As Spearot notes, if existing PTA-induced tariff discrimination causes
sufficient trade diversion, even a large country such as the United States with low MFN
tariffs could gain in terms of real national
income by eliminating its remaining MFN
tariffs. And this is exactly what Spearot finds

1 992–2001) and do not find evidence of trade deflection to
third countries in that setting.
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for the United States (and others including
India, Japan, and South Korea).
Relatedly, Caliendo and Parro (2015)
and Tintelnot (2014) build on the Eaton
and Kortum (2002) framework to quantify
the trade impacts of NAFTA (Caliendo and
Parro) and the trade and production impacts
of the proposed C
 anada–EU trade and investment agreement (Tintelnot). Caliendo and
Parro find small price and quantity impacts
of NAFTA on the rest of the world, while
Tintelnot finds larger potential t hird-country
impacts of the proposed C
 anada–EU agreement. Tintelnot’s findings are especially relevant for assessing the potential of recent
PTAs to impose third-country externalities,
as he focuses on the d
 eep-integration features of the proposed agreement and their
impacts on the location of multinational
production facilities for export platform
purposes.
Taken together, we interpret the literature
as indicating that the potential for PTAs to
impose important 
third-country externalities is real and has at times probably been
exercised, but that it does not appear to
be a pronounced and consistent feature of
existing PTAs. It is possible that PTAs have
mostly not imposed significant third-country
effects, at least in part because of the role of
the GATT/WTO dispute procedures in policing such effects, a possibility that is given
some credence by the literature we survey in
section 7.3. In any event, the literature surveyed above establishes that the potential for
third-country externalities is there, and suggests that the problem could become more
substantial with the increasing focus of new
PTAs on deep integration. Maintaining a cautious view of PTAs in light of this potential
seems warranted.
5.3 PTAs and Deep Integration
We consider now the growth in d
eepintegration PTAs. Does the terms-of-trade
theory provide support for this develop-

ment? We describe above how the theory
can provide support for shallow integration;
this is the basic message of Bagwell and
Staiger’s (2001a) claim that a w
 ell-working
market-access-preservation rule can allow

countries to achieve efficient outcomes
through tariff negotiations without directly
negotiating over domestic policies. This
message survives a variety of generalizations
of the original model in which it was made,
but requires qualification when governments
possess private information.113 In Bajona and
Ederington (2011), the private information
takes a “
hidden-action” form and is over
the degree of a government’s intervention
with domestic policies. The case for shallow integration then survives largely intact,
albeit with some modification: an efficient
self-enforcing agreement generally takes

the form of a minimum market-access level
combined with a binding tariff cap. But, as
Lee (2016) shows, if private information
takes a “hidden-information” form and concerns a government’s type (e.g., the magnitude of a domestic distortion associated with
an externality), and if the type is uncertain
at the time the agreement is written, then
a simple 
market-access-preservation rule
leads to excessive protection for some types
and is not optimal. Furthermore, while a
state-contingent market-access-preservation
rule could implement the first-best allocation
were the state observable, such an allocation
is not incentive compatible when information
113 Sauré (2014) argues that qualifications to the case
for shallow integration also arise when the agreement must
be self-enforcing and there exist i ntertemporal linkages that
can affect the deviation payoff, so that the extent to which
an agreement is self-enforcing may vary with policies, even
among policies that generate the same market access. Sauré
shows that the freedom over domestic policies provided
under shallow integration then might induce a government
to adjust its policies in a manner that ultimately changes its
own gains from deviation in an unanticipated way and renders the new policies unsustainable. It is an open question
whether such adjustments would be exercised in related
models were governments to anticipate the consequences
for their own self-enforcement constraint.
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is hidden. In the hidden-information setting,
Lee shows that a form of deep integration is
needed to construct the optimal agreement.
Hence, the terms-of-trade literature suggests that the case for shallow integration
can be weakened to the extent that private
(and perhaps especially hidden) information
is important in trade negotiations. While
more research is clearly needed, the possibility is thus raised that governments might
achieve efficiency gains in trade agreements
that include some deep integration rules. But
granting this possibility, what form would such
rules take? Could they be provided via modest adjustments to WTO rules, or are deeper
forms of integration required? And, if the latter, do PTAs represent the best path forward?
Or, might instead deep integration initiatives
in PTAs generate third-party externalities and
be inefficient from a multilateral perspective?
To date, the terms-of-trade literature has
not gone far enough to sort through these
possibilities and provide answers. But there
is suggestive evidence from a small empirical literature focusing on the trade effects
of regional integration of TBT and SPS
measures that does point to the potential
for important trade-diverting effects of these
kinds of agreements, with particular harm to
the exports of developing countries not party
to the agreements (see, in particular, WTO
2012, p. 152).114 We therefore see providing
answers to these questions as an important
area for future research. At this point, given
the broad affinity between the GATT/WTO
design and solutions to the terms-of-trade

problem, we view the current terms-of-trade
strand of the trade-agreement literature as
suggesting a presumption that any deep integration that would be required to achieve
efficiency (say, due to the presence of private
information) is likely better provided within
the GATT/WTO than by PTAs.115 But we
also see significant value in further research
that explores whether certain forms of deep
integration might exist that are achieved
most easily among smaller groups of countries at similar developmental stages and that
impose little or no costs on third countries.
As Maggi (2014) also emphasizes, future
research of this kind might explicitly include
bargaining frictions, which may be higher for
negotiations that involve many countries and
complex issues. For such forms of deep integration, the corresponding agreement might
be well placed in a PTA or, alternatively, in a
plurilateral or critical-mass agreement within
the WTO.116

114 See, for example, Disdier, Fontagné, and Cadot
(2015), who find evidence that regional agreements
between developed and developing countries that focus on
harmonizing standards tend to reduce the exports of the
developing country members to third countries, and Chen
and Mattoo (2008), who find that regional agreements
to harmonize standards can reduce developing country
exports from outside the region. The findings of these studies complement the findings of Tintelnot (2014) that we
discuss above regarding the potential for deep integration
PTAs to impose third-country externalities.

115 Even in the private-information models, the underlying problem is still the terms-of-trade problem, and so
Nash domestic policies are set efficiently, with the inefficiency amounting simply to a level of market access that is
too low. From this perspective, it is not obvious why PTAs
would be better than the WTO at providing the degree
of deep integration necessary to achieve efficient market
access levels in the presence of private information.
116 We discuss plurilateral and critical-mass agreements
further in the concluding section, where we consider
potential approaches for strengthening the WTO.

5.4 The Story Line Continued…
As WTO liberalization efforts seem to
have stalled, PTA liberalization has taken off.
Has the explosion of PTAs interfered with
the WTO’s ability to deliver countries to the
global efficiency frontier? Or are PTAs carrying countries to the global efficiency frontier in ways that the WTO could not? Or, are
PTAs succeeding where the WTO could not
because PTAs can impose costs on third countries that WTO rules successfully internalize,
in which case PTAs are likely moving the world
away from the global efficiency frontier?
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Our survey of the terms-of-trade literature suggests a cautious interpretation of
the benefits of PTAs to the world trading
system. As we have emphasized, this literature provides broad support for the view
that the GATT/WTO is fundamentally
well-designed to minimize the influence

of 
terms-of-trade externalities on the policy choices of member governments and
thereby solve the 
terms-of-trade 
problem.
The literature provides a more mixed view
of PTAs in this regard, with theory pointing out many avenues through which PTAs
could permit terms-of-trade externalities to
reenter the calculus of trade-policy making,
and empirical evidence providing only partial
assurance that these avenues have not been
exercised. In this sense, the terms-of-trade
literature supports a cautious view of the
wisdom of entrusting PTAs with the rules
of globalization. The literature also provides
ample reasons for caution concerning the
position that PTAs are complementary to
the GATT/WTO. Both the theory and evidence are mixed; hence, as a general matter, whether PTAs are stumbling blocks or
building blocks for multilateral liberalization
remains ambiguous.
6.

Beyond the T
 erms-of-Trade Theory

We now survey the literature on the
commitment, delocation/
profit-shifting and
offshoring theories of trade agreements. Our
purpose is to identify insights that would
qualify or alter the answers given by the
terms-of-trade theory to the questions that
motivate our survey.
6.1 The Commitment Theory
The most established alternative to the
terms-of-trade theory of trade agreements
is the commitment theory. According to this
theory, governments value trade agreements
as a way to tie their hands against their own
lobbies and citizens. Of course there is no

reason why trade agreements couldn’t serve
multiple purposes, which is to say the commitment and terms-of-trade theories need
not be mutually exclusive. The question for
us here is whether the commitment theory offers a more supportive interpretation
of PTAs relative to the GATT/WTO than
does the terms-of-trade theory and, if so,
whether there is sufficient empirical support
for the commitment theory more generally
to q
 ualify or alter the initial conclusions we
have drawn from our survey of the terms-oftrade theory literature concerning the relative merits of PTAs and the GATT/WTO.
While expressions of the commitment
theory of trade agreements can be found
in a variety of early papers (see, for example, Carmichael 1987; Staiger and Tabellini
1987; Lapan 1988; Matsuyama 1990; Tornell
1991; and Brainard 1994), a particularly
elegant treatment that has become the
workhorse model of this idea is provided
by Maggi and 
Rodriguez-Clare (1998).
Their model is one of a small open economy, where the 
terms-of-trade argument
for trade agreements is absent. The focus of
the model is on the idea that an anticipated
trade-policy-lobbying relationship between

a government and producers in some sector is likely to distort the equilibrium allocation of resources in the economy toward
that sector, and on the possibility that the
lobby might then not fully compensate the
government for this distortion. To formalize
this possibility, Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare
extend the lobbying model of Grossman and
Helpman (1994) to include a prior stage in
which resources in the economy are allocated across sectors. They confirm that the
government is compensated by the lobby for
the e x post distortions its t rade-policy choice
imposes on the economy given the sectoral
allocation of the economy’s resources that
are sunk at the time the trade policy choice
is made; this finding is the same as in the
original Grossman and Helpman model.
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However, Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare establish that the lobby does not compensate the
government for the ex ante distortions in
the sectoral allocation of resources created
by the anticipation of the government’s relationship with the lobby. This second finding
is novel, and as Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare
show, it provides a reason that the government might (under certain conditions which
they explore) wish to tie its hands ex ante
against influence by the lobby ex post. And
in this way, a possible commitment role for a
trade agreement is thereby identified.117
The commitment theory has been used to
offer interpretations of some of the features of
the GATT/WTO that appear puzzling when
viewed through the lens of the terms-of-trade
theory. One example is Potipiti (2012), who
uses the commitment theory to explain why,
in the WTO, tariffs are the subject of negotiated limits while export subsidies are banned
outright. From the perspective of the standard terms-of-trade model, and as discussed
in section 4.3, this feature is puzzling at two
levels: the standard theory suggests that, if
anything, export subsidies should be encouraged, and it also does not rationalize treating
export subsidies more severely than import
tariffs. Potipiti shows that these puzzles can
be resolved in the context of the commitment
theory, once an asymmetry between the rents
earned by import-competing and exporting
interests is introduced.
Potipiti (2012) builds on the s
mall
open-economy model of Maggi and
Rodriguez-Clare (1998). In Potipiti’s v ersion
of this model, a government can join an agreement that bans tariffs and/or an agreement

that bans export subsidies, and doing so
eliminates the anticipation of protection by
the private sector and the associated ex ante
investment distortion, and thereby generates
a social welfare gain. Commitment to such an
agreement, however, also requires the government to forfeit the political contributions
it would otherwise collect for the protection it
offers. The government thus faces a t rade-off,
and it commits to a trade agreement covering a particular policy only if the social welfare gain from banning the use of that policy
is greater than the government’s valuation of
the associated loss in political contributions.
Applied to export policies, the underlying
Maggi and R
 odriguez-Clare model can therefore account for an agreement that discourages (bans) export subsidies. But how can
the asymmetry in treatment across import
tariffs and export subsidies be understood?
Potipiti argues that this asymmetric treatment
can arise from an underlying asymmetry in
growth prospects of the two sectors that he
shows occurs when trade costs are decreasing through time, and from the differences
in the 
rent-generating capacity of protection in (expanding) export and (declining)
import-competing sectors that this implies.

Due to the relative inability for protection to
create rents in expanding as opposed to contracting sectors, he finds that it is sometimes
optimal for a government to agree to a ban
on export subsidies and thereby give up the
(smaller) political rents in favor of the social
welfare gain, while also not banning import
tariffs and instead opting to retain the (larger)
political rents that their use generates.118

117 See also Mitra (2002), for a similar commitment
story where the avoidance of wasteful lobbying resources,
rather than distorted sectoral allocations, is the driving factor that motivates governments to use trade agreements as
a commitment device. As Bagwell and Staiger (2002) and
Maggi (2014) observe, commitment arguments can also
serve as reasons against joining a trade agreement, as the
papers by McLaren (1997, 2002) elegantly illustrate.

118 Potipiti’s (2012) model can explain why export subsidies might be banned while import tariffs are not banned,
but it doesn’t explain why some limits on tariffs might still
be negotiated. However, it is not hard to see that introducing a small amount of terms-of-trade motive into the model
(by relaxing slightly the small country assumption) could
provide a reason for negotiating tariff bindings while not
altering the other results of the model.
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The commitment theory may also be
used to interpret the evolution of rules on
domestic subsidies from GATT to the WTO,
an evolution that as discussed in section
4.3, does not find easy support under the
terms-of-trade theory. Here the relevant

paper is Brou and Ruta (2013), who augment the Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1998)
model by allowing the domestic government
to use both a production subsidy and an
import tariff in its relationship with the lobby
in an i mport-competing sector.119 Taxation to
raise revenue is assumed to be distortionary, so that a production subsidy does not
dominate a tariff for redistributive purposes;
rather, as Brou and Ruta show, in this setting
optimal intervention will typically include a
mix of tariffs and production subsidies.
In the B
 rou–Ruta (2013) model, the fundamental reason for signing a trade agreement
that commits a government to free trade is the
same as that in Maggi and R
 odriguez-Clare
(1998) and Potipiti (2012). But Brou and
Ruta add two novel twists. First, the lobby’s
anticipation of both a tariff and a domestic
subsidy creates e x ante distortions that the
government is not compensated for ex post,
and so the government may have a direct
reason to sign agreements which constrain
both tariffs and domestic subsidies. Second,
if a government does sign an agreement that
constrains its tariff only, this commitment
119 Limão and Tovar (2011) also study the role of trade
agreements as a commitment device when governments
can use both tariffs and b
ehind-the-border policies to
redistribute to favored groups. But the focus of Limão and
Tovar is on whether a government might wish to constrain
its use of a more efficient instrument (in their model the
tariff), knowing that this would result in more reliance on a
less efficient instrument (in their model behind-the-border
nontariff barriers). As they show, a government might find
such a commitment desirable despite the associated efficiency costs because the commitment can improve its bargaining power relative to the lobby. Limão and Tovar do
not consider the possibility that international commitments
might be extended to cover b
 ehind-the-border nontariff
barriers, so unlike Brou and Ruta, their model does not
yield insights about the desirability of deep integration.

induces the government to turn more intensively to production subsidies in its political relationship with the import-competing
lobby—what Brou and Ruta term “the policy substitution problem”—and the resulting
distortions are themselves w
 elfare-reducing.
What Brou and Ruta show is that in the
presence of a tariff-only commitment, the
new subsidies associated with the policy
substitution problem can be handled with a
“
nullification-or-impairment” rule, offering
support for the GATT 
shallow-integration
approach to domestic subsidies in much
the same way that the terms-of-trade theory supports GATT’s approach to domestic subsidies. But Brou and Ruta show as
well that there is a remaining distortion
associated with the original subsidy level that
a tariff-only agreement in combination with
the GATT 
nullification-or-impairment rule
cannot address. It is with this second finding that Brou and Ruta demonstrate that the
commitment theory can provide support for
the WTO’s new disciplines imposed directly
on domestic subsidies, and in this sense provides support for deep integration.120
Finally, Ethier (1998) employs the commitment theory to address whether the
emergence of PTAs following a period of
multilateral liberalization might be viewed
120 Maggi and R
odriguez-Clare (2007) show that
in a 
large-country dynamic version of the Maggi and
Rodriguez-Clare (1998) model that combines the commitment and 
terms-of-trade theories, it is optimal for
governments to implement liberalization in two phases:
a first (and in their model instantaneous) phase in which
liberalization reflecting the elimination of terms-of-trade
motives occurs, and then a second (and in their model
gradual) phase in which further liberalization to handle
the domestic commitment motive occurs. When Brou
and Ruta’s (2013) finding is viewed alongside these results
it is tempting to conjecture that, if b
ehind-the-border
policies such as domestic subsidies were added to the
Maggi–Rodriguez-Clare (2007) model, the resulting model
might yield predictions that could support, as an optimal
development, the gradual spread of deep integration, but
only after t erms-of-trade considerations had been removed
from tariff choices. We leave this conjecture as a potential
topic for future research.
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as a positive development for the world
trading system. Actually, like Maggi and
Rodriguez-Clare (2007), Ethier combines

two reasons for a trade agreement into one
model. One of these reasons can be interpreted as the commitment motive, and
in Ethier’s model this is the motive that
best describes why governments might be
interested in PTAs (see especially Ethier’s
discussion on pp. 1240-41). The second reason is an international externality, but it is
not the terms-of-trade externality; rather, it
is a (Marshallian) scale economy that operates at the w
 orld-wide level and creates a
positive international (non-pecuniary) externality associated with greater investment.
This form of international externality is what
underpins the purpose of a multilateral trade
agreement in Ethier’s model.
Ethier’s (1998) model is meant to capture the forces behind the growth in numbers of PTAs beginning in the 1990s that
involved large developed countries forming
PTAs with small reforming developing countries. In Ethier’s model, foreign investment
from the developed world is by assumption
necessary for successful reform in a developing country, and PTAs are ways in which
developing countries compete among themselves for the required foreign investment.
In essence, a PTA with a large developed
country can enable the developing country
to credibly “lock in” its reforms with commitments to deep integration: these deep
integration commitments attract foreign
investors to sink capital in the developing
country which in turn, by creating natural
interests that will push the foreign government to enforce the developing country’s
commitments, ensures the success of the
reform. As Ethier argues, once multilateral
liberalization among developed countries
has occurred and makes entry into the global
economy attractive for developing countries,
the commitment role of the PTAs can lead
to a greater level of reform and investment
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 orld-wide than would otherwise occur. The
w
international scale economy externality then
implies that the greater investment in and
scale of the successfully reformed developing countries leads to gains for everyone.121
Viewed together, these papers support the
potential appeal of deep integration in trade
agreements as a way to solve commitment
problems. Three key issues remain. First,
from the perspective of the commitment theory, are there good reasons to think that the
required deep integration is best carried out
in PTAs, rather than in the WTO? Second,
when it comes to tariff commitments, what
does the commitment theory say about the
appeal of preferential tariff cuts? And third,
is there evidence that commitment motives
are important for understanding real-world
trade agreements?
Regarding the first question, the WTO
treatment of domestic subsidies illustrates
that deep integration is possible in the WTO.
But the failure of the WTO’s Doha Round to
gain traction on the deep integration components of the 
so-called Singapore issues
points to severe limits on how far deep integration is likely to proceed in the WTO. So
to put the first question slightly differently:
does the commitment theory literature provide reasons to believe that the WTO cannot generate enough deep integration, and
that PTAs should be called upon to shoulder
the load? Here the literature does not provide a direct answer, but there are suggestions of a partial answer: the WTO may be
ineffective at helping small countries make
commitments, and the preferential nature of
121 We have confined our discussion here to the economic benefits that commitments via a trade agreement
may provide, but there may also be important political
benefits, as the recent paper by Liu and Ornelas (2014)
suggests. Liu and Ornelas show that PTAs can serve as
commitment devices for future governments that lower
the probability of democracy failure, and they show as well
that unstable democracies are more likely to join PTAs as
a result.
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PTAs may allow PTAs to be more effective
for small countries in serving this role. The
reason is that, as Bown and Hoekman (2008)
argue, a small country is likely to face challenges in getting trading partners to utilize
the WTO dispute-settlement system when
it violates a trade-policy commitment; however, a small country may become “large”
to foreign exporters who enjoy preferential access to its market, and those foreign
exporters then have an incentive to push
even a small PTA partner country to follow
through on its commitments.122 This suggests in turn that, at least when it comes
to PTAs between large developed countries and small developing countries (small
because of the small-country enforcement
issues associated with the WTO, developing
because commitment issues are arguably
most germane for developing countries), the
commitment theory could provide a reason
to look more favorably on PTAs than does
the terms-of-trade theory.123
122 This reasoning is not without caveats, however. For
example, the rents created for the foreign exporters of a
large country by preferential access to a small PTA partner
market may only exist in the short run, and be dissipated
by supply responses as the foreign exporter prices return to
their long run MFN world-price levels. Notice also that if
Ethier’s (1998) position—that it is sunk foreign investment
rather than preferential trade access per se that creates
the natural interests to make sure the foreign government
enforces the deep integration commitments of its PTA
partner—is correct, then it is not obvious why the preferential nature of a PTA should matter for enforcement,
and therefore not clear why a PTA would be more effective
than the WTO in this capacity.
123 A second suggestive possibility comes from a particular interpretation of the findings of Aghion, Antràs, and
Helpman (2007). They identify circumstances under which
global free trade may not be achievable via multilateral
negotiations but could be achievable if FTAs are permitted; however, this possibility arises only when governments
do not maximize welfare (so that global free trade is not
efficient relative to governments’ own objectives). If we
make a distinction between governments’ ex ante and ex
post preferences and evaluate the institution relative to
the former, then this result suggests a possible commitment story that could support the creation of an institution
that permits PTAs. The interpretation is that governments
seek to maximize overall welfare at the ex ante stage, but

Regarding the second question raised
above, we have just pointed out one possible
reason that the commitment theory could
lend support to the preferential tariff cuts that
define PTAs, namely to aid in the enforcement of commitments for small countries.
But beyond this, the commitment theory of
trade agreements does not display any particular affinity to PTAs over the GATT/WTO.
To the contrary, as can be seen with reference to the Maggi and R
 odriguez-Clare
(1998) workhorse model, a preferential tariff
cut could be completely ineffective in reducing the ex-ante distortions that the domestic government is seeking to address with its
commitment to (in the model, multilateral)
free trade.124 More generally, the domestic
distortions that the government is attempting to reduce with commitments under a
trade agreement are related to local prices
in the domestic economy, and any set of local
prices that can be achieved via preferential tariff cuts can be achieved as well with
appropriate MFN tariffs.
Finally, we turn to the third question: is
there evidence that commitment motives
are important for understanding real-world
trade agreements? Here the evidence is thin,
but supportive. Staiger and Tabellini (1999)
offer early empirical support for the commitment theory. They look for evidence that
anticipate that they may be captured by lobbies in the ex
post stage. To maximize their ex ante objectives, governments then might set up an institution that permits FTAs
as a potential bulwark against ex post political motivations.
We regard this interpretation as leading only to a suggestive possibility, however, since Aghion et al. also identify
circumstances under which politically motivated governments could achieve global free trade only when PTAs are
banned.
124 This would be the case as long as the domestic-country
imports from n
 on-PTA countries were not driven to zero
in the presence of the preferential tariff cut (because
then the unchanged MFN tariff of the domestic country
together with its small size in world markets and the arbitrage condition would ensure that the local-market prices
in the domestic economy are unaffected by its tariff preferences and so the sectoral allocation of domestic productive
resources would be unaffected as well).
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governments make different tariff choices
across GATT environments that are distinguished by the degree of commitment
that GATT rules provide for those choices.
Focusing on US tariff choices made under
the GATT escape clause (where GATT
should not have helped provide commitment) and made in the Tokyo Round of GATT
negotiations (where GATT rules could have
helped provide commitment), Staiger and
Tabellini find that US tariff decisions were
more responsive to the production-distorting
impacts of the tariffs in the latter decisions
as compared to the former decisions, in line
with what their commitment model would
predict. Tang and Wei (2009) adopt a different approach. They consider the differences
in the growth performance of developing
countries that joined the GATT/WTO under
two different kinds of accession rules: rules
that applied in GATT prior to the creation
of the WTO and that did not require acceding countries to undertake extensive policy
commitments, and rules that applied subsequent to the creation of the WTO in 1995
and that typically required substantial policy
commitments by the acceding government.
Tang and Wei find that the p
 ost-accession
growth performance of the developing countries that acceded to the GATT/WTO under
the latter set of rules was significantly better than that of n
 on-acceding countries and
countries that acceded to GATT under the
former rules, and they attribute this difference to the domestic commitment role
played by the WTO. Further evidence lending some support to the commitment theory
of trade agreements is provided by Limão
and Tovar (2011), Liu and Ornelas (2014),
and Bown and Crowley (2014).125
125 Limão and Tovar (2011) (see note 119) employ data
on Turkish tariffs and nontariff barriers and find evidence
in line with their theory that Turkey was more likely to bind
its tariffs in the WTO and to bind them more tightly in
industries where it had low bargaining power, relative to
the lobbies it faced. Liu and Ornelas (2014) (see note 121)
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Summarizing, we conclude from our survey of the commitment theory strand of the
literature that this theory provides some reason to be more supportive of PTAs than our
survey of the 
terms-of-trade theory alone
would suggest, though it provides no particular reason to be less supportive of the
WTO. We thus see the commitment theory
as moving the answer to the motivating question of our survey toward a view that PTAs
and the WTO may be complementary, but in
light of the relatively thin empirical support
to date on the widespread importance of the
commitment theory’s role in actual trade
agreements, probably not as yet moving the
answer very far in this direction.
6.2 The Delocation/Profit-Shifting Theory
Another alternative to the terms-of-trade
theory can be found in a growing body
of literature emphasizing firm delocation
and 
profit-shifting as sources of international externalities that might give rise to
and shape the design of trade agreements.
This strand of the literature shares with the
terms-of-trade theory a focus on the internalization of international policy externalities
as the primary task of trade agreements; but
the delocation/profit-shifting theories reject
the implication of the 
terms-of-trade theory that terms-of-trade externalities are the
only—or even the most important—cause of
the inefficiency that a trade agreement can
correct. Instead, according to these theories,
noncooperative trade policy choices are inefficient because, when left on their own, governments use trade protection to inefficiently

find evidence supporting the two key predictions of their
model that PTAs are more likely to be formed by unstable
democracies and participation in PTAs helps to stabilize
these democracies. Finally, in their c ross-country study of
emerging economies, Bown and Crowley (2014) provide
evidence that these countries changed how they conduct
their trade policy (through antidumping and safeguards)
by taking on tariff-binding commitments when joining the
WTO.
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“delocate” firms or shift fi
 rm profits from foreign locations to the domestic market.
The delocation/
profit-shifting theories
build on the unilateral incentives for
trade policy intervention that arise when
the assumption of perfect competition is
relaxed, incentives that were first identified by Brander and Spencer (1984, 1985),
Spencer and Brander (1983), and Venables
(1985, 1987). Brander and Spencer argued
that trade policy intervention could be used
to shift firm profits toward the intervening
country when firms possess market power
and use their market power in the presence
of entry barriers to earn profits in equilibrium. Venables showed that in a world where
profits are dissipated by free entry, it is still
possible to gain unilaterally with trade policy
intervention, as long as there are international
transport costs, due to the delocation/entryexit effect of this intervention on foreign and
domestic firms.126 Ossa (2011) was the first to
explore the consequences of the delocation
effect for the purpose and design of trade
agreements, while Mrázová (2011) develops the profit-shifting rationale for trade
agreements.127
Ossa (2011) considers a monopolistically
competitive setting in which firms producing differentiated products compete for
sales in both the home and foreign markets
under conditions of free entry, and where
exporting the product abroad involves shipping costs. Venables (1987) establishes that
a 
firm-delocation motive for trade policy
126 As we discuss in footnote 75, the problem for a
trade agreement to solve in models featuring profit shifting or delocation effects can be given a terms-of-trade
interpretation under certain conditions. But the papers
we next discuss impose conditions so that this interpretation is not valid, which is why we discuss these papers
here, rather than in the context of our earlier discussion of
the terms-of-trade theory. We return to this point further
below.
127 Brander and Spencer (1984) offer an early analysis
of the benefits of a trade agreement in a p
 rofit-shifting
model.

arises in such an environment: if the home
country offers protection to its importers or a
subsidy to its exporters, foreign firms can be
“delocated” to the home market and home
consumers save on trade costs and enjoy a
lower overall price index as a result. This
home gain, however, comes at the expense of
foreign consumers, whose price index rises.
Hence, the fi
 rm-delocation effect represents
a negative international policy externality.
What Ossa demonstrates is that in his model,
the transmission of the firm-delocation effect
from the home to the foreign country can be
interpreted as traveling through local prices,
not the terms of trade. Intuitively, in Ossa’s
model each country is impacted directly by
the local price in the other country’s market,
because each country could enjoy the savings
in transport costs if it could have more of the
world’s firms (and the production of their
individual varieties) located locally rather
than abroad; and the equilibrium pattern
of firm location across countries depends
on local prices in both countries via the
free-entry condition.
A main thrust of Ossa (2011) is therefore that one does not have to believe that
terms-of-trade effects of trade policy are

important in order to understand the purpose
of trade agreements. In fact, Ossa argues that
a number of the prominent design features
of the GATT/WTO (e.g., reciprocity and
MFN) can be equally interpreted as sensible if governments are instead attempting to
internalize delocation externalities with their
trade agreements.128 Accordingly, and based
on Ossa’s results, if anything the delocation
theory of trade agreements could be said to
strengthen support for the GATT/WTO as
a 
well-designed institution, as it broadens
128 This is not to say that the predictions of the
terms-of-trade theory and the delocation theory are the
same. For example, as Ossa (2011) demonstrates, the
particular definition of reciprocity that is suggested by his
model differs from that suggested by the terms-of-trade
theory.

Bagwell et al.: Is the WTO Passé?
the interpretation of the problem that the
GATT/WTO is well-designed to solve.
Still, while the delocation theory does
not appear to undercut support for the
GATT/WTO in some fundamental way,
might it nevertheless swing support from
shallow to deep integration, in which case,
like the commitment theory, the delocation
theory might be interpreted as supporting the need for PTAs to complement the
GATT/WTO? This is still an open question
in the literature, but the results of DeRemer
(2013a) suggest that the answer to this question may be a qualified “No.” DeRemer
demonstrates that shallow integration can
work in a delocation model where governments have both t ariffs and wage subsidies at
their disposal, but DeRemer also shows that
the particular form of the “market access
preservation rule” that makes shallow integration work in his model bears little relationship to any of the closest analogies in the
GATT/WTO. Together with Ossa’s (2011)
findings, DeRemer’s results therefore suggest that the GATT/WTO is probably less
well-designed to solve problems associated
with international delocation externalities
than it is to solve the terms-of-trade problem, but with some selective fixes there is no
reason in principle that it could not be optimized in this direction, and thus no particular reason to believe that PTAs are needed to
help shoulder the load.
Similarly, Mrázová (2011) develops a model
of trade agreements based on the notion that
such agreements help to internalize an international profit-shifting externality, and uses
this model to explain the WTO ban on export
subsidies that is puzzling from the perspective of the terms-of-trade theory. Mrázová’s
argument is based on s elf-enforcement considerations: she shows that it can be easier
to enforce commitments in a repeated game
model of trade agreements when import
tariffs are the only trade policy instrument
allowed under the agreement. Offering a
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different perspective, DeRemer (2013b)
abstracts from self-enforcement issues but
employs a 
profit-shifting model of trade
agreements to argue that the evolution of
GATT/WTO domestic and export subsidy
rules can be better understood from the perspective of 
profit-shifting models of trade
agreements than from the perspective of
the terms-of-trade theory. To generate his
domestic subsidy result, DeRemer assumes
that governments wield a particular form
of entry subsidy, and it is an open question
whether the result would hold for more general forms of domestic subsidy (or for domestic policy instruments more generally).129
But at a minimum, DeRemer’s result illustrates that 
profit-shifting externalities can
be usefully employed to help interpret the
evolution of GATT/WTO subsidy rules. And
finally, Ossa (2014) assesses the importance
of profit-shifting and terms-of-trade externalities in a calibrated quantitative model
of trade agreements, and finds that together
these externalities are sizable enough to
account broadly for the observed magnitude
of multilateral tariff liberalization under the
GATT/WTO.
Like the delocation theory, the results
from the profit-shifting theory seem to provide further support for the GATT/WTO
approach to liberalization. And at least to
date, the profit-shifting theory has not generated results that would indicate specific
support for PTAs. These conclusions are
further supported from the perspective of
the findings of Bagwell and Staiger (2012a,
2015). According to their findings, as long
as governments have both import tariffs and
export tax/subsidies at their disposal, the
129 It is for this reason that we interpret DeRemer’s
(2013b) domestic subsidy result somewhat more narrowly
as applying to certain subsidies, but probably not to domestic policies more generally, while we view the analogous
results of Brou and Ruta (2013) concerning domestic subsidies as suggesting (from the perspective of the commitment theory) broader implications for deep integration.
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underlying problem for a trade agreement
to solve in the delocation and p
 rofit-shifting
models can still be given a terms-of-trade
externality interpretation, though novel
local-price externalities do arise when export
policies are not available to governments.
This means that we should expect key results
across these theories to be similar, at least
when the use of export policies is not ruled
out, and Bagwell and Staiger confirm this for
a number of the standard predictions of the
terms-of-trade theory.130
We conclude from our survey of the
delocation/
profit-shifting theories of trade
agreements that this strand of the literature, if anything, bolsters the case for the
GATT/WTO approach to liberalization, as
it provides a broader base from which to
interpret as sensible many of the core design
features of the GATT/WTO; and while more
work is needed to tease out the implications
of these theories for the desirability of PTAs
as a form of liberalization, at present these
theories provide no specific reasons to think
that PTAs offer an attractive alternative or
complement to the GATT/WTO approach.
Combined with the fact that, with the notable exception of Ossa’s (2014) calibration
exercise, there is to date no evidence on the
empirical importance of these theories, we
do not view the delocation/
profit-shifting
strand of the trade-agreement literature
as providing further qualifications to our

130 To be clear, the delocation and p
 rofit-shifting models do offer important new insights. First, to the extent
that they are successful, the GATT/WTO attempts to limit
export subsidies make analyses of these models without
export policies an empirically relevant case to consider.
Second, even when export policies are available and a
standard t erms-of-trade interpretation can be given to the
problem, the deviation from perfect competition that is
featured in the delocation and p
 rofit-shifting models can
yield novel predictions, as discussed in section 4.3. And as
Ossa (2014) shows in the context of a profit-shifting model,
the existence of product differentiation can interfere with
the ability of MFN and reciprocity to neutralize third-party
spillovers in bilateral tariff negotiations.

c onclusions concerning the relative merits of
PTAs and the GATT/WTO.
6.3 The Offshoring Theory
It is by now well-documented that trade in
intermediate inputs dominates modern trade
flows, that many of these inputs appear to be
highly specialized to their intended use, and
that this has not always been so (see Johnson
and Noguera 2014, as well as the discussion
in Antràs and Staiger 2012a, and Baldwin
2014). This rise in the importance of “offshoring” raises the question of whether the
rules and norms of the GATT/WTO, conceived at a time when the nature of trade was
quite different, are still relevant today. There
are two issues that have been addressed in
the literature. First, the rise in offshoring has
been accompanied by a significant rise in foreign investment. Adopting the perspective
of the terms-of-trade theory of trade agreements, Blanchard (2007, 2010) argues that
this investment might naturally reduce the
magnitude of the terms-of-trade externality
problem, and in this way offshoring may act
to reduce the need for a GATT/WTO-type
institution. We discuss Blanchard’s work in
section 4.5 in the context of our survey of the
terms-of-trade literature. In this section, we
focus on a second issue associated with the
rise in offshoring: its potential to alter the
mechanism of international price determination. This issue is emphasized by Antràs and
Staiger (2012a, 2012b), who argue that the
rise of offshoring may have changed the way
that international prices are determined, and
thereby the nature of the international externality that a trade agreement must address,
with implications for the design of effective
trade agreements.
Antràs and Staiger (2012a, 2012b) distinguish between international prices that are
determined by standard market-clearing
conditions and prices that are determined
by bilateral bargaining between foreign
suppliers and domestic buyers. The former
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mechanism is featured in the terms-of-trade
theory, and it underpins a property that is
key for the terms-of-trade theory’s affinity with shallow integration: the tariff is the
first-best policy for terms-of-trade manipulation and the international cost shifting that
is implied. This is a key property because, as
we discuss earlier in our survey, according
to the t erms-of-trade theory, the only “problem” for a trade agreement to “solve” is
terms-of-trade manipulation, and as the tariff is the fi
 rst-best policy for terms-of-trade
manipulation, it then follows that the tariff is
in fact the only policy that is distorted in the
Nash equilibrium: behind-the-border measures are set efficiently under Nash choices.
But when international prices are determined by bilateral bargains between buyers
and sellers located in different countries and
these bargains are undisciplined by market
clearing conditions, as Antràs and Staiger
(2012a, 2012b) argue is increasingly the case
with the rise in offshoring, the tariff is no longer the fi
 rst-best policy for c ost shifting, and
governments typically find it unilaterally optimal to distort many of their policy choices—
border but also 
behind-the-border—in an
effort to manipulate international prices
and shift costs onto their trading partners.
This leads to Antràs and Staiger’s first claim:
through its implications for international
price determination, the rise in offshoring
is likely to erode the effectiveness of the
GATT/WTO shallow-integration approach.
As Antràs and Staiger show, a second claim
follows when governments have political
economy motives: in the presence of offshoring, and in stark contrast to the predictions of the terms-of-trade theory, these
motives introduce additional policy inefficiencies that a trade agreement can address.
Taken together, the implication of Antràs
and Staiger’s findings is that the rise of offshoring may usher in a new world in which a
collection of individualized d
 eep-integration
agreements is needed to guide governments
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to efficient policy choices. Strikingly, that
sounds a lot like the recent wave of PTAs.
Evidently, the offshoring theory of trade
agreements has strong implications for the
relative merits of PTAs and the GATT/WTO,
both diminishing the appeal of the GATT/
WTO and elevating the appeal of PTAs. In
comparison to the other theories reviewed
in this section, the offshoring theory seems
more fundamentally at odds with the
terms-of-trade theory and the implied support for the GATT/WTO approach to liberalization. A key question for our survey is thus
whether there is empirical support for the
offshoring theory. In fact, we are unaware of
any direct empirical evidence relating to this
theory, and only a few pieces of indirect evidence, which are supportive and suggestive,
but hardly definitive.131 Hence, while the
offshoring theory of trade agreements has
the potential to substantially alter our conclusions about the relative merits of PTAs
and the GATT/WTO, in light of the lack of
empirical evidence to date on the relevance
of the theory, it would be premature to place
much weight on its implications at this time.
Clearly, however, empirical research in this
area is warranted.
6.4 Summing Up Thus Far
Having surveyed the three additional
strands of the trade-agreement literature,
we are therefore left with the following view:
while qualified along some important dimensions, the terms-of-trade theory’s implication, that strong support for the GATT/WTO
is warranted, while a cautious view of PTAs
131 We are aware of two pieces of evidence that offer
some indirect support for this theory. A first is presented
in Antràs and Staiger (2012a), and relates to apparent
difficulties in achieving negotiated reductions of tariffs
on imported differentiated inputs for a set of countries
acceding to the WTO. A second is contained in Orefice
and Rocha (2014), who find evidence that an important
predictor of whether two countries sign a deep-integration
PTA is the share of their bilateral trade that is comprised of
parts and components.
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seems appropriate, survives largely intact.
The commitment theory serves to elevate
support for PTAs in certain circumstances
beyond what the terms-of-trade theory would
suggest, while the delocation/profit-shifting
theory seems to reinforce the terms-of-trade
theory’s support for the GATT/WTO. The
offshoring theory could potentially overturn
the implications of the terms-of-trade theory
in this regard, but there is so far insufficient
evidence to justify a change in position based
on the predictions of this theory.
The view that we put forth here reflects
our assessment of research to date, and as
we note, further research is required in
many areas. Research on deep integration, in
particular, is at an early stage. The potential
coordination benefits of regulatory harmonization, as well as the potential third-party
costs, represent an important direction for
future research, for example. As we also note
in section 5.3, another important direction is
to include bargaining frictions and explore
the potential benefits that such frictions suggest for negotiations among smaller groups
of countries as PTA members or in WTO
plurilateral or c ritical-mass agreements.
7. Dispute Settlement
Such is the apparent success of WTO dispute settlement that it is often referred to as
the “crown jewel” of the multilateral trading system. Over a relatively short period,
economists, political scientists, and legal
scholars have developed a range of positive and normative approaches to explore
important research questions in this area.132
For example, legal scholars now parse the
132 Examples of seminal legal scholarship over GATT
law begin with Dam (1970), Jackson (1969), and Hudec
(1990). The WTO’s legal process is explained in more
detail by Palmeter and Mavroidis (2004). Davis (2012)
provides a recent overview of political science research on
WTO dispute settlement.

language of each n
 ewly arriving WTO legal
decision—so as to draw potential precedent
implications for international and domestic
law, as well as for public policy—with the
same voracity as the American Bar devours
fresh Supreme Court rulings or Europeans
tackle judgments from the European Court
of Justice. Furthermore, legal and e conomic
scholars have already teamed up for more
than a decade to annually publish joint
interdisciplinary assessments of each year’s
new WTO jurisprudence.133
We begin this section by describing how
the WTO dispute-settlement system has
been used to date. We then survey the theory
on the role of the WTO dispute-settlement
system before examining the relationship
between PTA implementation and WTO
dispute-settlement activity. We also describe
recent PTA disputes associated with the
enforcement of n
 on-trade policies. Finally,
we conclude with thoughts on the relative
merits of a multilateral dispute-settlement
system.
7.1 WTO Dispute-Settlement:
Patterns in Use
WTO disputes involve state-to-state level
interaction. Here we characterize some of
the data on the nearly 500 formal disputes
initiated between 1995 and 2014, in order
to first clarify what the disputes tend to be
about, who they tend to be between, how
the process works, and the typical outcomes
that arise. Due to a number of potential
issues related to sample selection, a central
133 Beginning in 2001, Horn and Mavroidis (2003) initiated a series of annual assessments with the backing of
the American Law Institute, subsequently extended by
Bown and Mavroidis (2013), which pairs legal scholars
with economists to jointly analyze each of the formal WTO
Appellate Body (and n
 on-appealed Panel) decisions that
arise. Cumulatively these l egal-economic assessments have
covered nearly one hundred different individual dispute
decisions to date.
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argument of the literature described below
is that dispute settlement cannot be appreciated or evaluated based solely on an appeal
to information regarding the disputes that
are observed—i.e., the procedures also have
important “off equilibrium” implications that
do not necessarily arise through formal disputes. Nevertheless, evidence that the WTO
members are putting trust in the system by
frequently triggering its use over important
policies or significant amounts of trade is
potentially supportive of the idea that dispute
settlement is playing a significant role.134
7.1.1 WTO Disputes are Most Frequently
Allegations of Excessive Import 		
Protection
We begin by appealing to an assessment
drawn from a database of WTO disputesettlement information compiled and made
publicly available by Horn and Mavroidis
(2011). Of the formal disputes that have
arisen to date, the typical topic concerns a
plaintiff (“complainant”) member alleging
that the defendant (“respondent”) country
has imposed an excessive level of import
protection.
Horn, Johannesson, and Mavroidis (2010)
examine disputes taking place between 1995
and 2010 and report that nearly 95 percent
of all WTO disputes concern trade in goods,
with the remainder concerning services trade
or intellectual property rights protection. The
most frequently invoked legal agreements
in these disputes include the baseline 1947
GATT, followed by the separate 1995 WTO
Agreements on Antidumping, Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures, Agriculture, TBT,
Safeguards, and SPS Measures.
134 Put differently, at this moment in time, the WTO
members do not seem to be avoiding use of the system
or clamoring to develop an alternative system. The GATT
experience of the 1980s in particular suggests that this
is not necessarily always the case (Bhagwati and Patrick
1990).
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China, which acceded to the WTO in
2001, is an illustrative case study. China’s
accession terms required it to take on significant commitments to domestic (economic)
and trade-policy reform. And because China
is such a large importer and exporter, and has
so many trading partners, there were expectations that it would become significantly
involved in WTO litigation (Bown 2010).
Within a relatively short period of time,
China has become an important WTO litigant; more than 40 percent of disputes initiated between 2007 and 2011, for example,
featured China as either a respondent or
complainant, with an almost two-to-one ratio
of respondent to complainant.
China’s WTO disputes are also quite
diverse. Some disputes filed against China
fit the “typical” mold—i.e., they feature an
allegation of excessive import protection in a
politically sensitive sector such as autos, steel,
or agriculture, and address a commonly challenged policy such as antidumping. However,
China has also faced a number of disputes
in relatively new issue areas. These include
trading partners using the WTO to legally
challenge China’s export restrictions over
various raw materials and “rare earth” metals that are especially important in electronic
goods. There have been protests over China’s
tax and subsidy policies and its allegedly lax
protection of intellectual property rights.
Finally, trading partners have objected to
China’s import restrictions on foreign service providers; examples include financial information services (e.g., Bloomberg,
Dow Jones, Thomson–Reuters), electronic
payment services (e.g., Visa, MasterCard,
American Express), and audio-visual services
(e.g., movie studios, media and publishers,
software providers).
More generally, WTO disputes are rarely
as simple as one country challenging another
country’s increase of an applied MFN tariff
above its legal binding. Instead, the complainant country’s typical allegation is that
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the respondent has implemented excessive
import protection through some 
nontariff
policy. At least in part, the dispute can be
understood to arise because of a disagreement
in interpretation of whether the respondent’s
policy was implemented in order to achieve
some other (non-trade) objective that may
nevertheless be justifiable under the rules
or exceptions of the WTO agreement. The
appearance—if not reality—of two countries
having different interpretations of the WTO
raises the possibility that dispute settlement
may be doing more than simply enforcing
the agreement, but it may also address the
incompleteness of the GATT/WTO contract.
Section 7.2.2 describes advances in this particular area of research.
An early dispute-settlement literature was
motivated by recognition that most disputes
initiated immediately in the aftermath of
implementation of the Uruguay Round commitments (e.g., 1995–98) seemed to involve
the trading interests of only h
igh-income
countries. The policy concern was that the
newly arising legal and institutional costs
of engaging dispute settlement—given
the increased “legalization” of the disputesettlement process under the WTO relative
to its immediate GATT predecessor—might
be too burdensome for developing country members with limited legal capacity to
enforce their market access interests.135
Beginning with Horn, Mavroidis, and
Nordstrom (2005), the evidence indicates strong correlations between disputesettlement use, the level of country’s exports,
and the diversity of its trading partners. The
more a country traded and the more bilateral
trading relationships that it had, the greater
the scope for potential frictions to arise that
would result in a formal dispute. Subsequent
research on disputes from the early WTO
135 Bown (2009) provides a more comprehensive and
in-depth treatment of these and related issues confronting
developing country access to WTO dispute settlement.

period that also explored the potential role of
other factors—such as legal and retaliatory
capacities—that might affect dispute initiation tended to confirm the central importance of the result that high levels of trade
were positively correlated with the triggering
of disputes.136
Nevertheless, Bown and Reynolds (2015)
characterize the bilateral trade in disputed
products for a sample of disputes making up
more than 70 percent of the WTO caseload
between 1995 and 2011 and find evidence
of vast heterogeneity in the levels of market
access at stake. Roughly 14 percent of WTO
disputes involve bilateral trade in disputed
products of tiny amounts—e.g., less than
$1 million per year—and yet 15 percent of
disputes involve bilateral trade in products
over more than $1 billion per year. The
heterogeneity in trade stakes across the dispute data raises research questions regarding determinants of dispute-settlement
use. Some of the new theoretical advances
described below may improve our understanding of these forces.
The Bown and Reynolds (2015) evidence
also suggests that WTO member countries in the aggregate have entrusted the
dispute-settlement system to assess policies
that cover significant amounts of trade. Over
1995–2011, WTO dispute-settlement investigations collectively scrutinized nearly $1 trillion in goods imports, an average of $55 billion
per year, or roughly 0.5 percent of world
136 Bown (2005b), for example, provides evidence
linking higher import penetration ratios to US antidumping duties in the first stage, and higher levels of bilateral
trade affected by those US duties subsequently positively
associated with the trading partners’ decision of whether
to formally challenge them through GATT/WTO dispute
settlement in a second stage. In a separate study examining a c ross-country sample of WTO disputes that concern
policies imposed on a national treatment basis—in which
the policy negatively affected all trading partners—Bown
(2005a) finds that higher 
pre-policy levels of bilateral
exports of the disputed products are positively associated
with potential litigants’ decisions of whether to formally
engage in the dispute-settlement process.
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imports in 2011.137 These are arguably significant amounts of trade for dispute settlement
to address, without even yet considering the
impact of the potential precedent arising
through WTO jurisprudence, as well as the
“off-equilibrium” impacts of the system.
7.1.2 The WTO Legal Process and
Outcomes
If the mandatory consultations with the
respondent resulting from the initiation of a
formal dispute fails to resolve the issue, the
complainant country can trigger a formal
legal process whereby the legal representatives of the two sides make arguments and
present evidence to a WTO dispute-settlement panel. Nearly 200 of the roughly 500
WTO disputes initiated to date have resulted
in formal legal rulings through Panel Reports.
Of these, more than half have subsequently
been appealed and received rulings from the
WTO’s standing Appellate Body.
Each WTO dispute can contain numerous
“claims” made by the complainant against
the respondent; the data also reveal substantial variation across disputes as to the total
number of claims filed. There is a “pro-trade
bias” in WTO legal rulings, in the sense that
the panel or Appellate Body finds that the
respondent has done something wrong in
almost every dispute that receives a formal
ruling. Nevertheless, there are also selection issues associated with this interpretation
that the theory that we introduce below has
begun to tackle.138
137 These are conservative statistics because they do not
include roughly 30 percent of the WTO caseload of disputes that are either tied to export policies, services policies,
TRIPS, or policies that affect all imports and are not linked
to specific product codes. The overall level of trade directly
affected by WTO disputes is likely to be much higher.
138 Furthermore, at the level of legal rulings over particular claims made, Horn, Johannesson, and Mavroidis
(2010) report that the complainant “wins” only 57 percent
of the claims over which the panel ultimately rules. There
are also often many claims in these disputes over which
the panel declines to rule for reasons of judicial economy.

1209

Horn, Johannesson, and Mavroidis (2010)
also provide information on the average
time that disputes take to work their way
through the sequential steps of the WTO
dispute-settlement process. On average, the
process takes almost three years between the
initiation of the dispute, the issuances of the
panel report and Appellate Body report, and
finally the outcome whereby the respondent
country is required to bring itself into compliance with legal rulings or face authorized
retaliation.139
Finally, the default form of compensation
in WTO disputes in the event of noncompliance is tariff retaliation by the complainant
subject to limits determined by WTO arbitrators; and authorized retaliation can only
begin after the legal process described
above is exhausted. Overall, and despite
the increased frequency of disputes arising during the WTO period, retaliation has
rarely been an equilibrium outcome. Fewer
than fifteen disputes have resulted in the
WTO judges even having to articulate the
permissible level for formal retaliation by
the complainant in the event of noncompliance. Many fewer cases have resulted in the
complainant country actually implementing
the WTO’s authorized retaliation.140 Some
139 On average, disputing countries remain in consultations for nearly six months, and then another fifteen
months elapse before the WTO’s first panel ruling. While
the cases that are appealed receive an Appellate Body
report relatively quickly (three months) thereafter, another
nine–eleven months typically elapse before expiration of
the reasonable period of time necessary for the respondent
to bring its disputed policy into compliance with rulings
and before the potential for discussion of compensation
due to noncompliance can occur.
140 Bown and Ruta (2010) describe the calculation
of economic retaliation levels for the roughly ten disputes that had made it all the way through the WTO dispute-settlement process between 1995 and 2008, whereby
arbitrators determined the upper limits to the level of permissible retaliation. The Bown and Pauwelyn (2010) volume provides a broader set of research contributions on
the retaliation-setting experiences under the WTO from
other perspectives in law, political science, and economics,
as well as from policymakers.
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high-profile exceptions notwithstanding,
there are very few examples of egregious
noncompliance with rulings of the sort that
result in the explicit WTO authorization of
retaliation.141 Nevertheless, some of these
exceptions identify limits to the system and
have become subject of areas of formal
research.
7.1.3 Dispute Use and Retaliatory Capacity
The 
terms-of-trade theory suggests that
trade agreements are designed to facilitate an escape from a terms-of-trade driven
prisoners’ dilemma. Cooperation in trade
policies is achieved in a repeated game,
where observed deviations may lead to a
severe 
off-equilibrium-path punishment
such as Nash reversion that corresponds to
an unraveling of the agreement. A different
kind of retaliation is featured in the WTO
dispute-settlement system, as authorized
retaliation in this context is arguably both
on the equilibrium path (i.e., something
that is part of the agreement and occurs in
practice) and commensurate in nature.142
The terms-of-trade theory thus suggests that
governments’ decisions to impose certain
141 The EC—Beef Hormones dispute involved a sustained period of retaliation by the United States, as did
EC—Banana Regime dispute between the European
Union, the United States, and Latin American banana
exporting countries before it was eventually resolved.
US—Upland Cotton has not resulted in compliance,
but in a payoff (financial transfer) from United States to
Brazil. US—Internet Gambling, discussed by Irwin and
Weiler (2008), has not resulted in compliance or implemented retaliation by the tiny island nations of Antigua
and Barbuda against the United States. Finally, Bown and
Prusa (2011) describe the repeated challenges—fifteen
different disputes over ten years—brought by a number of
different WTO members to the United States use of “zeroing” in antidumping investigations.
142 For discussion of interpretations of retaliation in
GATT/WTO, see Bagwell and Staiger (2002, Chapter 6).
In addition, as discussed in section 4.2, commensurate
retaliation may occur along the equilibrium path in less
formal ways, as, for example, when a privately informed
government imposes an antidumping duty while recognizing that doing so increases the likelihood that its exporters
will face a similar duty in the future.

trade policies along the equilibrium path
may be influenced by their perceptions of
the retaliatory capacities of their affected
trading partners. We next discuss empirical
approaches providing evidence broadly supportive of this perspective.
Bown (2002, 2004b) provides theoretical
and empirical approaches, respectively, to
explore the potential enforcement implications of the terms-of-trade theory in the
setting of dispute settlement. The theory exploits differences across the GATT/
WTO-mandated limits to the compensatory
retaliation response under different legal
provisions and their implications in an environment characterized by trading partners
with different capacity constraints on retaliation. The empirical application examines
a cross-country sample of policies imposed
between 1973 and 1994 and a framework
in which governments are given the choice
between G
ATT-consistent and -inconsistent policies of import protection, the latter of which would subsequently result in a
formal dispute. Conditional on choosing to
impose additional import protection, the evidence suggests that heightened retaliation
capacity by affected trading partners makes
the policy-imposing country more likely to
implement policy changes in a way that conforms to the rules of trade agreements.143
Blonigen and Bown (2003) present a
related empirical analysis that focuses on US
antidumping policy and provides further evidence that an enforcement system based on
retaliation capacity is likely to endogenously
affect the structure of policies that countries
impose in the first place. That study e xamines
143 Bown (2004a) presents related evidence on retaliation capacity impacting the outcomes of trade disputes
as well, which is consistent with the notion that such
incentives are likely to affect policy choices ex ante. See
also Bown (2004c) for evidence that the outcomes of such
bilateral disputes are extended to third-country exporters
in a manner consistent with successful application of the
MFN rule.
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US policies implemented during the GATT
and early WTO period (1980–98) and finds
that bilateral retaliation capacity influenced how new US import restrictions were
implemented along two different dimensions. First, US industries were less likely
to request that antidumping import restrictions be imposed against trading partners
for which they have industry-level export
exposure to retaliation; this likely affects the
potential policy actions that a government is
ultimately asked to consider implementing.
Second, conditional on receipt of a request
for additional import protection, the US government was less likely to impose duties on
trading partners for which overall US exports
would subsequently be exposed to bilateral
retaliation under a potential WTO dispute.
7.2 WTO Dispute Settlement:
Theoretical Perspectives
The terms-of-trade theory suggests that
the WTO represents a codification of a
set of cooperative strategies for governments engaged in the repeated play of a
terms-of-trade driven prisoners’ dilemma

game. Cooperation in such a setting is possible only if governments understand that
off-equilibrium-path deviations may lead to
a breakdown in the agreement and a corresponding reduction in cooperation. In this
general context, what, then, is the role of the
WTO dispute-settlement system? This is an
important and u
 nder-studied question. Here,
we highlight two theoretical perspectives on
this question: the system may enhance cooperation by increasing transparency (i.e., by
generating and disseminating information)
or by helping to “complete” the WTO contract. We also discuss research concerning
possible reforms of the dispute-settlement
system.
7.2.1 Transparency and Information
in

Cooperation is typically easier to achieve
prisoners’ dilemma settings when
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ehavior is transparent or public.144 The
b
decision of GATT contracting parties to
concentrate protection mainly into tariffs
(rather than quotas) can be understood in
this light. Nevertheless, governments may
face monitoring impediments and may not
be perfectly informed about the full range of
trade-policy conduct of other governments.
Consequently, WTO rules that generate
and disseminate public information about
trade-policy conduct may facilitate greater
cooperation. The WTO Trade Policy Review
Mechanism (TPRM), under which the WTO
Secretariat conducts periodic reviews of
the trade policies of member governments,
may be evaluated in this context. We now
briefly describe research in which the WTO
dispute-settlement system likewise may
facilitate cooperation by generating and disseminating information.
Consider again Maggi (1999), which provides a model where cooperation can be
achieved under a multilateral enforcement
mechanism in which 
third-party transparency is present and third countries stand
ready to retaliate. If a trade agreement is
designed to ensure that any deviation would
be observed by all member governments,
then the resulting 
off-equilibrium-path
punishment could take an immediate multilateral form and thus be more severe. A dispute-settlement body that publicly identifies
an o ff-equilibrium-path deviation could play
a role in facilitating cooperation by ensuring that all member governments would
be aware of the transgression. By making
“bilateral” deviations observable at a multilateral level, governments thus may be able
to achieve more cooperative tariffs along the
equilibrium path as part of a self-enforcing
agreement.
Park (2011) develops a two-country model
to explore a related information role for
144 See again the discussion of these and related insights
for the models surveyed in section 4.2.
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 ispute settlement. Each government has a
d
publicly observed trade policy (e.g., a tariff)
and a “hidden” trade policy (e.g., a n
 ontariff
barrier) that is imperfectly observed by the
other government, and each government
privately observes a signal of the other’s hidden trade policy. Governments attempt to
cooperate in this “private monitoring” setting even in the absence of a dispute-settlement system, and a key feature of optimal
cooperation is that, after observing a suspicious signal, a government increases its publicly observed trade policy, which publicly
initiates a trade-war phase. The prospect of
a trade-war phase discourages opportunistic
behavior with respect to the hidden policy;
however, 
suspicious 
signals are sometimes
observed even when the hidden trade policy
is set at cooperative levels, so the trade-war
episodes are a feature of optimal cooperation in the absence of a dispute-settlement
system. Relative to this benchmark, a dispute-settlement system can facilitate greater
cooperation by changing the information
structure of the game through its provision
of a public signal and enriching the forms of
feasible punishment.
Empirically, a potentially useful environment to examine implications of the WTO’s
information-dissemination role may turn out
to be the Great Recession of 2008–09. For
despite the highly synchronized and sudden global collapse in economic activity and
trade flows, it is now well understood that a
global surge in new trade protection of the
scale of even earlier recessions, let alone
the Great Depression of the 1930s, did not
occur (Bown and Crowley 2013a). Given the
relatively moderate trade-policy response,
it is unsurprising that the WTO has also not
been flooded with a subsequent onslaught
of newly initiated disputes. However, one
contributing explanation may be the sharp
increase starting in 2009 of the multilateral monitoring efforts to improve information dissemination on trade policy changes,

including by the WTO Secretariat (through
its Trade Policy Review Body), the World
Bank, and establishment of the independent
Global Trade Alert.145
7.2.2 Contract Completion
Disputes sometimes arise as a result of
disagreement about whether particular legal
conditions are met. Legal scholars especially
stress the view that countries invoke dispute
settlement to address instances in which the
original terms of the agreement were vague
or incomplete, perhaps because it was too
costly to write all possible contingencies into
the original agreement. Dispute settlement
may present a forum to address legitimate
differences of opinion about what behavior
the contract was intended to induce. We
briefly describe here research that adopts
this perspective.146
Maggi and Staiger (2011) provide a first
analysis of roles that dispute settlement
might play in a trade agreement modeled as
an incomplete contract. Trade takes place
between two countries in a single industry.
The importing country has the policy option
of free trade or protection, and makes its
choice after both countries and the “court”
(i.e., the dispute-settlement process) observe
the realization of state variables that affect
welfare levels. However, it is too costly to
describe the states in an e x ante contract, and
145 Bown (2011a) provides a more complete discussion
of these three enhanced initiatives for additional trade
policy monitoring and surveillance that arose during the
Great Recession, with emphasis on motivations underlying
the World Bank’s TTBs information dissemination activities in particular.
146 There is also a growing literature that explores the
role of dispute-settlement procedures in facilitating e x post
renegotiation of trade agreements where commitments
may be viewed as either property rules or liability rules.
See Maggi and Staiger (2015) where there are no disputes
in equilibrium and Beshkar (2010, 2013) and Maggi and
Staiger (forthcoming) where disputes arise in equilibrium.
See also Bagwell (2008), Lawrence (2003), and the legal
discussion of Schwartz and Sykes (2002).
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the court does not observe the joint payoff to
the two countries under the realization of the
state variables. The two countries thus cannot write a complete s tate-contingent agreement. Maggi and Staiger focus on three forms
of contract incompleteness: the contract may
leave gaps, it may be overly rigid, or it may
use vague language that leaves the obligations under the contract ambiguous in some
states. The theory explores ways in which the
agreement might articulate various roles for
the court, including its degree of “activism,”
such as limiting the court to enforce clearly
stated obligations versus allowing it to interpret ambiguous obligations, or to fill gaps, or
possibly to modify clearly stated obligations.
The model assumes the court is costly to
use and makes errors in decisions, and the
contract and the court mandate are chosen
together as part of the optimal design of the
institution. A two-period extended model is
also considered to explore implications of
allowing the court to establish precedent.
Maggi and Staiger (2011) derive a number of results assessing different degrees of
court activism. First, it is never optimal to
allow the court to modify obligations that
are clearly stated in the contract. Second,
as court decisions become more accurate,
its mandate changes from noninvolvement
(beyond a pure enforcement role) to a
more activist role, such as interpreting
vague clauses and even filling in the contract where it is silent. Third, while precedent can improve efficiency by reducing
expected future litigation costs on issues
that would have been litigated in any event,
offsetting negative effects include the costly
increase of additional disputes arising over
issues that would not otherwise have been
litigated. Overall, the benefits of precedent
outweigh the costs when governments are
impatient and when the court is more likely
to make mistakes.
Finally, this model can also be used to
describe other important features of the
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isputes that arise, especially in relation
d
to the characteristics of the court. First,
there is a tendency of the court to exhibit a
pro-trade bias in its legal rulings if the litigation costs to the complainant (exporter) are
high, relative to the respondent. However,
this pattern arises due to selection effects
associated with the importing country being
more likely to actually have been at fault in
the first place. Second, and following the
same intuition as arises in the enforcement
literature, the o ff-equilibrium influences of
the court are what generate its beneficial
impacts. Third, and also in parallel with the
enforcement literature, the frequency with
which countries trigger disputes provides
little information on the performance of
the court or the value of the dispute-settlement process to the overall agreement, a
result that occurs in the model because of
the interaction between the optimal choice
of the contract and the optimal mandate of
the court.
7.2.3 Dispute-Settlement Reform
Proposals
Despite the apparent success of WTO
dispute settlement, there have been a number of proposals for reform. Here we consider the literature that has evaluated some
of these proposals. For the purpose of evaluation, it is also important to consider why
such reforms may be desirable. One concern
is that tariff retaliation, when implemented,
may generate efficiency losses. A second
concern may be the “equity” properties of
dispute settlement that arise for countries
with bilateral trade imbalances that may not
have a sufficiently credible enforcement
threat to induce policy compliance.
A first proposal is to replace the current
system of trade retaliation with a system
of financial compensation; this could also
be motivated by the realization that financial transfers have emerged in a couple of
instances as part of voluntary settlements
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in actual WTO disputes.147 To explore this
proposal, Limão and Saggi (2008) analyze
the potential role of “fines” (financial transfers) in a 
self-enforcing, 
repeated-game
framework.148 In order for fines to support
low cooperative tariffs, they must be backed
by an additional policy instrument that is
not controlled by the deviating country. The
natural instrument to consider is a tariff,
and thus tariff retaliation remains the central backstop of the system. Accordingly,
Limão and Saggi find that a system in which
retaliatory tariffs enforce the payment of
fines yields no more cooperation than a system that relies directly on retaliatory tariffs.
While the two systems are equivalent in the
absence of disputes, Limão and Saggi argue
that a system with fines offers an advantage
when shocks occur that lead to disputes. The
intuition is simply that fines are a more efficient transfer instrument.149
Mexico introduced a separate reform proposal based on the idea that countries could
be allowed to trade their right to retaliate to
other trading partners in lieu of implementing retaliation themselves (WTO 2002). This
option may be of special interest to smaller
countries that perceive less benefit from
retaliating on their own. Bagwell, Mavroidis,
and Staiger (2007) consider different auction
formats to analyze tradeable retaliation rights
147 As a settlement in the US—Upland Cotton dispute,
the United States agreed to transfer $147.3 million annually as a form of technical assistance and capacity building
to the government of Brazil (USTR, 2010). In the US—
Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act dispute, the United
States paid European copyright holders 1.3 million euros
annually in compensation. See Bronckers and van den
Broek (2005), which also provides a more complete legal
articulation of the proposal.
148 See also Bagwell and Staiger (2005a). Extensions
include Limão and Saggi (2013).
149 Limão and Saggi (2008) develop this point by considering the possibility of unanticipated shocks. Bagwell
and Staiger (2005a) also explore the benefits of monetary
transfers in a repeated game model, although in their
model (preference) shocks are anticipated and privately
observed along the equilibrium path.

in a trade agreement setting.150 They begin
with a basic auction, in which two competing
importers of the product on which retaliation
can take place bid for the right to retaliate.
The basic auction has positive externalities:
the losing country prefers that the other
bidding country win and impose a retaliatory tariff in comparison to the scenario in
which no retaliation occurs.151 Intuitively,
the retaliatory tariff imposed by the winning
country lowers the world price of the common import good, and thereby generates a
terms-of-trade gain for the losing country.
Due to this positive externality, free-riding
is a potential concern, and auction failures
(where neither country bids) and misallocations of retaliation rights (due to pooling
at the reserve price) can occur. They then
consider an extended auction, in which the
respondent country is allowed to bid and
potentially retire the right of retaliation
against it. Both positive and negative externalities can arise in the extended auction,
the respondent country always wins, and the
retaliation right is always retired without the
realization of the inefficiencies. The extended
auction thus suggests a potential means
through which monetary compensation
might be extended from a large (respondent)
country to a small (complainant) country.
Drawing normative inference from
these different auctions requires further
thinking about the underlying motivation
of the reform to the enforcement mechanism—e.g., is it to ensure compensation,
encourage respondent compliance with
rulings, or enhance efficiency? The results
suggest that the basic auction generates
lower expected revenue for the complainant
than the extended 
auction in which the
150 See also Chen and Potipiti (2010), who derive the
optimal auction design for this setting.
151 Bagwell, Mavroidis, and Staiger’s (2007) formal
analysis is closely related to that of Jehiel and Moldovanu
(2000).
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respondent country is also allowed to participate. On the other hand, the compliance
and efficiency criteria favor the basic auction
under some circumstances.
7.3 WTO Dispute Settlement and PTAs
The stumbling-block/building-block literature reviewed in section 5 indicates that
PTA formation can impact the extent to
which multilateral tariff cooperation can be
achieved in a self-enforcing agreement. A
related but distinct question concerns the
relationship between PTA implementation
and WTO dispute-settlement activity. While
there is little formal econometric work assessing implications of repeated-game models for disputes, there are many examples
of actual PTA implementation resulting in
policy changes that lead PTA n
 on-members
to formally challenge those policy changes
through GATT or WTO disputes. These
examples highlight this as a likely area of continued conflict, and thus an important area
for additional research, especially in light of
the proliferation of “WTO-extra” provisions
arising under the new wave of PTAs.
The GATT period was replete with disputes arising after countries took on new
PTA commitments involving tariffs and
trade-related policies that led to adjustments
of the PTA members’ external trade policy
commitments toward 
nonmembers. The
European Economic Community, in particular, faced formal GATT disputes in 1973 after
the accession of United Kingdom, Ireland,
and Denmark, in 1982 after the accession of
Greece, and in 1987 after the accession of
Spain and Portugal, where the three disputes
were respectively initiated by Canada, the
United States, and Argentina.152
152 Hudec (1993) provides an expanded discussion of
Canada’s dispute over cereals exports (pp. 460–61), the
United States’ dispute over fruit exports (pp. 496–98),
and Argentina’s dispute over corn and sorghum exports
(p. 550).
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Other and more recent examples of disputes involve new PTA members allegedly
adjusting their 
nontariff policies toward
nonmembers, both immediately as well as
long after implementation of the PTA, in
the latter case due to PTA rules constraining the conduct of policy toward members in
particular. The MERCOSUR tariff cuts and
customs union between Argentina, Brazil,
Paraguay, and Uruguay in the early 1990s
provide two case studies.
Argentina’s preferential tariff cuts in footwear under MERCOSUR led to an import
surge from Brazil and was the precipitating
event behind one important WTO dispute.
Argentina’s response to the preferential
import surge was to subsequently impose a
safeguard on footwear beginning in 1997.
However, because of a MERCOSUR
legal requirement that safeguards cannot
be applied against other PTA members,
Argentina exempted imports from Brazil
from the policy. Not surprisingly, the policy
failed to stem the import surge from Brazil—
though it was effective against imports from
nonmembers—and the result was that the
European Union and Indonesia filed a formal WTO dispute against Argentina. The
WTO rulings in the dispute were some of
the first WTO jurisprudence establishing
additional conditions under which countries
could viably apply safeguard measures.153
A second example escalated from Brazil’s
ban on retreaded tire imports in 2000; Brazil
153 Bown, Karacaovali, and Tovar (2015, pp. 4
 49–52)
discuss the Argentina—Footwear dispute, which is also
noteworthy as its legal decisions resulted in the important
WTO jurisprudence establishing the principle of “parallelism,” whereby 
safeguard-imposing countries became
required to only impose safeguard measures against trading partners whose imports they had actually included in
the safeguard’s injury investigation. We note that there are
also important examples of countries facing WTO disputes
brought by PTA partners after they have imposed a safeguard in a way that increased the level of import protection
against PTA partners relative to n
 on-partners. An example
is the Dominican Republic—Safeguard Measures dispute;
for an analysis see Bown and Wu (2014).
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later claimed a public-policy motive based
on environmental and human health protection. Uruguay challenged Brazil’s ban
under MERCOSUR’s dispute-settlement
provisions, and the legal ruling required
Brazil to remove the ban’s application on
retreaded tire imports from MERCOSUR
partners. Brazil’s imports from some of the
newly exempted MERCOSUR partners
subsequently increased, and the European
Union—another exporter of retreaded tires
still subject to the Brazilian import ban—filed
a WTO dispute. This dispute also resulted in
important WTO jurisprudence—this time
for the overlap of trade and environmental
policy (Bown and Trachtman 2009).
7.4 PTA Dispute Settlement and Deep
Integration
While the GATT approach emphasizes
shallow integration, many PTAs pursue
deep-integration linkages between domestic and trade policies. As we discuss in section 4.4, these linkages may have implications
for the m
 ost cooperative tariffs that can be
enforced; in particular, Limão’s (2005) work
raises the possibility that optimal cooperation in a linked setting with non-pecuniary
international spillovers could entail a reduction in t rade-policy cooperation, if the linked
agreement “borrows” enforcement power
from trade policy to achieve n
 on-trade objectives.154 In this section, we focus on a related
but distinct theme and consider PTA disputes
that are associated with the enforcement of
non-trade policies. We regard this area as an
especially promising area for future research.
Our discussion is motivated by recent
developments. For the first time, c ountries
are now using trade policy to explicitly
154 There are many high-profile examples of countries
“borrowing” enforcement through trade retaliation to
achieve other objectives, including countries implementing trade sanctions for allegedly political or national security purposes (Hufbauer et al. 2009)—e.g., those imposed
recently on North Korea, Iran, and Russia.

enforce some of the new, non-trade policy
commitments that countries have undertaken bilaterally, outside of the WTO, in
other agreements. Some of these examples
stem directly from the “trade and...” provisions—such as environmental or labor standards—that were introduced into the public
lexicon and came to prominence in the 1990s
when NAFTA was first under consideration
(Bhagwati and Hudec 1996). We describe
three recent examples here.
In 2010, the United States initiated its
first formal dispute for a trading partner’s
failure to implement sufficiently high labor
standards that it had committed to uphold
as part of the PTA. As background, the
CAFTA–DR that the United States signed
in 2004 included a number of “WTO-extra”
provisions of the kind described by Horn,
Mavroidis, and Sapir (2010)—including
labor standards, environmental standards,
and foreign direct investment provisions—
that would subsequently be enforceable
under the PTA’s own dispute-settlement procedures. When Guatemala allegedly failed
to enforce its own labor laws, the United
States initiated a formal CAFTA–DR dispute
(USTR 2011). Such a dispute has the potential to escalate to tariff retaliation.
The second example stems from Mexico
filing, winning, and retaliating after a
NAFTA dispute over the United States failure to liberalize its market for commercial
trucking services due to alleged public safety
concerns. As background, when NAFTA
was implemented in 1994, the United States
agreed to remove restrictions on commercial
truck and cargo shipping services provided
by Mexican firms. However, the United
States announced in 1995 that it would not
remove the restrictions out of alleged safety
concerns that the Mexican trucks posed for
the US public. Mexico initiated a formal dispute under NAFTA and in 2001, a NAFTA
panel found against the US restrictions.
After eight years of the United States failing
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to implement the panel recommendations,
Mexico announced it would seek compensation by implementing NAFTA-authorized
tariff retaliation over more than $2 billion
of imports. Ultimately, this retaliation on
US exporters galvanized sufficient political
pressure within the United States to allow
for policy reform in 2011, whereby Mexican
trucks were allowed to service the US market
and Mexico ended its period of retaliation
(Department of Commerce 2011).
The third example involves the United
States implementing trade sanctions in 2012
against Argentina by removing the lower
tariff preferences the United States had
previously offered under the Generalized

System of Preference (GSP) program. The
United States does not have a PTA with
Argentina, the trade retaliation did not follow from a formal dispute, and it was not
authorized by any particular dispute-settlement process. The source of friction
between the two countries is not even a
trade matter; instead, it stems from a dispute
over an alleged expropriation of US investments in Argentina, and as such is covered
by a bilateral investment treaty between the
two countries. The investment dispute was
litigated under the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID),
which determined that Argentina should
compensate US investors for damages with
a financial transfer. The implementation of
US trade retaliation beginning in 2012 was
an attempt to enforce Argentina’s foreign
direct investment commitments and was
due to Argentina’s failure to pay roughly
$300 million that it owed US investors since
2005–2006 (USTR 2012).
The Guatemala (labor standards), 
US–
Mexico (trucking services and safety standards), and Argentina (foreign direct
investment) examples highlight the need
for further research to evaluate the disputesettlement implications of existing “deeperintegration” trade agreements. This is
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articularly evident if these three recent
p
examples also signal a tendency for such
agreements to move over time beyond “soft”
law and toward “hard” law, where deepintegration policy commitments could then
expose highly sensitive 
behind-the-border
measures not only to litigation under formal
dispute settlement, but also to enforcement
through tariff retaliation.
7.5 Summary
Our review highlights central features
of the WTO dispute-settlement system,
the theoretical frameworks that attempt
to identify a specific role for disputesettlement procedures, the complicated relationship between WTO dispute settlement
and PTA implementation, and some aspects
of PTA dispute settlement in the context of
deeper-integration initiatives. In this con
cluding section, we briefly reflect on some of
the relative merits of the WTO’s multilateral
dispute-settlement system.
While WTO dispute settlement is widely
praised, it is challenging to determine a solid
benchmark against which to measure its
success. Certainly the willingness of member governments to utilize WTO disputesettlement procedures to examine disputed
policies is suggestive that these procedures
play an important role. Furthermore, it is
also the case that for many bilateral trading
relationships, the WTO’s multilateral system
may be the only game in town. Indeed, as we
observed in section 2.2.1, one-half to twothirds of world trade occurs between countries that are not in a common PTA, and thus
between countries without an obvious alternative forum under which to resolve their
potential disputes.155
155 The WTO (2011, p. 64) reports that 65 percent
(49 percent) of world trade in 2008 was e xtra-PTA trade
excluding (including) the European Union. The trade
included in the construction of these ratios does include
some trade between n
 on-WTO members, so not all of it
would therefore be subject to WTO dispute settlement.

1218

Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. LIV (December 2016)

One possible relevant benchmark is to compare the current WTO dispute-settlement
system to its most immediate predecessor, i.e.,
the multilateral dispute-settlement system
under the GATT in the late 1980s. The GATT
system, which was relatively toothless and
based more on diplomacy than law, spurred
the rogue path of unilateralism that the
United States undertook through its Section
301 actions during the period (Bhagwati and
Patrick 1990). US unilateralism was a signal
of its strong displeasure with the old system
and at least partially served to illustrate what
a world without binding multilateral disciplines could look like. Ultimately these events
contributed to ushering in the WTO’s new
dispute-settlement system in 1995, and the
evolving system has arguably performed well
in comparison to the GATT system.
A second possible benchmark is to compare the WTO dispute-settlement system
to systems emerging in PTAs. In principle,
PTA systems might be customized to better address the deep-integration initiatives
that these agreements increasingly pursue.
However, it is far from clear that dispute
settlement in PTAs can handle the job on
its own. First, there are a number of cases
in which purely bilateral issues arising
between partners in PTAs with relatively
well-functioning dispute-settlement systems
(e.g., NAFTA) could not be resolved internally and ultimately spilled over into WTO
dispute settlement anyway. Second, there
are other examples (e.g., MERCOSUR),
in which PTA dispute-settlement decisions
pushed PTA members to make policy choices
that imposed externalities on n
 onmembers,
thus leading those n
 onmembers to initiate
WTO disputes. While the empirical record
of PTA dispute-settlement use is scant, such
examples at least suggest that PTA dispute
settlement may cause as many problems for
the WTO as they help resolve.
More research is required to better understand the tradeoffs, incentives, and forces

also at work at the particular intersection of
preferential and multilateral commitments.
Such research may be of special value now,
since it is unlikely that a single overarching
rule—such as, “wherever there might be a
conflict in commitments or obligations, WTO
law dominates PTA law”—can be relied
upon. Indeed, some of the major proponents
of new obligations arising under PTAs—such
as the United States and European Union—
are also some of the most significant litigants
and contributors to WTO jurisprudence. As
a thought experiment, consider once again
the U
 S–Guatemala dispute over labor standards or the U
 S–Argentina retaliation over
investment provisions and compensation.
When would it make sense for Guatemala
or Argentina to use the WTO to challenge
potential US trade sanctions as a violation
of its WTO commitments, since there are
no explicit WTO provisions authorizing the
United States to raise its tariffs for such reasons in the first place?
Together these considerations lend support to the WTO dispute-settlement system,
but it is clear that much more research is
needed.156 The relative merits of multilateral
and preferential dispute-settlement systems
is thus an important subject for further theoretical and empirical analysis.
8.

Conclusion

The world trading system seems to be at
a crossroads. The emphasis of international
156 An additional area in which research is needed is
investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), whereby private
firms in one country have direct access to a separate court
system to defend their foreign direct investment from
potential government expropriation. One example of a dispute in which ISDS procedures were triggered is the case
that US investors took against Argentina under the ICSID
described above. Sykes (2005b) provides an introduction
to bilateral investment treaties (BITs), the distinctive form
of dispute settlement arising under such agreements, and
how this differs from the system typically arising under
trade agreements.
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cooperation has apparently experienced a
momentum shift away from the multilateral
and nondiscriminatory framework of the
GATT/WTO in favor of discriminatory arenas under new PTAs, and away from negotiations emphasizing shallow integration and
toward negotiations stressing increasingly
deep integration. Understanding the implications of these shifts is important. What is
on the line is a choice over which international institutions will set the future rules
of globalization and shape the trade-offs we
face in a globalized world economy.
The best path forward may depend on how
we have arrived at this particular crossroads.
In broad terms, there are two possibilities
suggested by the trade-agreements literature.
One possibility is that fundamental
changes in the global economy, such as the
rise in global supply chains and offshoring
and the emergence of BRICS, have somehow
affected the kinds of rules needed for international economic cooperation. According
to this possibility, countries must now negotiate deeper constraints in what traditionally
was considered the realm of domestic policy making; and as a consequence, greater
restrictions on national sovereignty are now
an inevitable feature of globalization, with
PTAs the most efficacious institution for carrying out the task.
The second possibility is that changes in
the global economy have created new challenges for the WTO, but the rules needed
for international economic cooperation are
still fundamentally the same. Under this possibility, the GATT/WTO approach to shallow
integration may be in trouble, but its problems are fixable, provided that the WTO is
supported and its approach strengthened.
On balance, our review of the literature to
date favors the second possibility. The WTO
is not passé. Subject to some caveats, as an
institution, the WTO appears to be structured in a way that is likely to encourage
policy outcomes that are viewed as efficiency
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enhancing by WTO member governments.
This position is only strengthened when
also taking into consideration the WTO’s
relatively successful track record of resolving bilateral frictions through its system of
dispute settlement. At the same time, our
review also suggests some weaknesses in
the WTO approach that could be related to
some of the current challenges that it faces.
It is likely that the task of shallow integration is not yet completed and important
work remains to be done, especially for
some of the major emerging economies and
less developed countries. However, creative adaptations to the GATT/WTO’s historically successful principles of reciprocity
and nondiscrimination could seemingly be
redeployed—albeit in a more guided and

targeted way—to address these challenges.
While our review of the literature to date
broadly supports the GATT/WTO shallow integration approach, we also highlight
research that raises important caveats. As we
note, the presence of n
 on-pecuniary international externalities may motivate deeper
forms of integration, and it is possible that
governments can enforce greater overall
cooperation in an agreement that links trade
and domestic policies.157 We also describe
research indicating that the presence of private information or commitment problems
may provide rationales for certain forms
of deep integration. As well, some recent
research indicates that the e ffectiveness of the
GATT/WTO shallow integration approach
157 Indeed, the WTO TRIPS agreement is a deep-integration agreement and a possible example of this sort
of linkage within the WTO. As we discuss in footnote 1,
we do not include in our survey the literature that investigates the purpose and design of the TRIPS agreement, as
it is not a market-access agreement. Recent work adopting
TRIPS as the focus includes Maskus (2000), Grossman and
Lai (2004), Scotchmer (2004), and Geng and Saggi (2015).
Similarly, we do not address the possible role of trade
agreements with regard to other non-pecuniary international externalities, such as global warming, human rights,
and geopolitics and global security.
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may be undermined by offshoring and its
implications for international price determination. These research areas are at early
stages, however, and their full implications
are uncertain. As such, they represent especially important areas for future research.
Our review also highlights some important
considerations that have received relatively
little attention in the formal trade-agreements literature. First, actual negotiations
may entail bargaining frictions, which are
plausibly higher for negotiations that involve
many countries and complex issues. Second,
gains from international economic cooperation in certain policies may take the form of
coordination gains.158 Further work on these
topics may offer new insights about deep-integration initiatives and the possible benefits of negotiations among smaller groups
of countries. Finally, the effect of deep-integration initiatives on third-party countries,
and especially developing countries, is an
important and u
 nder-explored direction for
additional research.159
We close our review with a brief discussion
of one potential approach to strengthening
the WTO in response to these challenges
that has received recent attention in the literature, namely, the possibility of pursuing
critical mass agreements (CMAs) or plurilateral agreements (PAs). Such agreements can
158 See, e.g., Hoekman (2014) on possible coordination
gains in the context of the Trade Facilitation Agreement.
159 We mention here two further important issues for
future research. The first issue concerns the extent to which
power asymmetries between developed and developing
countries impact deep-integration negotiations among
participating countries more readily in PTAs than in the
WTO. The second is whether deep-integration PTAs facilitate or hinder deeper integration at the multilateral level.
Deep-integration PTAs might offer laboratories in which
to discover effective disciplines and thereby facilitate multilateral efforts, but they might also generate incompatible
standards across PTAs that “lock in” members and thereby
inhibit multilateral harmonization. For further discussion
of these and related issues, see Bhagwati, Krishna, and
Panagariya (2014), Trebilcock (2014), and WTO (2011,
p. 182).

be thought of as a hybrid between the preferential trade agreements and what has otherwise been the WTO’s “Single Undertaking”
approach.160 A CMA is defined as an
agreement in a WTO-covered area between
a subset of WTO member countries whereby,
because WTO disciplines apply, the benefits
the members offered to one another under
the CMA must be extended to all other WTO
members on an MFN basis. In order to prevent free riding, CMAs therefore may be only
likely to occur between major subsets of large
countries. The main example of a successfully
concluded CMA occurring under the WTO is
the 1997 Information Technology Agreement,
which cut tariffs to zero in products covered
under the agreement, and for which the original negotiations were concluded between
only twenty-nine WTO members, though this
has subsequently grown to more than seventy.
A PA, on the other hand, is an agreement
between a subset of WTO member countries
in an area where either WTO disciplines are
not applied (“
WTO-extra”) or where they
are extended (“WTO-plus”), and to which,
therefore, the benefits offered to one another
would not need to be extended to other WTO
members. Examples under the WTO include
the Agreement on Government Procurement
and the Agreement on Civil Aviation.161
160 Plurilateral agreements were a common outcome of
GATT rounds prior to the Uruguay Round. For example,
the conclusion of the Tokyo Round in 1979 led to a number
of plurilateral agreements adopted mainly by industrialized countries, in issue areas such as subsidies and countervailing measures, technical barriers to trade (standards),
import licensing procedures, government procurement,
customs valuation, antidumping, bovine meat, dairy, and
trade in civil aircraft. The Kennedy Round of negotiations
in the 1960s also brought forward a plurilateral code on
antidumping.
161 Negotiations using CMA/PA approaches in new-issue areas include attempts to liberalize trade in environmental goods and additional liberalization in services
under a proposed TiSA (Trade in Services Agreement).
Negotiations outside of the WTO among a small subset of
mostly high-income countries have taken place for additional intellectual property rights protection and resulted
in the anti-counterfeiting agreement (ACTA).
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As Hoekman and Mavroidis (2013, 2014)
point out, PAs and PTAs have important similarities and differences.162 Similarities include
that both can be applied on a non-MFN basis
without violating WTO rules and both seem
to be going beyond the shallow integration
approach of traditional GATT/WTO disciplines and into deep integration. On the other
hand, important differences may make PAs
more appealing than PTAs from the perspective of the multilateral system. First, PAs are
“open” in that other WTO members should
(in principle) be allowed an explicit path
to accede to the PA in the future, whereas
PTAs do not typically have an open accession
process for potentially interested trading
partners. Second, attempts to bring PAs into
the WTO system would potentially make
the content of these agreements much more
transparent, which may be especially important for non-signatory countries. Third, problems arising between PA signatories would
be addressed through litigation taking place
under the WTO, thus more likely completing
the contract in a coherent way, as opposed
to the potential fragmentation of international jurisprudence that might otherwise
arise under PTA dispute-settlement provisions. Combined, Hoekman and Mavroidis
suggest these features of PAs could make
them less likely to impose externalities on
third countries than PTAs. Nevertheless, the
full theoretical implications of such alternative approaches have yet to be fully explored
by the literature, and thus further analysis
along these lines is a ripe area for additional
research.
References
Aghion, Philippe, Pol Antràs, and Elhanan Helpman.
2007. “Negotiating Free Trade.” Journal of International Economics 73 (1): 1–30.
162 For additional discussions of plurilateral agreements, or what is sometimes referred to as potential “variable geometry” under the WTO, see also Lawrence (2006),
Levy (2006), and Trebilcock (2014).

1221

Agur, Itai. 2008. “The US Trade Deficit, the Decline of
the WTO and the Rise of Regionalism.” Global Economy Journal 8 (3).
Allee, Todd, and Manfred Elsig. 2015. “Dispute Settlement Provisions in PTAs: New Data and New
Concepts.” In Trade Cooperation: The Purpose,
Design and Effects of Preferential Trade Agreements,
edited by Andreas Dür and Manfred Elsig, 319–52.
Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University

Press.
Amador, Manuel, and Kyle Bagwell. 2012. “Tariff Revenue and Tariff Caps.” American Economic Review
102 (3): 459–65.
Amador, Manuel, and Kyle Bagwell. 2013. “The Theory
of Optimal Delegation with an Application to Tariff
Caps.” Econometrica 81 (4): 1541–99.
Anderson, James E., and Eric van Wincoop. 2002.
“Borders, Trade, and Welfare.” In Brookings Trade
Forum 2001, edited by Susan M. Collins and Dani
Rodrik, 207–44. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
Anderson, Kym, Gordon Rausser, and Johan Swinnen.
2013. “Political Economy of Public Policies: Insights
from Distortions to Agricultural and Food Markets.”
Journal of Economic Literature 51 (2): 423–77.
Antràs, Pol, and Robert W. Staiger. 2012a. “Offshoring
and the Role of Trade Agreements.” American Economic Review 102 (7): 3140–83.
Antràs, Pol, and Robert W. Staiger. 2012b. “Trade
Agreements and the Nature of Price Determination.” American Economic Review 102 (3): 470–76.
Antràs, Pol, and Stephen R. Yeaple. 2014. “Multinational Firms and the Structure of International
Trade.” In Handbook of International Economics,
Volume 4, edited by Gita Gopinath, Elhanan Helpman, and Kenneth Rogoff, 55–130. Amsterdam and
Boston: Elsevier, North-Holland.
Athey, Susan, and Kyle Bagwell. 2001. “Optimal Collusion with Private Information.” RAND Journal of
Economics 32 (3): 428–65.
Bacchetta, Marc, and Roberta Piermartini. 2011. “The
Value of Bindings.” World Trade Organization Economic Research and Statistics Division Staff Working
Paper 2011-13.
Bagwell, Kyle. 2008. “Remedies in the World Trade
Organization: An Economic Perspective.” In The
WTO: Governance, Dispute Settlement, and Developing Countries, edited by Merit E. Janow, Victoria
Donaldson, and Alan Yanovich, 733–70. Huntington,
NY: Juris Publishing.
Bagwell, Kyle. 2009. “Self-Enforcing Trade Agreements and Private Information.” National Bureau of
Economic Research Working Paper 14812.
Bagwell, Kyle, and Seung Hoon Lee. 2015. “Trade
Policy under Monopolistic Competition with Firm
Selection.” Unpublished.
Bagwell, Kyle, Petros C. Mavroidis, and Robert W.
Staiger. 2002. “It’s a Question of Market Access.”
American Journal of International Law 96 (1): 56–76.
Bagwell, Kyle, Petros C. Mavroidis, and Robert W.
Staiger. 2007. “Auctioning Countermeasures in the

1222

Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. LIV (December 2016)

WTO.” Journal of International Economics 73 (2):
309–32.
Bagwell, Kyle, and Robert W. Staiger. 1990. “A Theory
of Managed Trade.” American Economic Review 80
(4): 779–95.
Bagwell, Kyle, and Robert W. Staiger. 1994. “The Sensitivity of Strategic and Corrective R&D Policy in
Oligopolistic Industries.” Journal of International
Economics 36 (1–2): 133–50.
Bagwell, Kyle, and Robert W. Staiger. 1997a. “Collusion
over the Business Cycle.” RAND Journal of Economics 28 (1): 82–106.
Bagwell, Kyle, and Robert W. Staiger. 1997b. “Multilateral Tariff Cooperation during the Formation of Customs Unions.” Journal of International Economics 42
(1–2): 91–123.
Bagwell, Kyle, and Robert W. Staiger. 1997c. “Multilateral Tariff Cooperation during the Formation of Free
Trade Areas.” International Economic Review 38 (2):
291–319.
Bagwell, Kyle, and Robert W. Staiger. 1998. “Will
Preferential Agreements Undermine the Multilateral Trading System?” Economic Journal 108 (449):
1162–82.
Bagwell, Kyle, and Robert W. Staiger. 1999a. “An
Economic Theory of GATT.” American Economic
Review 89 (1): 215–48.
Bagwell, Kyle, and Robert W. Staiger. 1999b. “Regionalism and Multilateral Tariff Cooperation.” In International Trade Policy and the Pacific Rim, edited by
John Piggott and Alan D. Woodland, 157–90. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Bagwell, Kyle, and Robert W. Staiger. 2001a. “Domestic Policies, National Sovereignty, and International
Economic Institutions.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 116 (2): 519–62.
Bagwell, Kyle, and Robert W. Staiger. 2001b. “Reciprocity, Non-discrimination and Preferential Agreements in the Multilateral Trading System.” European
Journal of Political Economy 17 (2): 281–325.
Bagwell, Kyle, and Robert W. Staiger. 2001c. “Strategic Trade, Competitive Industries and Agricultural
Trade Disputes.” Economics and Politics 13 (2):
113–28.
Bagwell, Kyle, and Robert W. Staiger. 2002. The Economics of the World Trading System. Cambridge,
MA and London: MIT Press.
Bagwell, Kyle, and Robert W. Staiger. 2003. “Protection and the Business Cycle.” Advances in Economic
Analysis and Policy 3 (1).
Bagwell, Kyle, and Robert W. Staiger. 2005a. “Enforcement, Private Political Pressure, and the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization Escape Clause.” Journal of Legal Studies 34
(2): 471–513.
Bagwell, Kyle, and Robert W. Staiger. 2005b. “Erratum
to ‘Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Bilateral Opportunism and the Rules of GATT/WTO’.” Journal of
International Economics 67 (2): 268–94.
Bagwell, Kyle, and Robert W. Staiger. 2006. “Will
International Rules on Subsidies Disrupt the World

Trading System?” American Economic Review 96 (3):
877–95.
Bagwell, Kyle, and Robert W. Staiger. 2010a. “Backward Stealing and Forward Manipulation in the
WTO.” Journal of International Economics 82 (1):
49–62.
Bagwell, Kyle, and Robert W. Staiger. 2010b. “The
World Trade Organization: Theory and Practice.”
Annual Review of Economics 2: 223–56.
Bagwell, Kyle, and Robert W. Staiger. 2011. “What Do
Trade Negotiators Negotiate About? Empirical Evidence from the World Trade Organization.” American Economic Review 101 (4): 1238–73.
Bagwell, Kyle, and Robert W. Staiger. 2012a. “Profit
Shifting and Trade Agreements in Imperfectly Competitive Markets.” International Economic Review 53
(4): 1067–104.
Bagwell, Kyle, and Robert W. Staiger. 2012b. “The Economics of Trade Agreements in the Linear Cournot
Delocation Model.” Journal of International Economics 88 (1): 32–46.
Bagwell, Kyle, and Robert W. Staiger. 2014. “Can the
Doha Round Be a Development Round? Setting a
Place at the Table.” In Globalization in an Age of
Crisis: Multilateral Economic Cooperation in the
Twenty-First Century, edited by Robert C. Feenstra
and Alan M. Taylor, 91–124. Chicago and London:
University of Chicago Press.
Bagwell, Kyle, and Robert W. Staiger. 2015. “Delocation and Trade Agreements in Imperfectly Competitive Markets.” Research in Economics 69 (2): 132–56.
Bagwell, Kyle, Robert W. Staiger, and Alan O. Sykes.
2013. “Border Instruments.” In Legal and Economic
Principles of World Trade Law, edited by Henrik
Horn and Petros C. Mavroidis, 68–204. Cambridge
and New York: Cambridge University Press.
Bagwell, Kyle, and Alan O. Sykes. 2004. “Chile—Price
Band System and Safeguard Measures Relating to
Certain Agricultural Products.” World Trade Review
3 (3): 507–28.
Bagwell, Kyle, and Alan O. Sykes. 2005. “India—Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector.” In The WTO
Case Law of 2002, edited by Henrik Horn and Petros C. Mavroidis, 158–78. Cambridge and New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Bajona, Claustre, and Josh Ederington. 2011. “Domestic Policies, Hidden Protection and the GATT/
WTO.” Unpublished.
Baldwin, Richard. 1987. “Politically Realistic Objective Functions and Trade Policy PROFs and Tariffs.”
Economics Letters 24 (3): 287–90.
Baldwin, Richard. 2014. “WTO 2.0: Governance of 21st
Century Trade.” Review of International Organizations 9 (2): 261–83.
Battigalli, Pierpaolo, and Giovanni Maggi. 2003. “International Agreements on Product Standards: An
Incomplete–Contracting Theory.” National Bureau
of Economic Research Working Paper 9533.
Beshkar, Mostafa. 2010. “Trade Skirmishes Safeguards:
A Theory of the WTO Dispute Settlement Process.”
Journal of International Economics 82 (1): 35–48.

Bagwell et al.: Is the WTO Passé?
Beshkar, Mostafa. 2013. “Arbitration and Renegotiation in Trade Agreements.” Unpublished.
Beshkar, Mostafa, and Eric W. Bond. 2016. “Cap and
Escape in Trade Agreements.” Unpublished.
Beshkar, Mostafa, Eric W. Bond, and Youngwoo Rho.
2015. “Tariff Binding and Overhang: Theory and
Evidence.” Journal of International Economics 97
(1): 1–13.
Bhagwati, Jagdish. 2008. Termites in the Trading System: How Preferential Agreements Undermine Free
Trade. Oxford and New York: Oxford University
Press.
Bhagwati, Jagdish, and Robert E. Hudec, eds. 1996.
Fair Trade and Harmonization: Prerequisites for
Free Trade? 2 Volumes. Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press.
Bhagwati, Jagdish, Pravin Krishna, and Arvind
Panagariya. 2014. “The World Trade System: Trends
and Challenges.” Unpublished.
Bhagwati, Jagdish, and Hugh T. Patrick, eds. 1990.
Aggressive Unilateralism: America’s 301 Trade Policy
and the World Trading System. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Bhagwati, Jagdish, and V. K. Ramaswami. 1963.
“Domestic Distortions, Tariffs and the Theory of
Optimum Subsidy.” Journal of Political Economy 71
(1): 44–50.
Blanchard, Emily J. 2007. “Foreign Direct Investment,
Endogenous Tariffs, and Preferential Trade Agreements.” BE Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy
7 (1).
Blanchard, Emily J. 2010. “Reevaluating the Role of
Trade Agreements: Does Investment Globalization
Make the WTO Obsolete?” Journal of International
Economics 82 (1): 63–72.
Blanchard, Emily J., and Xenia Matschke. 2015. “U.S.
Multinationals and Preferential Market Access.”
Review of Economics and Statistics 97 (4): 839–54.
Blonigen, Bruce A., and Chad P. Bown. 2003. “Antidumping and Retaliation Threats.” Journal of International Economics 60 (2): 249–73.
Blonigen, Bruce A., and Thomas J. Prusa. 2003. “Antidumping.” In Handbook of International Trade,
edited by E. Kwan Choi and James Harrigan, 251–
84. Malden, MA and Oxford: Blackwell.
Bond, Eric W., Raymond Riezman, and Constantinos
Syropoulos. 2004. “A Strategic and Welfare Theoretic Analysis of Free Trade Areas.” Journal of International Economics 64 (1): 1–27.
Bond, Eric W., and Constantinos Syropoulos. 1996a.
“The Size of Trading Blocs: Market Power and World
Welfare Effects.” Journal of International Economics
40 (3–4): 411–37.
Bond, Eric W., and Constantinos Syropoulos. 1996b.
“Trading Blocs and the Sustainability of Interregional
Cooperation.” In The New Transatlantic Economy,
edited by Matthew B. Canzoneri, Wilfred J. Ethier,
and Vittorio Grilli, 118–41. Cambridge and New
York: Cambridge University Press.
Bond, Eric W., Constantinos Syropoulos, and L. Alan
Winters. 2001. “Deepening of Regional Integration

1223

and Multilateral Trade Agreements.” Journal of
International Economics 53 (2): 335–61.
Bown, Chad P. 2002. “The Economics of Trade Disputes, the GATT’s Article XXIII, and the WTO’s
Dispute Settlement Understanding.” Economics and
Politics 14 (3): 283–323.
Bown, Chad P. 2004a. “On the Economic Success of
GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement.” Review of Economics and Statistics 86 (3): 811–23.
Bown, Chad P. 2004b. “Trade Disputes and the
Implementation of Protection under the GATT: An
Empirical Assessment.” Journal of International
Economics 62 (2): 263–94.
Bown, Chad P. 2004c. “Trade Policy under the GATT–
WTO: Empirical Evidence of the Equal Treatment
Rule.” Canadian Journal of Economics 37 (3):
678–720.
Bown, Chad P. 2005a. “Participation in WTO Dispute
Settlement: Complainants, Interested Parties, and
Free Riders.” World Bank Economic Review 19 (2):
287–310.
Bown, Chad P. 2005b. “Trade Remedies and World
Trade Organization Dispute Settlement: Why Are So
Few Challenged?” Journal of Legal Studies 34 (2):
515–55.
Bown, Chad P. 2009. Self-Enforcing Trade: Developing
Countries and WTO Dispute Settlement. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
Bown, Chad P. 2010. “China’s WTO Entry: Antidumping, Safeguards, and Dispute Settlement.” In China’s
Growing Role in World Trade, edited by Robert C.
Feenstra and Shang-Jin Wei, 281–337. Chicago and
London: University of Chicago Press.
Bown, Chad P. 2011a. “Introduction.” In The Great
Recession and Import Protection: The Role of Temporary Trade Barriers, edited by Chad P. Bown, 1–51.
Washington, DC: World Bank Publications.
Bown, Chad P. 2011b. “Taking Stock of Antidumping,
Safeguards and Countervailing Duties, 1990–2009.”
World Economy 34 (12): 1955–98.
Bown, Chad P. 2014. “Temporary Trade Barriers Database.” http://econ.worldbank.org/ttbd/.
Bown, Chad P., and Meredith A. Crowley. 2006. “Policy
Externalities: How U.S. Antidumping Affects Japanese Exports to the EU.” European Journal of Political Economy 22 (3): 696–714.
Bown, Chad P., and Meredith A. Crowley. 2007. “Trade
Deflection and Trade Depression.” Journal of International Economics 72 (1): 176–201.
Bown, Chad P., and Meredith A. Crowley. 2010. “China’s Export Growth and the China Safeguard: Threats
to the World Trading System?” Canadian Journal of
Economics 43 (4): 1353–88.
Bown, Chad P., and Meredith A. Crowley. 2013a.
“Import Protection, Business Cycles, and Exchange
Rates: Evidence from the Great Recession.” Journal
of International Economics 90 (1): 50–64.
Bown, Chad P., and Meredith A. Crowley. 2013b.
“Self-Enforcing Trade Agreements: Evidence from
Time-Varying Trade Policy.” American Economic
Review 103 (2): 1071–90.

1224

Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. LIV (December 2016)

Bown, Chad P., and Meredith A. Crowley. 2014.
“Emerging Economies, Trade Policy, and Macroeconomic Shocks.” Journal of Development Economics
111: 261–73.
Bown, Chad P., and Bernard Hoekman. 2008. “Developing Countries and Enforcement of Trade Agreements: Why Dispute Settlement Is Not Enough.”
Journal of World Trade 42 (1): 177–203.
Bown, Chad P., Baybars Karacaovali, and Patricia
Tovar. 2015. “What Do We Know About Preferential
Trade Agreements and Temporary Trade Barriers?”
In Trade Cooperation: The Purpose, Design and
Effects of Preferential Trade Agreements, edited by
Andreas Dür and Manfred Elsig, 433–62. Cambridge
and New York: Cambridge University Press.
Bown, Chad P., and Petros Mavroidis, eds. 2013. The
WTO Case Law of 2011: Legal and Economic Analysis. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University
Press.
Bown, Chad P., and Joost Pauwelyn, eds. 2010. The
Law, Economics and Politics of Retaliation in WTO
Dispute Settlement. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
Bown, Chad P., and Thomas J. Prusa. 2011. “U.S.
Anti-dumping: Much Ado About Zeroing.” In Unfinished Business? The WTO’s Doha Agenda, edited by
Will Martin and Aaditya Mattoo, 355–92. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Bown, Chad P., and Kara M. Reynolds. 2015. “Trade
Flows and Trade Disputes.” Review of International
Organizations 10 (2): 145–77.
Bown, Chad P., and Michele Ruta. 2010. “The Economics of Permissible WTO Retaliation.” In The
Law, Economics and Politics of Retaliation in WTO
Dispute Settlement, edited by Chad P. Bown and
Joost Pauwelyn, 149–93. Cambridge and New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Bown, Chad P., and Alan O. Sykes. 2008. “The Zeroing Issue: A Critical Analysis of Softwood V.” World
Trade Review 7 (Special Issue 1): 121–42.
Bown, Chad P., and Patricia Tovar. 2011. “Trade Liberalization, Antidumping, and Safeguards: Evidence
from India’s Tariff Reform.” Journal of Development
Economics 96 (1): 115–25.
Bown, Chad P., and Joel P. Trachtman. 2009. “Brazil—
Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres: A
Balancing Act.” World Trade Review 8 (Special Issue
1): 85–135.
Bown, Chad P., and Mark Wu. 2014. “Safeguards and
the Perils of Preferential Trade Agreements: Dominican Republic—Safeguard Measures.” World Trade
Review 13 (2): 179–227.
Brainard, S. Lael. 1994. “Last One Out Wins: Trade
Policy in an International Exit Game.” International
Economic Review 35 (1): 151–72.
Brander, James A. 1995. “Strategic Trade Policy.” In
Handbook of International Economics, Volume 3,
edited by Gene M. Grossman and Kenneth Rogoff,
1395–455. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science.
Brander, James A., and Barbara J. Spencer. 1981. “Tariffs and the Extraction of Foreign Monopoly Rents

under Potential Entry.” Canadian Journal of Economics 14 (3): 371–89.
Brander, James A., and Barbara J. Spencer. 1984. “Tariff
Protection and Imperfect Competition.” In Monopolistic Competition and Product Differentiation and
International Trade, edited by Henryk Kierzkowski,
194–206. New York: Oxford Economic Press.
Brander, James A., and Barbara J. Spencer. 1985.
“Export Subsidies and International Market Share
Rivalry.” Journal of International Economics
18 (1–2): 83–100.
Brock, William A., and Stephen P. Magee. 1978. “The
Economics of Special Interest Politics: The Case
of the Tariff.” American Economic Review 68 (2):
246–50.
Broda, Christian, Nuno Limão, and David E. Weinstein. 2008. “Optimal Tariffs and Market Power:
The Evidence.” American Economic Review 98 (5):
2032–65.
Bronckers, Marco, and Naboth van den Broek. 2005.
“Financial Compensation in the WTO: Improving
the Remedies of WTO Dispute Settlement.” Journal
of International Economic Law 8 (1): 101–26.
Brou, Daniel, and Michele Ruta. 2013. “A Commitment Theory of Subsidy Agreements.” BE Journal of
Economic Analysis and Policy 13 (1).
Cadot, Olivier, Jaime de Melo, and Marcelo Olarreaga.
1999. “Regional Integration and Lobbying for Tariffs against Nonmembers.” International Economic
Review 40 (3): 635–57.
Caliendo, Lorenzo, and Fernando Parro. 2015. “Estimates of the Trade and Welfare Effects of NAFTA.”
Review of Economic Studies 82 (1): 1–44.
Calvo-Pardo, Hector, Caroline Freund, and Emanuel
Ornelas. 2011. “The ASEAN Free Trade Agreement:
Impact on Trade Flows and External Trade Barriers.” In Costs and Benefits of Economic Integration
in Asia, edited by Robert J. Barro and Jong-Wha
Lee, 157–86. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
Caplin, Andrew, and Kala Krishna. 1988. “Tariffs and
Most-Favored-Nation Clause: A Game Theoretic
Approach.” Seoul Journal of Economics 1 (3): 267–89.
Carmichael, Calum M. 1987. “The Control of Export
Credit Subsidies and Its Welfare Consequences.”
Journal of International Economics 23 (1–2): 1–19.
Caves, Richard E. 1976. “Economic Models of Political
Choice: Canada’s Tariff Structure.” Canadian Journal of Economics 9 (2): 278–300.
Chang, Pao-Li, and Myoung-Jae Lee. 2011. “The WTO
Trade Effect.” Journal of International Economics 85
(1): 53–71.
Chang, Won, and L. Alan Winters. 2002. “How Regional
Blocs Affect Excluded Countries: The Price Effects
of MERCOSUR.” American Economic Review 92
(4): 889–904.
Chase, Claude, Alan Yanovich, Jo-Ann Crawford, and
Pamela Ugaz. 2013. “Mapping of Dispute Settlement
Mechanisms in Regional Trade Agreements—Innovative or Variations on a Theme?” World Trade Organization Staff Working Paper ERSD-2013-07.

Bagwell et al.: Is the WTO Passé?
Chen, Bo, and Tanapong Potipiti. 2010. “Optimal Selling Mechanisms with Countervailing Positive Externalities and an Application to Tradable Retaliation in
the WTO.” Journal of Mathematical Economics 46
(5): 825–43.
Chen, Maggie Xiaoyang, and Aaditya Mattoo. 2008.
“Regionalism in Standards: Good or Bad for Trade?”
Canadian Journal of Economics 41 (3): 838–63.
Choi, Jay Pil. 1995. “Optimal Tariffs and the Choice
of Technology: Discriminatiory Tariffs vs. the ‘Most
Favored Nation’ Clause.” Journal of International
Economics 38 (1–2): 143–60.
Clausing, Kimberly A. 2001. “Trade Creation and Trade
Diversion in the Canada–United States Free Trade
Agreement.” Canadian Journal of Economics 34 (3):
677–96.
Copeland, Brian R. 1990. “Strategic Interaction among
Nations: Negotiable and Non-negotiable Trade
Barriers.” Canadian Journal of Economics 23 (1):
84–108.
Corden, W. Max. 1971. The Theory of Protection.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Costinot, Arnaud. 2008. “A Comparative Institutional
Analysis of Agreements on Product Standards.” Journal of International Economics 75 (1): 197–213.
Costinot, Arnaud, Dave Donaldson, Jonathan Vogel,
and Iván Werning. 2015. “Comparative Advantage
and Optimal Trade Policy.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 130 (2): 659–702.
Crowley, Meredith A. 2011. “Cyclical Dumping and
US Antidumping Protection: 1980–2001.” Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago Working Paper 2007-21.
Curzon, Gerard. 1965. Multilateral Commercial Diplomacy: The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
and Its Impact on National Commercial Policies and
Techniques. London: Michael Joseph.
Dai, Mian, Yoto V. Yotov, and Thomas Zylkin. 2014.
“On the Trade-Diversion Effects of Free Trade
Agreements.” Economics Letters 122 (2): 321–25.
Dam, Kenneth W. 1970. The GATT: Law and International Economic Organization. Chicago and London:
University of Chicago Press.
Damuri, Yose Rizal. 2012. “How Preferential Are
Preferential Trade Agreements? Analysis of Product Exclusions in PTAs.” Graduate Institute Centre
for Trade and Economic Integration Working Paper
2012-3.
Davey, William J., and André Sapir. 2009. “The Soft
Drinks Case: The WTO and Regional Agreements.”
World Trade Review 8 (1): 5–23.
Davis, Christina L. 2012. Why Adjudicate? Enforcing
Trade Rules in the WTO. Princeton and Oxford:
Princeton University Press.
Demidova, Svetlana. 2015. “Trade Policies, Firm Heterogeneity, and Variable Markups.” McMaster University Department of Economics Working Paper
2015-4.
Department of Commerce. 2011. “Foreign Retaliations.” http://www.trade.gov/mas/ian/tradedisputesenforcement/retaliations/tg_ian_002094.asp.
DeRemer, David. 2013a. “Domestic Policy Coordination

1225

in Imperfectly Competitive Markets.” Université
Libre de Bruxelles Working Paper 2013-46.
DeRemer, David. 2013b. “The Evolution of International Subsidy Rules.” Université Libre de Bruxelles
Working Paper 2013-45.
Dhingra, Swati. 2014. “Reconciling Observed Tariffs
and the Median Voter Model.” Economics and Politics 26 (3): 483–504.
Disdier, Anne-Célia, Lionel Fontagné, and Olivier
Cadot. 2015. “North-South Standards H
 armonization
and International Trade.” World Bank Economic
Review 29 (2): 327–52.
Dixit, Avinash. 1987. “Strategic Aspects of Trade Policy.” In Advances in Economic Theory: Fifth World
Congress, edited by Truman F. Bewley, 329–62.
Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University
Press.
Dür, Andreas, Leonardo Baccini, and Manfred Elsig.
2014. “The Design of International Trade Agreements: Introducing a New Dataset.” Review of International Organizations 9 (3): 353–75.
Dutt, Pushan, Ilian Mihov, and Timothy Van Zandt.
2013. “The Effect of WTO on the Extensive and the
Intensive Margins of Trade.” Journal of International
Economics 91 (2): 204–19.
Dutt, Pushan, and Devashish Mitra. 2002. “Endogenous Trade Policy through Majority Voting: An
Empirical Investigation.” Journal of International
Economics 58 (1): 107–33.
Eaton, Jonathan, and Gene M. Grossman. 1986. “Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy under Oligopoly.”
Quarterly Journal of Economics 101 (2): 383–406.
Eaton, Jonathan, and Samuel Kortum. 2002. “Technology, Geography, and Trade.” Econometrica 70 (5):
1741–79.
Ederington, Josh. 2001. “International Coordination of
Trade and Domestic Policies.” American Economic
Review 91 (5): 1580–93.
Eicher, Theo S., and Christian Henn. 2011. “In Search
of WTO Trade Effects: Preferential Trade Agreements Promote Trade Strongly, but Unevenly.” Journal of International Economics 83 (2): 137–53.
Eschenbach, Felix, and Bernard Hoekman. 2006. “Services Policies in Transition Economies: On the EU
and WTO as Commitment Mechanisms.” World
Trade Review 5 (3): 415–43.
Estevadeordal, Antoni, Caroline Freund, and Emanuel
Ornelas. 2008. “ Does Regionalism Affect Trade Liberalization toward Nonmembers?” Quarterly Journal
of Economics 123 (4): 1531–75.
Ethier, Wilfred J. 1998. “Regionalism in a Multilateral World.” Journal of Political Economy 106 (6):
1214–45.
Feenstra, Robert C. 1989. “Symmetric Pass-Through of
Tariffs and Exchange Rates under Imperfect Competition: An Empirical Test.” Journal of International
Economics 27 (1–2): 25–45.
Feenstra, Robert C. 1995. “Estimating the Effects of
Trade Policy.” In Handbook of International Economics, Volume 3, edited by Gene M. Grossman
and Kenneth Rogoff, 1553–95. Amsterdam and New

1226

Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. LIV (December 2016)

York: Elsevier, North-Holland.
Feenstra, Robert C., and Jagdish N. Bhagwati. 1982.
“Tariff Seeking and the Efficient Tariff.” In Import
Competition and Response, edited by Jagdish N.
Bhagwati, 245–62. Chicago and London: University
of Chicago Press.
Feinberg, Robert M., and Kara M. Reynolds. 2006.
“The Spread of Antidumping Regimes and the Role
of Retaliation in Filings.” Southern Economic Journal
72 (4): 877–90.
Findlay, Ronald, and Stanislaw Wellisz. 1982. “Endogenous Tariffs, the Political Economy of Trade Restrictions, and Welfare.” In Import Competition and
Response, edited by Jagdish N. Bhagwati, 223–44.
Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.
Francois, Joseph, and Bernard Hoekman. 2010. “Services Trade and Policy.” Journal of Economic Literature 48 (3): 642–92.
Frazer, Garth, and Johannes Van Biesebroeck. 2010.
“Trade Growth under the African Growth and
Opportunity Act.” Review of Economics and Statistics 92 (1): 128–44.
Freund, Caroline. 2000a. “Different Paths to Free
Trade: The Gains from Regionalism.” Quarterly
Journal of Economics 115 (4): 1317–41.
Freund, Caroline. 2000b. “Multilateralism and the
Endogenous Formation of Preferential Trade Agreements.” Journal of International Economics 52 (2):
359–76.
Freund, Caroline, and Emanuel Ornelas. 2010.
“Regional Trade Agreements.” Annual Review of
Economics 2: 139–66.
Fudenberg, Drew, David Levine, and Eric Maskin.
1994. “The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public
Information.” Econometrica 62 (5): 997–1039.
Furusawa, Taiji. 1999. “The Negotiation of Sustainable
Tariffs.” Journal of International Economics 48 (2):
321–45.
Furusawa, Taiji, and Hideo Konishi. 2007. “Free Trade
Networks.” Journal of International Economics 72
(2): 310–35.
Geng, Difei, and Kamal Saggi. 2015. “Is there a Case
for Non-discrimination in the International Protection of Intellectual Property?” Journal of International Economics 97 (1): 14–28.
Goldberg, Pinelopi Koujianou, and Michael M. Knetter. 1997. “Goods Prices and Exchange Rates: What
Have We Learned?” Journal of Economic Literature
35 (3): 1243–72.
Goyal, Sanjeev, and Sumit Joshi. 2006. “Bilateralism
and Free Trade.” International Economic Review 47
(3): 749–78.
Grossman, Gene M. 1981. “The Theory of Domestic
Content Protection and Content Preference.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 96 (4): 583–603.
Grossman, Gene M., and Elhanan Helpman. 1994.
“Protection for Sale.” American Economic Review 84
(4): 833–50.
Grossman, Gene M., and Elhanan Helpman. 1995a.
“The Politics of Free-Trade Agreements.” American
Economic Review 85 (4): 667–90.

Grossman, Gene M., and Elhanan Helpman. 1995b.
“Trade Wars and Trade Talks.” Journal of Political
Economy 103 (4): 675–708.
Grossman, Gene M., Henrik Horn, and Petros C. Mavroidis. 2013. “National Treatment.” In Legal and
Economic Principles of World Trade Law, edited
by Henrik Horn and Petros C. Mavroidis, 205–345.
Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University
Press.
Grossman, Gene M., and Edwin L. C. Lai. 2004.
“International Protection of Intellectual Property.”
American Economic Review 94 (5): 1635–53.
Gulotty, Robert. 2014. “Governing Trade Beyond Tariffs: The Politics of Multinational Production and
Its Implications for International Cooperation.”
Unpublished.
Handley, Kyle. 2014. “Exporting under Trade Policy
Uncertainty: Theory and Evidence.” Journal of International Economics 94 (1): 50–66.
Handley, Kyle, and Nuno Limão. 2015. “Trade and
Investment under Policy Uncertainty: Theory and
Firm Evidence.” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 7 (4): 189–222.
Hillman, Arye L. 1982. “Declining Industries and Political-Support Protectionist Motives.” American Economic Review 72 (5): 1180–87.
Hochman, Gal, and Ella Segev. 2010. “Managed Trade
with Imperfect Information.” International Economic Review 51 (1): 187–211.
Hoekman, Bernard M. 2008. “The General Agreement
on Trade in Services: Doomed to Fail? Does It Matter?” Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade 8
(3–4): 295–318.
Hoekman, Bernard M. 2014. “The Bali Trade Facilitation Agreement and Rulemaking in the WTO: Milestone, Mistake or Mirage?” European University
Institute Working Paper RSCAS 2014/102.
Hoekman, Bernard M., and Petros C. Mavroidis. 2013.
“WTO ‘a la carte’ or WTO ‘menu du jour’? Assessing the Case for Plurilateral Agreements.” European
University Institute Working Paper RSCAS 2013/58.
Hoekman, Bernard M., and Petros C. Mavroidis. 2014.
“Embracing Diversity: Plurilateral Agreements and
the Trading System.” Centre for Economic Policy
Research Discussion Paper 10204.
Hoekman, Bernard M., and Çaglar Özden. 2007.
“Introduction.” In Trade Preferences and Differential
Treatment of Developing Countries, edited by Bernard M. Hoekman and Çaglar Özden, xi–xlii. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar.
Holmstrom, Bengt. 1977. “On Incentives and Control in Organizations.” Stanford University Ph.D
Dissertation.
Horn, Henrik. 2006. “National Treatment in the
GATT.” American Economic Review 96 (1): 394–404.
Horn, Henrik, Louise Johannesson, and Petros C. Mavroidis. 2011. “The WTO Dispute Settlement System
1995–2010: Some Descriptive Statistics.” Journal of
World Trade 45 (6): 1107–38.
Horn, Henrik, Giovanni Maggi, and Robert W.
Staiger. 2010. “Trade Agreements as Endogenously

Bagwell et al.: Is the WTO Passé?
Incomplete Contracts.” American Economic Review
100 (1): 394–419.
Horn, Henrik, and Petros C. Mavroidis. 2001. “Economic and Legal Aspects of the Most-FavoredNation Clause.” European Journal of Political Economy 17 (2): 233–79.
Horn, Henrik, and Petros C. Mavroidis, eds. 2003. The
WTO Case Law of 2001. Cambridge and New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Horn, Henrik, and Petros C. Mavroidis. 2011.
“WTO Dispute Settlement Database.” http://www.
worldbank.org/trade/wtodisputes.
Horn, Henrik, Petros C. Mavroidis, and Hakan Nordstrom. 2005. “Is the Use of the WTO Dispute Settlement System Biased?” In The WTO International
Trade Law/Dispute Settlement, edited by Petros C.
Mavroidis and Alan O. Sykes, 454–86. Cheltenham,
UK and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar.
Horn, Henrik, Petros C. Mavroidis, and André Sapir.
2010. “Beyond the WTO? An Anatomy of EU and
US Preferential Trade Agreements.” World Economy
33 (11): 1565–88.
Hudec, Robert E. 1990. The GATT Legal System and
World Trade Diplomacy, Second edition. Salem,
NH: Butterworth Legal Publishers.
Hudec, Robert E. 1993. Enforcing International Trade
Law: The Evolution of the Modern GATT Legal System. Salem, NH: Butterworth Legal Publishers.
Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, Jeffrey J. Schott, Kimberly Ann
Elliott, and Barbara Oegg. 2009. Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, Third edition. Washington, DC:
Peterson Institute for International Economics.
Irwin, Douglas A. 1995. “The GATT’s Contribution to
Economic Recovery in Post-war Western Europe.”
In Europe’s Post-war Recovery, edited by Barry
Eichengreen, 127–50. Cambridge and New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Irwin, Douglas A. 2011. Peddling Protectionism:
Smoot–Hawley and the Great Depression. Princeton
and Oxford: Princeton University Press.
Irwin, Douglas A. 2012. Trade Policy Disaster: Lessons
from the 1930s. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Irwin, Douglas A. 2014. “Tariff Incidence: Evidence
from U.S. Sugar Duties, 1890–1930.” National
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 20635.
Irwin, Douglas A., Petros C. Mavroidis, and Alan O.
Sykes. 2008. The Genesis of the GATT. Cambridge
and New York: Cambridge University Press.
Irwin, Douglas A., and Joseph Weiler. 2008. “Measures
Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and
Betting Services (DS 285).” World Trade Review 7
(Special Issue 1): 71–113.
Itoh, Motoshige, and Kazuharu Kiyono. 1987. “Welfare-Enhancing Export Subsidies.” Journal of Political Economy 95 (1): 115–37.
Jackson, John H. 1969. World Trade and the Law of
GATT. Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs–Merrill.
Jehiel, Philippe, and Benny Moldovanu. 2000. “Auctions with Downstream Interaction among Buyers.”
RAND Journal of Economics 31 (4): 768–91.
Jensen, J. Bradford. 2011. Global Trade in Services:

1227

Fear, Facts, and Offshoring. Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics.
Johnson, Harry G. 1953–54. “Optimum Tariffs and
Retaliation.” Review of Economic Studies 21 (2):
142–53.
Johnson, Robert C., and Guillermo Noguera. 2014.
“A Portrait of Trade in Value Added over Four
Decades.” Unpublished.
Karacaovali, Baybars, and Nuno Limão. 2008. “The
Clash of Liberalizations: Preferential vs. Multilateral
Trade Liberalization in the European Union.” Journal of International Economics 74 (2): 299–327.
Keck, Alexander, and Andreas Lendle. 2014. “New Evidence on Preference Utilization.” Unpublished.
Kennan, John, and Raymond Riezman. 1988. “Do Big
Countries Win Tariff Wars?” International Economic
Review 29 (1): 81–85.
Kennan, John, and Raymond Riezman. 1990. “Optimal
Tariff Equilibria with Customs Unions.” Canadian
Journal of Economics 23 (1): 70–83.
Kim, In Song. 2013. “Political Cleavages within Industry: Firm Level Lobbying for Trade Liberalization.”
Unpublished.
Kowalczyk, Carsten, and Raymond Riezman. 2011.
“Trade Agreements.” In Palgrave Handbook of International Trade, edited by Daniel Bernhofen, Rod
Falvey, David Greenaway, and Udo Kreickemeier,
367–90. Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
Kreinin, Mordechai E. 1961. “Effect of Tariff Changes
on the Prices and Volume of Imports.” American
Economic Review 51 (3): 310–24.
Krishna, Pravin. 1998. “Regionalism and Multilateralism: A Political Economy Approach.” Quarterly
Journal of Economics 113 (1): 227–51.
Krishna, Pravin, and Devashish Mitra. 2005. “Reciprocated Unilateralism in Trade Policy.” Journal of
International Economics 65 (2): 461–87.
Krugman, Paul R. 1991. “Is Bilateralism Bad?” In International Trade and Trade Policy, edited by Elhanan
Helpman and Assaf Razin, 9–23. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.
Lapan, Harvey E. 1988. “The Optimal Tariff, Production Lags, and Time Consistency.” American Economic Review 78 (3): 395–401.
Lawrence, Robert Z. 2003. Crimes & Punishments?
Retaliation under the WTO. Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics.
Lawrence, Robert Z. 2006. “Rulemaking amidst Growing Diversity: A Club-of-Clubs Approach to WTO
Reform and New Issue Selection.” Journal of International Economic Law 9 (4): 823–35.
Lee, Gea M. 2007. “Trade Agreements with Domestic
Policies as Disguised Protection.” Journal of International Economics 71 (1): 241–59.
Lee, Gea M. 2016. “Optimal International Agreement
and Restriction on Domestic Efficiency.” Journal of
International Economics 99: 138–55.
Levy, Philip I. 1997. “A Political-Economic Analysis
of Free-Trade Agreements.” American Economic
Review 87 (4): 506–19.
Levy, Philip I. 2006. “Do We Need an Undertaker for

1228

Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. LIV (December 2016)

the Single Undertaking? Considering the Angles of
Variable Geometry.” In Economic Development &
Multilateral Trade Cooperation, edited by Simon J.
Evenett and Bernard M. Hoekman, 417–37. Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan and Washington, DC:
World Bank.
Limão, Nuno. 2005. “Trade Policy, Cross-Border
Externalities and Lobbies: Do Linked Agreements
Enforce More Cooperative Outcomes?” Journal of
International Economics 67 (1): 175–99.
Limão, Nuno. 2006. “Preferential Trade Agreements
as Stumbling Blocks for Multilateral Trade Liberalization: Evidence for the United States.” American
Economic Review 96 (3): 896–914.
Limão, Nuno. 2007. “Are Preferential Trade Agreements with Non-trade Objectives a Stumbling Block
for Multilateral Liberalization.” Review of Economic
Studies 74 (3): 821–55.
Limão, Nuno, and Giovanni Maggi. 2015. “Uncertainty
and Trade Agreements.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 7 (4): 1–42.
Limão, Nuno, and Kamal Saggi. 2008. “Tariff Retaliation versus Financial Compensation in the Enforcement of International Trade Agreements.” Journal of
International Economics 76 (1): 48–60.
Limão, Nuno, and Kamal Saggi. 2013. “Size Inequality,
Coordination Externalities and International Trade
Agreements.” European Economic Review 63: 10–27.
Limão, Nuno, and Patricia Tovar. 2011. “Policy Choice:
Theory and Evidence from Commitment via International Trade Agreements.” Journal of International
Economics 85 (2): 186–205.
Liu, Xuepeng, and Emanuel Ornelas. 2014. “Free
Trade Agreements and the Consolidation of Democracy.” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics
6 (2): 29–70.
Ludema, Rodney D. 1991. “International Trade Bargaining and the Most-Favored-Nation Clause.” Economics and Politics 3 (1): 1–20.
Ludema, Rodney D., and Anna Maria Mayda. 2009.
“Do Countries Free Ride on MFN?” Journal of
International Economics 77 (2): 137–50.
Ludema, Rodney D., and Anna Maria Mayda. 2013.
“Do Terms-of-Trade Effects Matter for Trade Agreements? Theory and Evidence from WTO Countries.”
Quarterly Journal of Economics 128 (4): 1837–93.
Magee, Christopher S. P., and Stephen P. Magee. 2008.
“The United States Is a Small Country in World
Trade.” Review of International Economics 16 (5):
990–1004.
Maggi, Giovanni. 1996. “Strategic Trade Policies with
Endogenous Mode of Competition.” American Economic Review 86 (1): 237–58.
Maggi, Giovanni. 1999. “The Role of Multilateral Institutions in International Trade Cooperation.” American Economic Review 89 (1): 190–214.
Maggi, Giovanni. 2014. “International Trade Agreements.” In Handbook of International Economics:
Volume 4, edited by Gita Gopinath, Elhanan Helpman, and Kenneth Rogoff, 317–90. Amsterdam and
San Diego: Elsevier, North-Holland.

Maggi, Giovanni, and Andres Rodriguez-Clare. 1998.
“The Value of Trade Agreements in the Presence of
Political Pressures.” Journal of Political Economy 106
(3): 574–601.
Maggi, Giovanni, and Andres Rodriguez-Clare. 2007.
“A Political-Economy Theory of Trade Agreements.”
American Economic Review 97 (4): 1374–406.
Maggi, Giovanni, and Robert W. Staiger. 2011. “The
Role of Dispute Settlement Procedures in International Trade Agreements.” Quarterly Journal of
Economics 126 (1): 475–515.
Maggi, Giovanni, and Robert W. Staiger. Forthcoming.
“Trade Disputes and Settlement.” International Economic Review.
Maggi, Giovanni, and Robert W. Staiger. 2015. “Optimal Design of Trade Agreements in the Presence of
Renegotiation.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 7 (1): 109–43.
Mai, Joseph, and Andrey Stoyanov. 2015. “The Effect
of the Canada–US Free Trade Agreement on Canadian Multilateral Trade Liberalization.” Canadian
Journal of Economics 48 (3): 1067–98.
Martin, Alberto, and Wouter Vergote. 2008. “On the
Role of Retaliation in Trade Agreements.” Journal of
International Economics 76 (1): 61–77.
Maskus, Keith E. 2000. Intellectual Property Rights
in the Global Economy. Washington, DC: Peterson
Institute for International Economics.
Matsuyama, Kiminori. 1990. “Perfect Equilibria in a
Trade Liberalization Game.” American Economic
Review 80 (3): 480–92.
Mavroidis, Petros C. 2000. “Remedies in the WTO
Legal System: Between a Rock and a Hard Place.”
European Journal of International Law 11 (4):
763–813.
Mayer, Wolfgang. 1981. “Theoretical Considerations on
Negotiated Tariff Adjustments.” Oxford Economic
Papers 33 (1): 135–53.
Mayer, Wolfgang. 1984. “Endogenous Tariff Formation.” American Economic Review 74 (5): 970–85.
McCalman, Phillip. 2002. “Multi-lateral Trade Negotiations and the Most Favored Nation Clause.” Journal
of International Economics 57 (1): 151–76.
McLaren, John. 1997. “Size, Sunk Costs, and Judge
Bowker’s Objection to Free Trade.” American Economic Review 87 (3): 400–420.
McLaren, John. 2002. “A Theory of Insidious Regionalism.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 117 (2):
571–608.
McMillan, John. 1986. Game Theory in International Economics. New York: Harwood Academic
Publishers.
McMillan, John. 1989. “A Game-Theoretic View of
International Trade Negotiations: Implications for
the Developing Countries.” In Developing Countries and the Global Trading System, edited by John
Whalley, 26–44. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Melitz, Marc J., and Gianmarco I. P. Ottaviano. 2008.
“Market Size, Trade, and Productivity.” Review of
Economic Studies 75 (1): 295–316.
Mitra, Devashish. 1999. “Endogenous Lobby

Bagwell et al.: Is the WTO Passé?
 ormation and Endogenous Protection: A Long-Run
F
Model of Trade Policy Determination.” American
Economic Review 89 (5): 1116–34.
Mitra, Devashish. 2002. “Endogenous Political Organization and the Value of Trade Agreements.” Journal
of International Economics 57 (2): 473–85.
Mrázová, Monika. 2011. “Trade Agreements When
Profits Matter.” Unpublished.
Mrázová, Monika, David Vines, and Ben Zissimos.
2013. “Is The GATT/WTO’s Article XXIV Bad?”
Journal of International Economics 89 (1): 216–32.
Nicita, Alessandro, Marcelo Olarreaga, and Peri Silva.
2013. “Cooperation in WTO’s Tariff Waters.”
Université de Genève Faculte des Sciences
Economiques et Sociales Working Paper 13061.
Olarreaga, Marcelo, Isidro Soloaga, and L. Alan Winters. 1999. “What’s Behind Mercosur’s CET?” Centre for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper
2310.
Olson, Mancur. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action:
Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Cambridge,
MA and London: Harvard University Press.
Orefice, Gianluca, and Nadia Rocha. 2014. “Deep
Integration and Production Networks: An Empirical
Analysis.” World Economy 37 (1): 106–36.
Ornelas, Emanuel. 2005a. “Endogenous Free Trade
Agreements and the Multilateral Trading System.”
Journal of International Economics 67 (2): 471–97.
Ornelas, Emanuel. 2005b. “Rent Destruction and the
Political Viability of Free Trade Agreements.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 120 (4): 1475–506.
Ornelas, Emanuel. 2005c. “Trade Creating Free Trade
Areas and the Undermining of Multilateralism.”
European Economic Review 49 (7): 1717–35.
Ornelas, Emanuel. 2008. “Feasible Multilateralism and
the Effects of Regionalism.” Journal of International
Economics 74 (1): 202–24.
Ossa, Ralph. 2011. “A ‘New Trade’ Theory of GATT/
WTO Negotiations.” Journal of Political Economy
119 (1): 122–52.
Ossa, Ralph. 2012. “Profits in the ‘New Trade’ Approach
to Trade Negotiations.” American Economic Review
102 (3): 466–69.
Ossa, Ralph. 2014. “Trade Wars and Trade Talks
with Data.” American Economic Review 104 (12):
4104–46.
Palmeter, David, and Petros C. Mavroidis. 2004. Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organization:
Practice and Procedure, Second edition. Cambridge
and New York: Cambridge University Press.
Panagariya, Arvind. 2000. “Preferential Trade Liberalization: The Traditional Theory and New Developments.” Journal of Economic Literature 38 (2):
287–331.
Park, Jee-Hyeong. 2011. “Enforcing International
Trade Agreements with Imperfect Private Monitoring.” Review of Economic Studies 78 (3): 1102–34.
Petersmann, Ernst-Ulrich. 1997. The GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System: International Law, International Organizations and Dispute Settlement.
London: Kluwer Law International.

1229

Pierce, Justin R., and Peter K. Schott. 2016. “The
Surprisingly Swift Decline of US Manufacturing
Employment.” American Economic Review 106 (7):
1632–62.
Potipiti, Tanapong. 2012. “Import Tariffs and Export
Subsidies in the World Trade Organization: A
Small-Country Approach.” Asia-Pacific Research and
Training Network on Trade Working Paper 119.
Prusa, Thomas J., and Susan Skeath. 2002. “The Economic and Strategic Motives for Antidumping Filings.” Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 138 (3): 389–413.
Prusa, Thomas J., and Robert Teh. 2010. “Protection
Reduction and Diversion: PTAs and the Incidence
of Antidumping Disputes.” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 16276.
Richardson, Martin. 1993. “Endogenous Protection
and Trade Diversion.” Journal of International Economics 34 (3–4): 309–24.
Richardson, Martin. 1995. “Tariff Revenue Competition in a Free Trade Area.” European Economic
Review 39 (7): 1429–37.
Riezman, Raymond. 1985. “Customs Unions and the
Core.” Journal of International Economics 19 (3–4):
355–65.
Riezman, Raymond. 1999. “Can Bilateral Trade Agreements Help to Induce Free Trade.” Canadian Journal of Economics 32 (3): 751–66.
Romalis, John. 2007. “NAFTA’s and CUSFTA’s Impact
on International Trade.” Review of Economics and
Statistics 89 (3): 416–35.
Rose, Andrew K. 2004. “Do We Really Know That the
WTO Increases Trade?” American Economic Review
94 (1): 98–114.
Rotemberg, Julio J., and Garth Saloner. 1986. “The
Supergame-Theoretic Model of Price Wars during
Booms.” American Economic Review 76 (3): 390–407.
Saggi, Kamal. 2004. “Tariffs and the Most Favored
Nation Clause.” Journal of International Economics
63 (2): 341–68.
Saggi, Kamal. 2006. “Preferential Trade Agreements
and Multilateral Tariff Cooperation.” International
Economic Review 47 (1): 29–57.
Saggi, Kamal, Alan Woodland, and Halis Murat Yildiz.
2013. “On the Relationship between Preferential and
Multilateral Trade Liberalization: The Case of Customs Unions.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 5 (1): 63–99.
Saggi, Kamal, and Halis Murat Yildiz. 2010. “Bilateralism, Multilateralism, and the Quest for Global Free
Trade.” Journal of International Economics 81 (1):
26–37.
Sauré, Philip. 2014. “Domestic Policies in Self-Enforcing Trade Agreements.” European Economic Review
68: 19–30.
Schiff, Maurice, and Won Chang. 2003. “Market Presence, Contestability, and the Terms-of-Trade Effects
of Regional Integration.” Journal of International
Economics 60 (1): 161–75.
Schwartz, Warren F., and Alan O. Sykes. 1997. “The
Economics of the Most Favored Nation Clause.”
In Economic Dimensions in International Law:

1230

Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. LIV (December 2016)

Comparative and Empirical Perspectives, edited by
Jagdeep S. Bhandari and Alan O. Sykes, 43–79. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
Schwartz, Warren F., and Alan O. Sykes. 2002. “The
Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute
Resolution in the World Trade Organization.” Journal of Legal Studies 31 (Special Issue 1): S179–204.
Scotchmer, Suzanne. 2004. “The Political Economy of
Intellectual Property Treaties.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 20 (2): 415–37.
Seidmann, Daniel J. 2009. “Preferential Trading
Arrangements as Strategic Positioning.” Journal of
International Economics 79 (1): 143–59.
Shirono, Kazuko. 2004. “Are WTO Tariff Negotiations
Reciprocal? An Analysis of Tariff Liberalization.”
Unpublished.
Spagnolo, Giancarlo. 1999a. “Issue Linkage, Delegation, and International Policy Cooperation.”
Unpublished.
Spagnolo, Giancarlo. 1999b. “On Interdependent
Supergames: Multimarket Contact, Concavity, and
Collusion.” Journal of Economic Theory 89 (1):
127–39.
Spamann, Holger. 2006. “The Myth of ‘Rebalancing’
Retaliation in WTO Dispute Settlement Practice.”
Journal of International Economic Law 9 (1): 31–79.
Spearot, Alan. 2016. “Unpacking the Long-Run Effects
of Tariff Shocks: New Structural Implications from
Firm Heterogeneity Models.” American Economic
Journal: Microeconomics 8 (2): 128–67.
Spencer, Barbara J., and James A. Brander. 1983.
“International R&D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy.”
Review of Economic Studies 50 (4): 707–22.
Staiger, Robert W. 1995. “International Rules and
Institutions for Trade Policy.” In Handbook of International Economics: Volume 3, edited by Gene M.
Grossman and Kenneth Rogoff, 1495–551. Amsterdam and San Diego: Elsevier, North-Holland.
Staiger, Robert W., and Alan O. Sykes. 2011. “International Trade, National Treatment, and Domestic Regulation.” Journal of Legal Studies 40 (1): 149–203.
Staiger, Robert W., and Alan O. Sykes. 2013.
“Non-violations.” Journal of International Economic
Law 16 (4): 741–75.
Staiger, Robert W., and Alan O. Sykes. Forthcoming.
“How Important Can the Non-violation Clause Be
for the GATT/WTO?” American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics.
Staiger, Robert W., and Guido Tabellini. 1987. “Discretionary Trade Policy and Excessive Protection.”
American Economic Review 77 (5): 823–37.
Staiger, Robert W., and Guido Tabellini. 1999. “Do
GATT Rules Help Governments Make Domestic Commitments?” Economics and Politics 11 (2):
109–44.
Subramanian, Arvind, and Shang-Jin Wei. 2007. “The
WTO Promotes Trade, Strongly But Unevenly.”
Journal of International Economics 72 (1): 151–75.
Sykes, Alan O. 1991. “Protectionism as a ‘Safeguard’: A
Positive Analysis of the GATT ‘Escape Clause’ with
Normative Speculations.” University of Chicago Law

Review 58 (1): 255–305.
Sykes, Alan O. 2003. “The Safeguards Mess: A Critique
of WTO Jurisprudence.” World Trade Review 2 (3):
261–95.
Sykes, Alan O. 2005a. “The Economics of WTO Rules
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.” In The
World Trade Organization: Legal, Economic and
Political Analysis: Volume 2, edited by Arthur E.
Appleton, Patrick F. J. Macrory, and Michael G.
Plummer, 1682–706. New York: Springer.
Sykes, Alan O. 2005b. “Public versus Private Enforcement of International Economic Law: Standing and
Remedy.” Journal of Legal Studies 34 (2): 631–66.
Syropoulos, Constantinos. 1999. “Customs Unions and
Comparative Advantage.” Oxford Economic Papers
51 (2): 239–66.
Tabakis, Chrysostomos. 2010. “Customs Unions and
Special Protection.” BE Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy 10 (1).
Tallberg, Jonas, and James McCall Smith. 2014. “Dispute Settlement in World Politics: States, Supranational Prosecutors, and Compliance.” European
Journal of International Relations 20 (1): 118–44.
Tang, Man-Keung, and Shang-Jin Wei. 2009. “The
Value of Making Commitments Externally: Evidence
from WTO Accessions.” Journal of International
Economics 78 (2): 216–29.
Tintelnot, Felix. 2014. “Global Production with Export
Platforms.” Unpublished.
Tornell, Aaron. 1991. “On the Ineffectiveness of Madeto-Measure Protectionist Programs.” In International Trade and Trade Policy, edited by Elhanan
Helpman and Assaf Razin, 66–79. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.
Tovar, Patricia. 2012. “Preferential Trade Agreements and Unilateral Liberalization: Evidence from
CAFTA.” World Trade Review 11 (4): 591–619.
Trebilcock, Michael. 2014. “Between Theories of Trade
and Development: The Future of the World Trading
System.” University of Toronto Law Working Paper
2014-10.
Trebilcock, Michael, Robert Howse, and Antonia Eliason. 2013. The Regulation of International Trade,
Fourth edition. New York: Routledge.
Trefler, Daniel. 2004. “The Long and Short of the Canada–U.S. Free Trade Agreement.” American Economic Review 94 (4): 870–95.
US Trade Representative. 2010. “U.S., Brazil Agree on
Memorandum of Understanding as Part of Path Forward toward Resolution of Cotton Dispute.” https://
ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/pressreleases/2010/april/us-brazil-agree-memorandumunderstanding-part-path-f.
US
Trade
Representative.
2011.
“USTR
Kirk Seeks Enforcement of Labor Laws in
Guatemala.”
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policyoffices/press-office/press-releases/2011/may/
ustr-kirk-seeks-enforcement-labor-laws-guatemala.
US Trade Representative. 2012. “U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk Comments on Presidential Actions
Related to the Generalized System of Preferences.”

Bagwell et al.: Is the WTO Passé?
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/
press-releases/2012/march/us-trade-representativeron-kirk-comments-presidenti.
Venables, Anthony J. 1985. “Trade and Trade Policy
with Imperfect Competition: The Case of Identical
Products and Free Entry.” Journal of International
Economics 19 (1–2): 1–19.
Venables, Anthony J. 1987. “Trade and Trade Policy with Differentiated Products: A Chamberlinian–Ricardian Model.” Economic Journal 97 (387):
700–717.
Viner, Jacob. 1950. The Customs Union Issue. New
York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Vousden, Neil. 1990. The Economics of Trade Protection. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
Wauters, Jasper M. 2010. “The Safeguards Agreement—An Overview.” In Law and Economics of
Contingent Protection in International Trade, edited
by Kyle W. Bagwell, George A. Bermann, and Petros C. Mavroidis, 334–66. Cambridge and New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Winkelmann, Liliana, and Rainer Winkelmann. 1998.
“Tariffs, Quotas and Terms-of-Trade: The Case of
New Zealand.” Journal of International Economics
46 (2): 313–32.
Winters, L. Alan, and Won Chang. 2000. “Regional
Integration and Import Prices: An Empirical Investigation.” Journal of International Economics 51 (2):
363–77.
World Trade Organization. 2002. “Dispute Settlement

1231

Body—Special Session—Negotiations on Improvements and Clarifications of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding—Proposal by Mexico.” World Trade
Organization Document TN/DS/W/23.
World Trade Organization. 2007. World Trade
Report 2007: Six Decades of Multilateral Trade
Cooperation: What Have We Learnt? Geneva:

World Trade Organization.
World Trade Organization. 2011. World Trade Report
2011: The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements:
From Co-existence to Coherence. Geneva: World
Trade Organization.
World Trade Organization. 2012. World Trade Report
2012: Trade and Public Policies: A Closer Look at
Non-tariff Measures in the 21st Century. Geneva:
World Trade Organization.
World Trade Organization. 2014a. “Current Situations
of Schedules of WTO Members.” https://www.wto.
org/english/tratop_e/schedules_e/goods_schedules_
table_e.htm.
World Trade Organization. 2014b. “Regional Trade
Agreements.” https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
region_e/region_e.htm.
World Trade Organization, International Trade Centre,
and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 2013. World Tariff Profiles 2013. Geneva:
World Trade Organization.
Yi, Sang-Seung. 1996. “Endogenous Formation of Customs Unions under Imperfect Competition: Open
Regionalism Is Good.” Journal of International Economics 41 (1–2): 153–77.

This article has been cited by:
1. Chad P. Bown, Kara M. Reynolds. 2017. Trade Agreements and Enforcement: Evidence from WTO
Dispute Settlement. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 9:4, 64-100. [Abstract] [View PDF
article] [PDF with links]

